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ABSTRACT 
 
For long, historians have considered the telegraph as a tool of power, one that replaced 
the colonial government’s a posteriori structures of control with a preventive system of 
authority. They have suggested that this revolution empowered colonial governments, 
making them more effective in their strategies of communication and rule. In this 
dissertation, I test these assumptions and analyze the use of telegraphic communication 
by Ceylon’s colonial government during the second half of the nineteenth-century; to 
determine not only the impact of the telegraph on political decision-making but also how 
the telegraph and politics became embedded together, impacting on colonial government 
and its decision-making and on everyday administrative processes. I examine telegraphic 
messages alongside other forms of correspondence, such as letters and memos, to gauge 
the extent to which the telegraph was used to communicate information between 
London and Ceylon, and the role that the telegraph played locally, within Ceylon, 
between the Governor General and the island’s regional officials. I argue that, contrary to 
conventional ideas, the telegraph did not transform colonial government practices. Rather, 
the medium became entrenched in a multi-layered system of communication, forming 
one part of a web of colonial correspondence tactics. While its role was purposeful, its 
importance and capacities were nevertheless circumscribed and limited.     
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DEDICATION 
 
Many of Sri Lanka’s major communication systems originated before the country’s 
independence from British rule in 1948. The railway track that lines the west coast of 
Colombo, just east of the rusted barbed-wire fence, blocking access to the seawater, is 
one example. It was laid about one hundred and fifty years ago. Continue the trace of 
colonial communications and board the train going from Colombo Fort to Kandy, and 
feel yourself bounce along the winding, bumpy mountain rail. This line was installed in 
the 1880s to support coffee and tea agriculture. Today it offers passengers an opportunity 
to experience the countryside in almost intrepid style: you are not restricted from hanging 
your body outside the boxcar while the train moves at a snail’s pace over steep cliffs 
overlooking breath-taking tea-covered mountain vistas. When you alight, call home. The 
telephone was also an invention first introduced to the island by the British in the 1880s.  
Also, many of Sri Lanka’s roads were originally laid by the British. Colombo to Kandy 
Road was constructed in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and many roads were 
constructed in the wake of plantation agriculture from the 1830s.  
 
Roads and railroads are quite obvious British communication technologies; they are 
visibly inscribed in the island’s landscape, and no traveler in Sri Lanka can possibly 
bypass them. There is, however, another communication technology, installed by the 
British, which less conspicuously co-exists with modern Sri Lankan society: the island’s 
telegraph network, installed in 1858.  
 
Even in 2012, many companies in Sri Lanka require its employees to request a leave of 
absence by telegram. “Sir, I beg three days’ leave,” is what a very spry ninety-year old 
woman told me she used to telegraph to her boss in the 1950s when she wanted a long 
weekend. And, according to a witty twenty-something year old man with whom I met 
and discussed Sri Lankan telegraphy, the same practice still applies today. “Why?” I asked 
him. “Telegrams, unlike telephone calls, leave an official paper trace,” he replied. Anyone 
familiar with Sri Lankan bureaucracy can attest to this importance. Sri Lankans have a 
paper-centric administrative tradition, which is also a communication remnant of British 
occupation.  
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But what is considered telegraphy today is far removed from what it was in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There are no longer telegraph clerks clicking away 
Morse code round the clock. Instead, telegrams are noted telephone conversations, 
verbal messages which are jotted down by post office workers and delivered by telegram 
couriers. Most telegraph poles, which once lined the island’s meandering roads, have 
been felled since the 1980s. Those that do remain are nothing more than wooden posts, 
stripped bare of their once buzzing wires.    
 
Perhaps, though, we are living in the end days of telegrams in Sri Lanka. On 8 June 2011 
the AFP ran a piece titled “Sri Lanka scraps colonial-era telegram service,”1 which stated 
the potential demise of Sri Lanka’s telegram service that sends on average 50 messages 
per day. The reason given: “Transmitting telegrams using a network of postal messengers 
across the country was too expensive, postal ministry secretary Hemasiri Fernando said, 
adding that they could not compete with phones and text messages for speed.” In 
addition to the announcement, the article highlighted various ways in which the 
technology has been, and continues to be, used in Sri Lankan society. Parliamentarians 
and businesses still send telegrams to contact people in remote locations. Until the 1990s, 
applicants were informed telegraphically of their employment, and hospitals and the 
police used telegrams to inform next-of-kin of deaths and accidents of loved ones. The 
article also stated that “provincial correspondents of newspapers used telegrams to send 
their news reports to offices in the capital.” The telegram service has not yet been 
“scrapped,” however, as the decision to end it is still pending presidential approval. But, 
soon, telegraphy, which has endured in Sri Lanka since its introduction in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, may vanish completely.  
 
This dissertation is dedicated to the preservation of Sri Lanka’s memory of its soon-to-
vanish telegraph system.  
 
 
 
                                                            
1 I dearly thank Neena Mahadev for pointing my attention to this article.  
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Synchronicity brought me here.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “telegram” was first recorded on 
6 April 1852 in the Albany Evening Journal: “A friend desires us to give notice that he will 
ask leave…to introduce a new word... It is telegram, instead of telegraphic dispatch, 
or telegraphic communication.”2  The word, it states, denotes a message sent by (electric) 
telegraph. It is a message that had first passed electrically through telegraph wires, cables 
and magnets; electrically coded information that was translated and transferred onto a 
piece of paper, becoming a telegram. But while this definition serves to explain what a 
telegram is, it does not express what a telegram means. That depends on the context. 
From a twenty-first century perspective a telegram is a relic of the past, part of the 
magical imagination of authors like Gabriel Garcia Márquez and Rudyard Kipling—a 
technology that represents an age of electric communication that humans have since 
surpassed in terms of ingenuity. But, from a nineteenth-century perspective a radically 
different interpretation emerges; in this time, the newly invented telegram was a 
milestone in technology, absolutely breaking with the past in its capacities of 
communication. The steamship, which developed alongside the telegraph, was fast, but 
messages sent by telegraph were approximately 99% faster. The semaphore, which 
predated the telegraph by well over a hundred years, was ingenious, but telegraphs could 
do what the semaphore did and its messages were capable of transcending the hitherto 
known boundaries of space and time. The telegraph’s transmission of messages, almost 
immediately across distances that reached beyond oceans and continents, far exceeded 
the capability of any previous communication device, and telegrams provided an entirely 
new way of expressing and sharing information.  
 
The nineteenth-century British Empire was the unequivocal site of the most expansive 
telegraph network in the world, a network that reached from Adelaide, Australia to 
Europe, and multiple islands and territories in between. The technology was primarily 
used in the empire in two ways: first, it was a commercial tool, being used by merchants 
                                                            
2 “telegram, n..” OED Online. June 2012. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/198685?isAdvanced=false&result=1&rskey=xXiGia& (accessed 
August 14, 2012) 
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and bankers to convey national and international market transactions and currency 
exchanges; second, it was used in the political correspondence activities of the 
government(s) of the empire. In these two ways, the technology was involved in 
coordinating the economies and political enterprises of the empire with impressive and 
unprecedented speed and form. In this dissertation, I focus on the second of these 
primary uses of the technology, its governmental use as a tool of the British Empire, 
detailing one British colony’s government’s use of telegrams in its correspondence 
activities by examining their impact on government practices and on decision-making 
processes.  
 
The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding of what telegraphy meant and how 
it functioned culturally and practically in the British Empire. I hypothesize that the 
telegraph’s lightning-fast communication speed created a number of transformations 
within the structures of imperial power, ranging from the most basic development of new 
communication choices, practices, and changes in language to the more profound 
renderings of shared time and space; and that these changes had the capacity to instill 
new forms of bureaucratic realities, including tighter centralization and weakened colonial 
Governors’ autonomy, and thus revolutionize imperial structures of control from within. 
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the full extent of telegraphy’s new 
communication powers, and to examine its impact on imperial government 
administration. I show that despite its revolutionary capacities the technology played only 
a minor role in colonial government administration; it operated in a conjoined effort with 
limited effect alongside other forms of communication, such as the letter. While its 
function was purposeful, it was nevertheless circumscribed by a system that was tailored 
to favor the imperial mail service, not the enterprise of telegraphy.  
 
I examine Ceylon, the tear-shaped island colony located south of India in the Indian 
Ocean, which received telegraphic technology in 1858. While Ceylon may seem like an 
obscure place to examine telegraphy, it is, in fact, particularly useful for exploring these 
issues. Not only was it one of the earliest British colonies to receive telegraphic 
technology, but also it was ruled by one colonial government, which allows for an in-
depth analysis on a definable, locatable colonial government’s use of telegraphy. This 
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would be a more complicated undertaking in other colonial government administration 
contexts, such as India’s vast administrative complex. Furthermore, studying Ceylon 
redresses a great deficit in the literature on south Asian communications, given that 
studies until now have focused almost exclusively on India.  
 
CEYLON, COMMUNICATION, AND TELEGRAPHY 
 
To highlight the significance of this dissertation’s aims, I begin with a brief history of the 
island and its political organization. Only with this knowledge will we be able to assess 
the implications which telegraphy had on the critical domain of imperial communication.  
 
Ceylon was formally ceded to the authority of the British Crown under the fifth article of 
the Peace of Amiens in March 1802.3  As a Crown Colony, the British Crown held 
absolute control over Ceylon’s legislation, while the administration was carried on by 
public officers under the control of the Home Government. The Secretary of State for 
the Colonies—responsible to the British Government, and thence to Parliament—was 
the de facto highest representative ruling Ceylon. All decisions regarding the ways in which 
Ceylon was run ultimately began and ended with him. All legislative, executive, and 
judicial decisions were conducted under his authority, and all individual acts depended on 
his consent. Given the distance between his position in London at the Colonial Office 
and the colony, the Secretary of State was required by necessity to appoint a 
representative to rule in his place in the colony. In Ceylon, the Secretary of State’s 
representative was known as the Governor General, under whose command was a 
retinue of civil servants and regional administrators. 4  In many ways, the Governor 
embodied the Secretary of State’s authority, as the full extent of his powers makes clear. 
He had both executive and legislative powers, and he exercised nearly all the 
                                                            
3 K.M. de Silva, “Chapter I - The Coming of the British to Ceylon,” University of Ceylon, History of Ceylon 
(from the Beginning of the 19th Century to 1948) 3 (1973): 10; G.C. Mendis, The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers: 
Documents on British Colonial Policy in Ceylon 1796-1833, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 30; 
Colvin R. de Silva, Ceylon Under the British Occupation 1795-1833, vol. 1 (Blacksburg: Navrang, 1995), 249; 
Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule 1795-1932: With an Account of the East India Company’s Embassies to 
Kandy 1762-1795 (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 41; A.E. Buultjens, ed., “The Dutch East 
India Company and the Peace of Aimens, 1802,” in Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register, vol. I, pt IV, 1916, 
237–242. 
4 Be aware that the title of the Governor differed in other colonial contexts. 
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constitutional functions of the Crown within his territory. The breadth and scope of his 
duties were officially declared in the Rules and Regulations for Her majesty’s Colonial Service, 5 
of 1843, and in the Colonial Office List under the “rules and regulations” chapter 
concerning the behavior of the Governor.6 According to the texts, the Governor was in 
charge of everything that occurred in his colony, from the smallest of bureaucratic details 
such as granting leaves-of-absence to the institution of large-scale public infrastructural 
projects, civil servant appointments, dealing with riots, and managing the colony’s finance; 
and, he was even the final verdict on criminal trials.7 However, while his powers were 
supreme in Ceylon, he was still subordinate to the Secretary of State and his actions were 
answerable to his superior’s discretion.8 Although he was required to use his discretionary 
powers autonomously to handle what were considered normal affairs, such as the 
remittance of fines and granting licenses for marriage, he was not allowed to act without 
the Secretary of State’s prior consent on more important matters, such as the declaration 
of war or the assent of rights of Her Majesty’s Subjects.  
 
In reference to all matters, the Governor was required by law to submit a report of all his 
actions, deeds, needs, or wants to the Secretary of State in the form of written 
correspondence, depending on the nature of the situation, either before, during, or upon 
completion of each and every course of action or decision. And, the Secretary of State 
was required to respond, retrospectively approving or disapproving of what the 
Governor had done or was in the course of doing. The Secretary of State could and did 
command the Governor directly as well; and in respect to situations of great importance, 
such as those examples posited above, the Governor was forced to await Home 
government directions or else give himself to the possibility of punishment. It was this 
                                                            
5 Great Britain. Colonial Office, Rules and Regulations for Her Majesty’s Colonial Service (Printed by W. Clowes 
and sons for H.M. Stationery off., 1843), 1–9. Even matters such as granting leave had to be confirmed 
by the powers in London. In cases of emergency like riots or famines, however, the Governor had 
discretionary authority to take immediate action and could disobey unnecessary directions. Still, following 
a Governor’s independent course of action, he had to inform the Secretary of State about what he did and 
all measures remained provisional, not official, until consented. So, while the Governor had the right and 
duty to rule Ceylon directly, the Secretary of State was wholly implicated in the process. 
6 The Colonial Office List (1878), 1878; Arthur N. Birch and William Robinson, The Colonial Office List for 
1867, Comprising Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the Colonial Dependencies of Great Britain: With an 
Account of the Services of the Principal Officers of the Several Colonial Governments (Pall Mall: Harrison, 1867). 
7 Birch and Robinson, Colonial Office List for 1867, 136. 
8 Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule 1795-1932: With an Account of the East India Company’s Embassies to Kandy 
1762-1795, 101. 
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legally necessary relay and transference of information between the Governor and the 
Secretary of State that concretized the Crown in Ceylon, both virtually and practically 
infusing the Governor and the Secretary of State into a hierarchical enterprise of power.  
 
The essential feature of Crown Colony rule, then, was the hierarchically distinct 
relationship of power, between the two officials, where the colony was virtually ruled by 
the Crown through various practical layers of hierarchy and representation. At the heart 
of the mechanism by which this control and power relationship was exercised was 
communication. This is to say, communication, in the form of a technology capable of 
circulating the reports, correspondence, and directives necessary for the relationship 
between the two men and the Crown itself, across a distance as vast as 5,000 miles, was 
the ultimate tool of Crown Colony power; without such a tool, the processes of Crown 
colony government could not or would not function. There is no need to insist further 
then that one of the most important practical matters to the colonial government was its 
communication system: a system whereby the Governor and the Secretary of State would 
be able to correspond on matters related to government, particularly concerning the 
authorization and oversight of the Governor’s authority, and whereby the Governor 
could relate or seek approval for his decisions from the Secretary of State, and the latter 
could affirm his approval and relate his directives. Given these circumstances, and the 
geographic distance between Ceylon and London (approximately 5,000 miles apart), an 
effective long-distance communication system was vital for the operation of Crown 
Colony government.  
 
Until telegraphy was installed on the island, the letter, transported by sailing and steam 
vessels and overland post carriers, was the primary means of relating and directing 
communication relevant to the function of Ceylon’s Crown government. Given the 
nature of transport at the time, letters took on average one month to travel from the 
colony to London and another month to return. Consequently, policies of Crown Colony 
government took months to realize, a duration which forced into effect the outstanding 
measures of power conferred to the Governor, mentioned above.  
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Because of distance, the Secretary of State could not realistically command every act of 
government in the colony from the top down; and because letters travelled slowly, the 
Governor would wait more than two months for a Home response. Therefore, rather 
than wait for the Secretary of State’s commands, the Governor was granted powers of 
autonomous action. Instead of waiting for the Secretary of State to tell him what to do, 
he would formulate a plan of action and execute it and then declare his case to London 
for official confirmation. As detailed in his list of General Powers, this active execution 
of his powers prior to the official command from the Secretary of State was precisely 
what the empire required of the Governor. The reason for this was because letters, taking 
approximately two months to circulate, did not foster a centrally driven system of control. 
On the contrary, letters fostered a different system of control, opposite to a rational 
process, one where control was repressive and reactive.  
 
The letter itself, with its inherent time lag, influenced the scale of hierarchy and the 
decision-making process, inflating the Governor’s abilities of power and deflating those 
of the Secretary of State. Letters had thus a real impact on the power relationship 
between the colony and the Crown. This all goes on to say that letters enforced a system 
based on a posteriori control. Control was not preventive; that is, it was not a top down 
imposition of decisions or a determent and avoidance of decisions considered 
inappropriate or inefficient. On the contrary, letters forced government to take a 
repressive or reactive position, if such a control was possible, particularly over decisions 
already taken and executed by the Governor. The immanent nature of the letter’s speed 
of transmission forced an environment of a posteriori mechanisms, whereby hierarchical 
power was inversely articulated. Therefore, the medium of communication mattered 
significantly; because of the practical limitations of the transmission of letters the system 
of control was forced to operate in a manner opposite to that of the established hierarchy, 
where the Governor had the right to act and then report and the Secretary of State had to 
trust, let be, only to later judge, the decisions made by his subordinate.  
 
Given the power of communication media to influence the Crown Colony’s system of 
control, one might speculate that the agency of the telegraph, with its impressive speed 
and unprecedented forms, reversed this situation, as it provided the Secretary of State 
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with an ability to communicate within a matter of hours. It is possible that the telegraph 
fostered an a priori system of control, where control was preventative and directive, 
therefore ideally representing the scale of hierarchy. This is evidenced by (a) the energy 
involved in the network’s installation and growth in the colony, (b) the colonial 
government’s subsequent application of it in political correspondence, and (c) the 
unprecedented characteristics of telegrams. One might speculate that given these three 
elements the telegraph’s use in colonial government correspondence shifted the dynamic 
of communication as a tool of power, so that the consequential mechanisms of a posteriori 
control were replaced by an a priori method of control. In fact, this has been the 
mainstream presumption sustained by scholarship. I turn now to detail these elements 
and explore their verity.  
 
Telegrams and the colonial government 
 
Ceylon was the second British colony, after India (1854), to receive telegraphic 
communication. Like in India, under the control of the British government, the network 
expanded rapidly and consistently throughout the century. The original outlay of the 
network connected Galle and Manaar, with conveying stations in Colombo and Kandy. 
In 1859, it was extended to Madras, India, via submarine cable technology. From which 
point in time it was expanded to include nearly all locations considered to have significant 
commercial and political importance, including but not limited to Dambulla, 
Anuradhapura, and Batticaloa; in 1900, there were nearly 1,500 miles of telegraph posts in 
Ceylon. In addition to its local expansion, the network functioned significantly as a node 
in the empire’s system of global communication, operating as a conveying station and 
communication mid-way point between the empire’s eastern colonies and the Middle 
East; as the rest of the empire’s network expanded, so too did the dimension and capacity 
of Ceylon’s. 
 
The island’s government, which had installed and controlled the system, began to 
incorporate the technology in its communication activities almost as soon as it was 
introduced. From 1865, the year when it was first used by the Governor of Ceylon to 
correspond with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London, it became part of the 
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everyday communication activities of official correspondence.9 The technology was also 
used locally, beginning in 1876, becoming integrated into the correspondence of the 
Governor and his subordinates. While the colonial state was hesitant to adopt the 
technology at first, by the 1870s telegrams had become an integral component of the 
colonial administration, operating on every level of government from the highest to the 
most subordinate. The colonial government’s energetic expansion of the telegraph and its 
subsequent application of telegrams in official correspondence suggest that the colonial 
government’s relationship with the technology was more than a novelty, but one with a 
long-term and committed view to shift the system of imperial communication from 
letters to telegraphic technology. Given the unprecedented characteristics of telegrams, 
this commitment might have also included an aim to switch from using a posteriori 
techniques of control to those of a priori control.  
 
Contrary to letters, the characteristics of a telegram were favorable to achieve 
preventative and prescriptive power. Firstly, telegrams were a vastly faster form of 
communication; they could travel the distance between the colony and London in about 
four hours. This was a near 99% increase. By the fact of speed alone, telegrams had the 
capacity to transform the current relationship of control, granting the Secretary of State 
the ability to dictate commands and the Governor the capacity to request permission. It 
was not until the telegram that Ceylon’s Governor could ask for advice on a pending 
decision. And, likewise, it was not until the telegram that the Secretary of State could 
intervene on a practical level, checking the Governor before his actions were made. This 
meant significantly less waiting, more interaction, nearly immediate implementation of 
London’s directives, and the reception of essential information from the Home authority. 
Furthermore, faster communication between the Governor and the Secretary of State 
could improve the quality and efficiency of policy- and decision-making; greater speed 
indicated a more interactive and responsive approach to political formulations which 
could entail greater contact and accountability.  
 
                                                            
9 Progress in telegraphic technology, such as the opening of the Red Sea submarine cable 
in 1870, improved telegraphic correspondence across this distance. 
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These characteristics of the telegram, including the ability to communicate information at 
once, and circumvent the letter’s necessary waiting period of several months, implied an 
absolutely new way in which the Crown colony government could communicate and a 
revolution within its system of control.  To clarify how the telegraph’s speed may have 
operated, consider the following brief message that the Governor telegraphed to the 
Secretary of State on 31 May 1873: “I propose in supplementary ordinance to the passed week to 
give 2000 in gratituties [sic] to the impensioned [sic] men of the rifles who would otherwise be sent adrift 
without any means of subsistence.” This message was sent one week before the passing of a bill 
in support of providing gratuities to riflemen. Although the outcome has not been 
ascertained, it shows that the telegraph could be used to influence legislative decisions up 
to and at the eleventh hour. By extension of its speed, the telegram, therefore, offered an 
unprecedented capacity to communicate last minute objections or changes of opinion, 
challenging and removing many of the obstacles, established by letters, that had for so 
long shaped and limited the regime’s relationship of power. But the telegraph’s potential 
to change communication practices was not only a matter of its ability to annihilate time 
and space.  
 
Telegrams were also an entirely new form of communication that, in addition to its speed, 
implied many changes in Crown Colony government. For years, Ceylon’s colonial 
administration circulated political information in the form letters. Letters were well 
written, perhaps not as artful as the Persian letters first incorporated by the British in 
India,10 but in their own way they were eloquent and articulate, and most distinctly, they 
were analytical. They contained a combination of quantitative and qualitative input. This 
was both a matter of convention and rule, as there were strict procedures dictating the 
writing and submission of official letters. Conversely, however, there were no such rules 
concerning telegrams and their operability was free form. Unlike letters, they were short 
and concise, not eloquent, and they hardly contained grammatical precision. But they 
offered a quality that letters did not. Free of rules and excess details, they acted as a short-
cut to communication, where the fact of poor writing was overlooked. The purpose of a 
                                                            
10 Bayly discusses the royal letters of the Mughal Court in: C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence 
Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870, 0 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
76–77. 
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telegram was to convey a message, an idea, not to become involved in grammatical 
warfare and the formalities of letters.   
 
All of this goes on to suggest that the telegram had not only the full support of the 
colonial government but also contained the technical characteristics capable of reversing 
the effects imposed on the regime by the speed of letters and reinstating an entirely new 
discursive system of power. A system based on the telegraph would not prohibit the 
Governor from reporting his actions before entertaining them; on the contrary, with 
telegraphy he would be able to communicate Home before making their attempt. Instead 
of passively awaiting the arrival of the mail, the Secretary of State could command the 
Governor from the armchair of his office and have more direct influence over the 
everyday conditions of the colony. The telegraph, in other words, had the capacity to 
revolutionize the Crown government from within. 
 
But this is a superficial reading of the subject and is just one of the many possible realities 
affected by telegraphic technology. I suggest that, alongside the general idea that 
telegraphy replaced or reversed the pre-existing system of communication, other 
possibilities about telegraphy and its consequences on power relations must also be taken 
into account. In addition to the conventional idea, there were other possible 
consequences and roles of telegraphy in Ceylon’s colonial government; these include the 
possibility that the telegraph (1) had no effects on, (2) complemented, or (3) paralleled the 
pre-existing system of lettered communication. In order to broaden our understanding of 
imperial communications and sharpen our knowledge of the role of telegrams in British 
colonial government, we must evaluate these alternative possibilities.  
 
(1) The telegraph had no effects on the pre-existing communication system: 
 
As well as having evidence to show that the telegraph had the capacity to revolutionize 
the system of control of Crown Colony rule in Ceylon, there is also evidence to support 
the claim that the telegraph had no effects at all. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
even after the telegraph was introduced and used by the colonial government, the system 
of letters continued in use. In fact, it not only persisted, it remained the dominant form 
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of communication used, both quantitatively and qualitatively. More letters than telegrams 
were sent, and the colonial government circulated all matters of government in letters, 
even re-circulating information that had already appeared as a telegram. Therefore, we 
might assume that the telegraph had no effects on the system of control, on the 
relationship between the Governor and the Secretary of State, or on Crown Colony 
policies.    
 
 (2) The telegraph complemented the pre-existing communication system  
 
There is also reason to believe that the telegram did have an important role to play as a 
complementary tool, as the telegram and letter were also seen to have combined to form 
a mutual enterprise of communication—where the telegram provided an extra system of 
communication and the two mediums worked together, not apart. Although the unique 
qualities of telegraphic speed and form would prove extremely useful in the context of 
Crown Colony government where time was of the essence and factual discourse was 
required, they would not overturn the need for letters, nor would they replace the unique 
roles that letters played. The telegraph’s form and speed enabled new ways of 
communicating. For example, telegrams were excellent for expressing short facts without 
the rigmarole of letter drafting; on 8 February 1890, the Governor telegraphed “M Clark 
recommends his son.” This short and informative telegram only would have made sense to 
the Secretary of State if it followed a more detailed letter; but, at this point in their 
discussion, this idea, conveyed by a solitary subject/verb/object statement, was all that 
was needed. The telegram was thus used to complement the letter, to provide something 
that had been lacking in the previous system, that is, the capacity to exercise same-day 
correspondence.  
 
The telegram also complemented the imperial system of communication in other ways, as 
a “meta-media”: a media used to coordinate and complement the functions of other 
media. This was clearly the case in Britain, where the telegraph was first used to organize 
the arrival and departure of trains. While the telegraph predates Ceylon’s railroad, there 
are numerous instances of the telegraph organizing the sending and receiving of the post, 
which is another possible function of the telegraph for which there is ample evidence. 
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The following is an example of a telegram being used to coordinate a letter, from 26 
February 1876: “Please do not appoint auditor till you can hear by mail.” This telegram did not 
provide new information about a subject; rather it postponed the results of an 
appointment that had been sent by mail, yet still not arrived, and permitted the 
Governor’s opinion to become heard. This was beneficial because the letter, detailing his 
ideas, may have been made and sent in vain. There is thus room to suppose that the 
telegram and letter coexisted, working to complement each other’s lacking qualities and 
to make imperial communication a dynamic and multi-layered system.   
 
(3) The telegraph paralleled the pre-existing communication system 
 
There is also evidence showing that telegraphy developed purposes independent of those 
of letters, working outside and in separate domains. A prominent example of this was the 
matter of leaves of absence. In fact, the practice of telegraphing a request for time off 
work still exists in Sri Lanka today. In order to request leave, an employee in Sri Lanka 
must telegraph, not call or e-mail. This is likely a practice dating from the nineteenth 
century, given the plethora of examples when telegrams, not letters, were used to request 
leaves of absence. To take just one of a handful of instances, on 1 January 1889 the 
Secretary of State received the following telegram from the Governor: “may I take leave 28 
days to take wife, serious illness …?”  The Governor would not have to wait long for a 
response from the Secretary of State, who could also telegraph his response without 
hesitation. As a fast, fact-oriented, and to-the-point medium, telegrams provided a new 
language for Crown Colony government that was capable of translating itself in a number 
of terms, ideas, and actions that were not sustainable by letters—situations which 
required immediate and forthright attention were purely the domain of the telegraph; 
hence, the mediums might have operated in parallel to each other, one for everyday 
communication and the other for situations that required immediate attention and the 
occasional emergency.    
 
As is clear from these alternative hypotheses, and the evidence supporting them, we must 
see telegraphy’s colonial history as more complex than the mainstream belief that the 
telegram revolutionized Crown Colony government. In fact, these purposes mutually 
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coexisted, operating in tandem, making the history of telegraphy a fluid one, a story 
stricken with both agreements and contradictions, and with revolutions and silent pauses. 
Telegraphy at times transformed power, while in other moments it complemented or 
paralleled existing forms of communication. Its impact on the system of Crown Colony 
control, in its mediating agency as a tool of power, was therefore highly complex and yet 
subtly charged. How it functioned culturally also remains widely uncertain. And, there is 
much to learn about this dynamic technology in the possession of the colonial state and 
its impact on imperial power relations. This dissertation takes on this challenge in its 
assessment of the topic to draw as broad a perspective as possible on the meaning and 
nuances of telegrams in the nineteenth century.  
 
To summarize its main aims, this dissertation, firstly, assesses the extent of telegrams’ 
impact on the practices of control in the power relations of the Crown in ruling Ceylon 
by directly examining the telegrams used by the colonial government in its administration 
of Ceylon, a methodological approach which has yet to be taken in studies on telegraphy; 
secondly, it attempts to measure telegrams’ roles, level of importance, benefits, and their 
force as agents of change, discerning the extent to which they manifested transformations 
in the colony’s structures of power and the extent to which they did nothing, 
complemented, or paralleled it; thirdly, it compares the functional differences and 
similarities between colonial government telegrams and letters and determines not only 
their impact on political decision-making but how they became embedded together, 
impacting on colonial government and its decision-making and on everyday 
administrative processes. As a final broad but critical aim, this dissertation seeks to 
understand the relationship between telegraphy and power in a colonial context to realize, 
on some level, what telegrams meant in the nineteenth century and how they operated in 
a culture of power’s everyday and extraordinary practices of government and 
administration. To reiterate, Ceylon is particularly useful for exploring these issues, and I 
do hope that a focused study on this colony draws attention to the benefit of examining 
south Asian regions other than India as a point of departure for exploring topics relevant 
to the British Empire as a whole. Doing so enriches our perspective on colonialism and 
on modern history in general.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
To date, there have been many studies on the subject of telegraphy with topics ranging 
from the technology’s application in commerce and trade 11  to its function in news 
correspondence, 12 its impact on language and culture, 13  and its role in imperial 
governments. Given the British Empire’s role in facilitating and controlling a major 
portion of the global telegraph network in the nineteenth century, Britain’s national and 
imperial telegraph networks during this time and later have constituted a part of this latter 
topic. Surprisingly, however, there has been very little attention paid to British south Asia 
and the library of British imperial telegraphy is relatively thin.  
 
Within this rather limited field, there are nevertheless a number of key scholarly texts, 
which can summarily be classified into two categories: first, Daniel Headrick’s books 
from the 1980s and his thesis that associates telegraphy inseparably from imperial power, 
claiming that the former was a direct cause of the latter and, second, studies made on 
telegraphy since the mid-1990s, which challenges Headrick’s thesis of power and the 
telegraph’s ostensible role in strengthening empire. This dissertation fits nominally in the 
second category, although it is unprecedented in two ways. It is the first study on Ceylon, 
                                                            
11  Some of the earliest examples include: John Langdale, “Impact of the Telegraph on the Buffalo 
Agricultural Commodity Market: 1846-1848,” Professional Geographer 31, no. 2 (1979): 165–169; Ranald C. 
Michie, “The London Stock Exchange and the British Securities Market, 1850-1914,” The Economic History 
Review, New Series 38, no. 1 (1985): 61–82. Recent publications on the topic include: Peter N. Davies, “The 
Impact of Improving Communications on Commercial Transactions: Nineteenth-Century Case Studies 
from British West Africa and Japan,” International Journal of Maritime History 14, no. 1 (2002): 225–38; and 
David Hochfelder, “‘Where the Common People Could Speculate’: The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the 
Origins of Popular Participation in Financial Markets, 1880–1920,” The Journal of American History 93, no. 2 
(2006): 335–58.  
12 For example: Toni Weller and David Bawden, “Individual Perceptions: A New Chapter on Victorian 
Information History,” Library History 22, no. 2 (2006): 137–156; Alex Nalbach, “‘Poisoned at the Source?’ 
Telegraphic News Services and Big Business in the Nineteenth Century,” History Review 77, no. 4 (2003): 
577–610; Donald L. Shaw, “News Bias and the Telegraph: A Study of Historical Change,” Journalism 
Quarterly 44 (1967): 3–31; Amelia Bonea, “The Medium and Its Message: Reporting the Austro-Prussian 
War in the Times of India,” Historical Social Research. Global Communication: Telecommunication and Global Flows 
of Information in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century 35, no. 1 (2010): 167–197. 
13 For example: Carey, Communication as Culture, Revised Edition; Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury, “Of Codes 
and Coda: Meaning in Telegraph Messages, Circa 1850-1920,” in Global Communication: Telecommunication 
and Global Flows of Information in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century, ed. Roland Wenzlhuemer 
(Cologne: Center for Historical Social Research, 2010), 127–139; Iwan Rhys Morus, “‘The Nervous 
System of Britain’: Space, Time and the Electric Telegraph in the Victorian Age,” The British Journal for the 
History of Science 33, no. 4 (2000): 455–475; Annteresa Lubrano, The Telegraph: How Technology Innovation 
Caused Social Change (New York: Garland, 1997). 
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and it is the first study to tackle the question of telegraphy by studying the everyday role 
of telegraphic communication in one imperial culture. In what follows, I will briefly 
outline the key texts in these categories and proceed to outline my methodology and my 
dissertation’s contribution to the field of British imperial telegraphy.  
 
Literature on imperial telegraphy began to emerge in the late 1960s and early 1970s14 as 
an offshoot of British imperial history and the scholarship of imperial science and 
technology. 15  Comparable to the contemporary trend in the discourse of British 
imperialism in general, these early works focused on the actions and policies of individual 
politicians responsible for constructing Britain’s telegraphs, acting as biographical 
accounts of the scientific men involved in the engineering and laying of the lines. As such, 
telegraphic history during these years included histories of the politicians, national leaders, 
and engineers who constructed the technology, but little was said about telegraphy itself 
and how it mattered from a sociological perspective. The discussion was reversed, 
however, in the late 1970s following the popularization of a republished edition of the 
until-then little-known work by Harold Innis, titled Empire and Communications (first 
published in 1952), that has since become the cornerstone of communication studies and 
the driving force behind the literature on imperial telegraphy.16 
  
Harold Innis’ work was a watershed. As stated above, previous scholarship on the British 
Empire had dealt with the actions of individual politicians, implying it was the subjective 
decisions of individuals that set the course of empire towards progress or decline. Innis 
                                                            
14 The first studies to discuss imperial telegraphy include: Christiana Phelps Harris, “The Persian Gulf 
Submarine Telegraph of 1864,” The Geographical Journal 135, no. 2 (1969): 169–190; Paul M. Kennedy, 
“Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914,” The English Historical Review 86, no. 341 (1971): 
728–752; Mel Gorman, “Sir William O’Shaughnessy, Lord Dalhousie, and the Establishment of the 
Telegraph System in India,” Technology and Culture 12, no. 4 (1971): 581–601. Technology and Culture 12, no.4 
(1971): 581-601. 
15 The most famous examples of works on imperial technology include: Gerald S. Graham, The China 
Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Henry T. Bernstein, 
Steamboats on the Ganges: An Exploration in the History of India’s Modernization Through Science and Technology 
(Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1960); Carlo Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires: Technological Innovation and the 
Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400-1700 (New York: Minerva Press, 1965); Lucile Brockway, 
“Science and Colonialism: The Role of the British Royal Botanic Gardens in Empire-Building” (Thesis 
(Ph. D), University of New York, 1977); Ms. Lucile H. Brockway and Lucile H. Brockway, Science and 
Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British Royal Botanic Garden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
The former title was based on her Ph.D. thesis.  
16 Harold Innis, Empire and Communications (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). 
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not only offered a completely different topic to the mix, communication media, but a 
completely new lens, a sociological and objective one, through which the history of 
empire could be gauged. According to Innis, communication media were a crucial 
determinant of the social fabric and central to the fact of empires. They were not just 
important because political men required or used them. Communication media were a 
primary factor of empires in their own right; through their own agency they were able to 
influence the rise, fall, and endurance of empires. For Innis, communication media, not 
individuals, accounted for the driving factor behind imperial history. His concept thus 
challenged the views that had hitherto encompassed the bulk of the literature by opening 
the floor to a discussion on empire that sought more than to scrutinize political and 
diplomatic capacities, but to objectively and morally discern the history of empire 
through the organizational basis of its institutions. For Innis, culture and institutions were 
interrelated and both were “epiphenomena of communications technology.”17   
 
To characterize the main ideas in Empire and Communications, I relate here a summary 
written by the eminent cultural and communication professor James Carey, a self-
declared admirer of Innis: 
 
Innis argues that any given medium of communication is biased in terms of the 
control of time or space. Media which are durable and difficult to transport—
parchment, clay, and stone—are time-binding or time-biased. Media which are 
light and less durable are space-binding or spatially biased. For example, paper and 
papyrus are space-binding, for they are light, easily transportable, can be moved 
across space with reasonable speed and great accuracy, and they thus favor 
administration over vast distance. Any given medium will bias social organization, 
for it will favor the growth of certain kinds of interests and institutions at the 
expense of others and will also impose on these institutions a form of 
organization. Media which are space-binding facilitate and encourage the growth 
of empire, encourage a concern with expansion and with the present, and thus 
favor the hegemony of secular political authority. Space-binding media encourage 
                                                            
17 James W. Carey, “Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan,” The Antioch Review 27, no. 1 (1967): 9. 
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the growth of the state, the military, and decentralized and expansionist 
institutions. Time-binding media foster concern with history and tradition, have 
little capacity for expansion of secular authority, and thus favor the growth of 
religion, of hierarchical organization, and of contractionist institutions. 18 
According to Innis’ model not only do communication media determine the type of 
social organization of an empire, they also determine the level of its success; an 
overemphasis of a media with either bias, which was ultimately a technical and moral 
bifurcation, was “the principal dynamic of the rise and fall of empire.”19 This meant that 
relying too much on media that fostered technical state and military expansion and not 
enough on media which favored tradition, religion, and history, or vice versa, would 
ultimately lead an empire to decline. The same he held true for Egypt and America and 
every empire in between. For Innis, a successful empire would have to strike a balance 
between the two media biases, honoring the institutions of both space and time.  
 
For the history of imperial telegraphy, Innis’ work signaled a new way to approach the 
topic, one which would be emancipated from the gravitational pull of politicians and 
centered instead on technology as an autonomous subject of history that could be studied 
objectively.  
 
The first historian to extend Innis’ ideas to the topic of telegraphy, by considerably 
looking at how communication technology related with imperial power, was Daniel R. 
Headrick, whose works from the 1980s are cornerstones for any historian interested in 
studying imperial telegraphy today. 20 Headrick began his exploration of imperial 
telegraphy in The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century 
in 1981, which he divided into three main parts. Part one concerned what he called “tools 
of penetration.”21  Steamboats, for example, enabled Europeans to penetrate lands deep 
in Asia and Africa by allowing river travel; likewise, it was malaria prophylaxes that 
                                                            
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
19 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in 
the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 (Oxford University Press, USA, 1988). 
20 Headrick, The Tools of Empire, 17–42. 
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allowed European occupation of sub-Saharan Africa. Part two concerned military 
technologies, such as rapid-fire guns, which enabled the conquest of indigenous people 
and the imposition over them of European rule. Part three emphasized the major role of 
steam ship and telegraphic communication in imperial consolidation. Although he 
dedicated only an eight-page survey-style chapter to telegraphy, it was an important 
component of his thesis of empire and technology as a whole. The telegraph, Headrick 
argued, was one of several technologies that allowed Europeans to penetrate, suppress, 
and control continents and indigenous non-European populations. In particular, it gave 
Europeans a strategic military advantage and intensified imperial central power in the 
colonies. 
 
In Tools of Empire and in successive writings, Headrick affirmed that hitherto studies had 
confronted the question of imperialism—why Europeans were able to colonize most of 
the world with relative success during the last half of the nineteenth century—from 
numerous angles but always came up short. Building on Innis, he argued that they 
focused on the various wills of individuals, politicians, and other interest groups in the 
imperial project but missed the critical importance of the “tools” under their command.22 
For example, he claimed that the British were able to conquer sub-Saharan Africa in the 
late nineteenth century, not because politicians suddenly became interested in colonizing 
Africa, but because the discovery of quinine and other prophylactics allowed them to 
penetrate the sub-Saharan African interior without dying from Malaria.23 He stressed that 
previous scholarship on European technologies had focused on developments in the 
technologies themselves at the expense of analyzing their relationship to imperial wills. 
There were thus scores of histories, according to Headrick, that thought critically of 
European imperialism, and many that explored European technology, but no single study, 
before his, confronted both concerns at once; and no study before his emphasized to the 
same extent the role that technologies, including the telegraph, played in imperial 
power.24  
 
                                                            
21  Ibid., 3–12. 
23 Ibid., 58–80. 
24 Headrick, The Tools of Empire; See Headrick’s introductions in both: Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress. 
 19 
 
For Headrick, telegraphy was one key to imperial success in the nineteenth century, 
providing greater social changes and increased governmental power than any prior 
technology. It improved the lines of communication which had feebly served empires 
before the second half of the nineteenth century: 
 
Before the 1840s it took 5 to 8 months for a letter to travel between Britain and 
India, and the writer could not expect to receive an answer in less than 2 years. 
Even after steamships took over the mail service, in still took 6 weeks in each 
direction. Within India, the mails were just as slow.25 
 
Telegraphy, according to Headrick, tied the empire into a web of power in which political 
and military decisions flowed swiftly between the colonies and the center, faster than they 
ever had before. According to the author, telegraphic messages took no more than four 
hours to send from India to London, resulting in a number of beneficial consequences. 
During peaceful times the telegraph served as a critical political decision-making tool; 
during times of crises and war, such as the 1857 Mutiny, the telegraph became valuable to 
diplomatic communications and military strategy. 26  According to Headrick, in other 
words, the telegraph reinforced the power structures of the imperial government, 
absolutely making its communications faster, more efficient, and by extension 
revolutionizing the operations of its system of control as well.  
 
But for such bold claims, Headrick based them on little more than conjecture. Rather 
than looking at the telegraph in context, Headrick hyper-focused on the technology itself. 
He based his thesis on one fact alone: the telegraph was fast. For Headrick, it was as if it 
were placed in a vacuum or superimposed on a cultural blank slate. Yet, as I have 
described above in the introduction, this was definitely not the case in the British Empire. 
The imperial telegraph was introduced into a system dominated by a system of lettered 
communication that had unique traditional and cultural practices, logic, function, rules, 
and agency. Without taking this into perspective, Headrick’s view of the telegraph’s 
absolute agency is baseless, deriving from a technological determinist theory, not from 
                                                            
25 Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress, 97. 
26 For Headrick’s chapter on imperial telegraph networks, see: Ibid., 97–144. 
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evidence. Yet, it was precisely this foundationless argument that has prevailed in the 
majority of studies on the subject of imperial telegraphy. Since Headrick, historians have 
assumed that because the telegraph was a technology that permitted rapid 
communication, once installed, all communication sped up, absolutely transforming all 
previous communication practices. The technology itself was perceived as inherently 
transformative. 
   
Headrick’s emphasis on the power of the telegraph’s technological agency became a 
foundational, uncontroversial part of the historiography, culminating over the years in a 
variety of texts on a diversity of related topics. Some of the most notable contributions 
following Headrick have included works by Peter J. Hugill, 27  Jill Hills, 28  and Peter 
McMahon29 in their studies on telecommunications and geopolitical power in various 
national and international contexts. The line connecting the ideas in their works was the 
precept established by Headrick’s views on the unbridled power of technology: 
telecommunication technologies, including the telegraph, were essential in geopolitical 
power shifts and fundamental to the decline of British and the rise of American world 
domination following the Second World War. Like Headrick’s works, they too examined 
telegraphy in a cultural and technological vacuum. Some of the most current works have 
also clearly been influenced by Headrick. As indicated in its introduction, Headrick has 
been identified as a direct source of inspiration for Daqing Yang’s recent publication 
Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883-1945,30 which 
analyzed imperial Japan’s telegraphic network and its role in the East Asian empire’s 
expansion throughout the region. Based on Headrick’s discourse of technology and 
power, Yang emphasized the role of telegraphy in the spread of Japanese influence and 
imperial hegemony.  John Tully’s 2009 article on the ecological impact of Gutta-Percha 
                                                            
27 Peter J. Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999). 
28 Jill Hills, The Struggle for Control of Global Communication:The Formative Century (Champaign: University of 
Illinois Press, 2002). 
29 Peter McMahon, Global Control: Information Technology and Globalization Since 1845 (Northampton: Edward 
Elgar Pub, 2002). 
30 Daqing Yang, Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883-1945 (Harvard: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2011). 
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manufacturing is another case in point.31 He began with Karl Marx’s 1853 observation as 
a starting point for his work, which, interestingly, was reflected in the theoretical 
foundation of Headrick’s work over a century later. Marx wrote:  
 
The political unity of India, more consolidated, and extending farther than it ever 
did under the Great Moguls, was the first condition of its regeneration. That unity, 
imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and perpetuated by the 
electric telegraph. 32 
 
While his article highlighted many current concerns regarding industrialization, history, 
and the environment,33 tying concepts of progress to ecological disasters, Tully’s article 
on Gutta Percha was nevertheless another addition to the growing library on the 
materiality of telegraphy and its agency as a tool of imperial power. To make sense of the 
environment and the effects that cultivating Gutta Percha had on it, he embedded his 
analysis in the discourse of technological power established by Headrick and perpetuated 
by the literature. In their pursuit of extending their domain of power, he showed, the 
British necessarily cultivated Gutta Percha, a key ingredient in insulating submarine cables; 
the over cultivation of the material rendered an unforeseeable ecological disaster. The 
ecological disaster, therefore, was not merely the product of human neglect, but an 
environmental mishap subsumed in the discourse of telegraphy and power. According to 
Tully, the more the empire strived to strengthen its base of power, and cultivate more 
materials for it, the greater were the wounds inflicted on nature. 
 
Over the last few decades there has arisen critical disagreement over Headrick’s work, 
particularly in regard to his association of telegraphic expansion with imperial power. The 
first historian to critically address such ideas was C.A. Bayly in his seminal study on the 
information order of the British Empire, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and 
Social Communication in India, 1780-1870. 34  Drawn together by an impressive array of 
                                                            
31 John Tully, “A Victorian Ecological Disaster: Imperialism, the Telegraph, and Gutta-Percha,” Journal of World 
History 20, no. 4 (2009): 559–579. 
32 Ibid., 559. 
33 For a discussion on the relation between history and the environment, see: Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of 
History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 197–222. 
34 Bayly, Empire and Information. 
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primary source materials, the book critically traces the ways in which the British came to 
understand Indian society, through indigenous social networks and surveillance agencies 
of the colonial state. In it, Bayly argued that before the 1830s, colonial intelligence was 
primarily based on pre-existing systems of knowledge gathering embedded in what he 
called the Indian ecumene, an Indian public sphere composed of various individuals and 
communities divided along the lines of religion and caste. He described the ways in which 
the British infiltrated and manipulated the sophisticated communication systems of the 
subcontinent’s Hindu and Mughal predecessors and adapted themselves strategically to 
their sources of local knowledge. According to Bayly, from around the turn of the 1830s, 
the British began to diverge from these traditional information channels and rely more on 
rational statistical surveys of state-run institutions, such as those used in the fields of the 
army, political services, revenue collection, education, and law. They also began to 
incorporate various new techniques and technologies of information gathering. Print 
media developed during this period. A postal department, a telegraph network, and a 
railway were adopted to support the interests of the state. 
 
Bayly states that this “information revolution” came at the expense of affective and 
patrimonial knowledge which ultimately isolated the British state from Indian society.35 
As the British came to understand Indians in abstract universal terms, through census 
reports and statistical analyses, much of the complexities of Indian society became hidden 
to the state, as exemplified by the inability of the British to anticipate the 1857 Mutiny. 
By the time the revolt was quelled, critics of the Indian state had already begun to utilize 
the new systems of communication to challenge the political and intellectual dominance 
of the British rulers. The author implied that this eventually escalated into Indian 
Independence and partition nearly a century later.36 Among the devices utilized in Indian 
nationalism was telegraphy.  
 
Bayly’s work turns Headrick’s conclusions on their head. In Empire and Information, Bayly 
argues that the “information revolution” in India, of which the telegraph was a crucial 
part, was detrimental to British imperial power in the region; the British were more 
                                                            
35 Ibid., 143, 343. 
36 Ibid., 338–364. 
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successful ruling and controlling their territories before the information revolution; and 
the new advanced technologies at their command, rather than becoming “tools of 
empire,” worked to undermine British authority in both the short- and long-runs. 
According to Bayly’s thesis, telegraphy was not the recipe for power that Headrick had 
taken it for.  
 
Yet, as insightful as his theory was, the fruit of his ideas did not fall too far from the tree 
of imperial power planted by Innis. Curiously, there is a major similarity between their 
theses. For one, Bayly’s insistence on the agency of new communication media and its 
capacity to bring an end to empire, particularly that of telegraphy and news media, can be 
seen in Innis’ terms: that too much space-biased media imbalanced the communication 
media of the empire and thus brought about its end. Without getting too close to details, 
Bayly’s argument is somewhat Headrick’s in reverse. While Headrick said that 
communication media empowered the empire, Bayly said it disempowered it. But, unlike 
Headrick, Bayly did not make this observation in a vacuum, but in the context of imperial 
as well as Indian communication practices and broader social networks. For that reason 
alone, not to mention his plethora of well-integrated examples and sources, his study on 
imperial communications, although limited in its attention to telegraphy, was undoubtedly 
a watershed, influencing at least a few studies of British Imperial telegraph since.      
 
The most exemplary of such cases, specifically dealing with the telegraph’s part in the 
information revolution in India, which Bayly described, was Deep Kanta Lahiri 
Choudhury’s Telegraphic Imperialism: Crisis and Panic in the Indian Empire, c.1830. In the book, 
he examined the construction, expansion, and fruition of telegraphy in the Indian Empire 
from 1830 to 1920, making the most current and thorough historical account of India’s 
telegraph network;37 and, drawing on Bayly’s wide perspective of a technology’s social 
and cultural uses, it gives further evidence of Headrick’s limitations and the need to 
examine the telegraph as something more than just a tool affecting absolute power.   
 
                                                            
37  Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism: Crisis and Panic in the Indian Empire, C.1830 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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Throughout the book Choudhury highlighted British ineffectiveness at managing 
telegraphy and the anxiety and panic which ensued. In the second chapter specifically he 
explains the difficulties which the British faced in using telegraphy as a way of “knowing” 
India and stopping the Mutiny.38 He showed that, at the time of the Mutiny, the network 
was incomplete, marginally connecting only the most significant northern cities. The 
telegraph, he states, was not a technology of surveillance and control as described by 
Headrick and others in the literature. He argues that following the Mutiny the Indian 
government began to improve upon and expand its telegraph network to redress the 
mistake of having a defunct telegraph system during a time when it could have been put 
better to use.39 Motivated by an “information panic”— a term he borrows from Bayly40 
to explain that the British wanted more information while at the same time knowing that 
important and exclusive information could leak into the wrong hands—the British 
government began to expand the telegraph across the Indian subcontinent and into 
transnational and global dimensions, and improve its security and operability both within 
and outside India.41 More telegraph lines were laid and fixed in an effort to gain greater 
control over information. New disciplinary measures and training efforts were enacted to 
enforce greater accountability among telegraph clerks and office personal. Tariff charges 
fluctuated and balanced to meet the needs of its users. Rather than the telegraph saving 
India, as previously thought, Choudhury suggests that India saved the telegraph through 
a sense of panic and an urgency to improve itself.42 
 
Like Bayly’s study, Choudhury’s history diverged from the narrative of imperial 
telegraphy espoused by Headrick. Instead of painting the telegraph as a tool of imperial 
conquest and a source of imperial strength, Choudhury describes it being fraught with 
weaknesses and a cause for skepticism, insecurity, and panic. On this point the author 
wrote: “In its quest for stability and control [the British Empire] did not realize the extent 
to which uncertainty, instability, and information panics were inherent in the system.”43 
                                                            
38 Ibid., 31–49. 
39 Ibid., 49. 
40 Bayly, Empire and Information, 174. 
41 Choudhury discusses this process in chapters 3 and 4 of the text: Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism, 50–
102. 
42 Ibid., 49. 
43 Ibid., 6. 
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The telegraph caused a vicious cycle of insecurity in which more information begot the 
need for more information, and the panic of losing the information to outsiders drove 
imperial needs to secure and expand it. Choudhury’s examination of the telegraph thus 
reveals, in extension of Bayly’s claims, that the telegraph undermined British authority in 
the region and that the over abundance of information led by new media technologies 
brought uncertainty and instability to the information order, not greater power. 
 
Yet, Choudhury’s argumentation and analysis are not perfect. Michael Mann pointed out 
in a review of Choudhury’s book that the author’s argument failed to redress effectively 
Headrick’s theories.44 For Mann, Choudhury’s emphasis on the telegraph in India as the 
point of departure for telegraphy throughout the region falsely accounted for the 
technology’s historical development, and that Choudhury’s view of the technology and 
the Indian Empire as mutually reinforcing agents 45  continued the “old positivistic 
narrative of a progressive imperial power subduing countries and people by means of 
science and technology,” espoused by Headrick and works under his persuasion. I agree 
to some extent with Mann’s argument that Choudhury’s book was too methodologically 
restricted to the confines of British Indian territory even though it was “transnationally 
operating cartels [which] influenced the laying and working of cables and tariffs” in India, 
not national and imperial politics as Choudhury shows. Choudhury’s failure may have 
been avoided, as Mann suggests, if he had incorporated the research of Dwane Winseck 
and Robert Pike, which I will introduce shortly, in their seminal work Communication and 
Empire: Media, Markets, and Globalization, 1860–1930, which had made the discovery about 
the link between the telegraph and its transnational roots, in 2007.46 However, I disagree 
with parts of Mann’s criticisms as well; as outlined in the above assessment of his work, 
Telegraphic Imperialism is, in fact, a far cry from the “old positivistic narrative,” which Mann 
has critically called it. Choudhury skillfully and effectively presented and examined the 
shadow side of imperial telegraphy, and he successfully demystified many of the “old 
positivistic” ideas created by Headrick and maintained by his followers.  
                                                            
44 Michael Mann, “Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury. Telegraphic Imperialism. Crisis and Panic in the Indian 
Empire, C.1830. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke [etc.] 2010. Xii, 277 Pp. Ill. Maps. £55.00,” International 
Review of Social History 56, no. 02 (2011): 341–343. 
45 Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism, 101–102. 
46 Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication and Empire: Media, Markets, and Globalization, 
1860–1930 (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007). 
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Probably the most serious departure from Headrick’s scholarship to date is the book 
referred to above, Communication and Empire. Even the authors were aware of their 
divergence; in the preface they wrote strongly against Headrick and the scholars he 
inspired: 
 
As found in much current literature, the key and distinguishing feature between 
the past and the present is that the advent of the global media system…was driven 
mainly by the logic of imperialism and rivalry among the imperial super powers. In 
this view, the conquest of people and territory provided the dominant logic of 
international relations while the means of communication were, above all else, 
adjuncts of great power strategy. The leitmotiv of this era, then, is what Jill Hills 
refers to as “the struggle for control of global communication.”47 
 
They continued by saying that their book departed from conventional approaches in 
several significant ways. Firstly, it showed that there was no great imperial power rivalry 
in the expansion of a global media network in the years prior to the First World War; 
instead, the development and organization of telegraph and cable systems were 
maintained along the lines of international cooperation, between private agencies and 
business cartels. Secondly, it stressed the hesitance of imperial officials to become 
involved in the expensive and tedious business of formal imperial rule and refrained from 
meddling in the affairs of global media. Thirdly, it demonstrated that it was neither 
national nor imperial politics which determined global cable strategies, but rather the 
mutual cooperation between transnational private individuals and groups. Their findings 
thus dispelled much of what has been written and known about imperial telegraphy, 
specifically in the literature of Headrick and the global telecommunication historians. 
According to the authors, the technology was not embedded in imperial and national 
politics, territorial expansion, and control but was instead a product of complex 
exchanges between capitalism and business. Empires did not construct the telegraphs to 
                                                            
47 Ibid., xv. 
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control its subjects, and it was not a tool of empire as much as it was a device of 
commercial capitalism. 
 
The works of Bayly, Choudhury, and Winseck/Pike, described above, represent the 
general disagreements that historians have had with the central ideas of Headrick’s works. 
They have moved the literature away from the simplistic reading of imperial telegraphy as 
an agent of absolute change and they have filled Headrick’s vacuum with culture, society, 
and practices. Nevertheless, they have all tackled the analysis of imperial telegraphy with 
his methodology. They have all studied imperial telegraphy from an institutional and 
network-centered point-of-view. This means that their records and source materials 
consist primarily of infrastructural accounts and correspondence on the technology’s 
formation, installation, and institution. Like Headrick, their histories have been primarily 
about the materiality of the technology, its construction, its formation, its institutions, etc., 
not about the technology-in-use. They have not written histories about how people used 
the technology and how the technology in turn affected individual lives. Rather, the 
subject of their histories has been the network itself, answering how it was built, by 
whom, and for what aim. But they have paid very little or no attention to the human-side 
of the network and what it meant for those involved.   
 
Quite recently this sustained methodological focus on the institution of telegraphy has 
come under redress. Drawing on James Carey’s seminal essay “Technology and Ideology: 
the Case of the Telegraph,”48 which postulated the telegraph’s revolutionary implications 
in time and space, language, and cultural practices, and its “dematerialization of 
information,”49 Roland Wenzlhuemer’s most recent account, Transforming Global Spaces: 
The Telegraph, Communication and Globalization in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century, is 
the first study to argue comprehensively for a need to study both technology as a fact and 
as a fact in use. His work draws on not just statistical reports but qualitative evidence of 
the telegraph’s use in cultural practices. According to the author, the telegraph brought 
about many discernible changes in cultures throughout the world, an insight which has 
                                                            
48 Carey, Communication as Culture, Revised Edition, 155–177. 
49 Roland Wenzlhuemer, “The Dematerialization of Telecommunication: Communication Centres and Peripheries 
in Europe and the World, 1850-1920,” Journal of Global History 2, no. 3 (2007): 345–372. 
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been neglected by historians concentrated primarily on infrastructural data. To observe 
these cultural changes, he suggested, one must observe the telegraphic exchanges 
manifested by the technology and attempt to locate how the technology affected 
individual users.  
 
His example about Lord and Lady Mayo makes a good case in point, showing his attempt 
to describe the telegraph’s capacity to impact cultural practices. Telegraphing to her 
husband in Simla from John Pender’s (Chairman of the British Indian Submarine 
Company) soiree at 10.34 p.m. on 23 June 1870, Lady Mayo wrote:  
 
In availing myself of the Submarine Cable I feel the obligation which science imposes upon the 
world. Not only does it serve political interests, but assists domestic relations in thus enabling me to 
send you almost instantaneously an affectionate greeting from your wife and family.50 
 
Given the time difference, the message found her husband still in bed and unable to reply 
until nearly two hours later. Presumably awoken with the message at around 5 a.m., he 
responded curtly: “Thankful for your message. I send you affectionate greetings from your two boys, 
and all here.”51 
 
Wenzlhuemer highlighted several ways in which this exchange was illustrative of the 
technology’s impact on culture in the nineteenth century and why studying such 
exchanges provides valuable insight into the history of the technology. Firstly, divided by 
vast geographic distances, the husband and wife were nevertheless capable of sharing 
time. Secondly, Lord Mayo’s curtness indicated how telegraphy began to affect language, 
making it shorter and direct. And, thirdly, it also showed that telegraphy’s impact on 
society was asymmetrical. The obvious asymmetry was in the language of Lady Mayo’s 
message, indicative of a gender division, reflecting how “distinguished women were 
expected to express themselves in Victorian society.”52 That her message was well written 
and polite, despite the technology’s linguistic shift, apparent in her husband’s telegram, 
                                                            
50 Roland Wenzlhuemer, “Transforming Global Spaces: The Telegraph, Communication and Globalization in the 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century” (University of Heidelberg, 2010), 19. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 20. 
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shows that the technology’s capacity to force users to write shorter messages was not 
universally received. Relying on infrastructural data alone, argued Wenzlhuemer, we 
would miss out on such cultural changes and relations between the telegraph and society, 
changes which have hitherto been lacking in the literature on empire. This dissertation 
picks up from Wenzlhuemer’s mark to create the first ever in-depth study of one imperial 
culture’s everyday use of telegraphy. 
 
To recap, the history of imperial telegraphy dates back to the 1950s but became popular 
in the 1980s with Daniel R. Headrick’s groundbreaking studies on technology and empire. 
His work has since triggered a lively discussion on the relationship between imperial 
telegraphy and power, one which has summoned a number of complex and well-
researched opinions. In Headrick’s view, the telegraph was a tool of power; the empire 
installed it, an unprecedented and by any contemporary standards revolutionary 
technology, which strengthened and transformed its power and capacity to control and 
conquer. A number of studies have challenged this simplistic and technologically 
determined view of the telegraph, claiming that the telegraph was actually incumbent in 
the process of decolonization in India, was a tool that brought forth panic to the empire, 
and that transnational commercial interests, not imperial ones, were the driving force 
behind telegraphic expansion.  
 
These arguments, including Headrick’s, are sustained by a common denominator. They 
unanimously focus on the technological and institutional aspects of the technology and 
have paid very little attention to the telegraph’s cultural practices. For this reason, the 
discussion on telegraphy’s relation to imperial power has remained limited, a limitation 
which has recently been redressed by Roland Wenzlhuemer’s redirection of the field into 
the domains of culture and society. In order to understand how “powerful” the telegraph 
was, he claimed we must take into account how the technology was used in practice and 
how this use was tied to the domains of power. Analyzing telegraph wires and lines can 
only get us so far. We must also look to see how people used the technology. Paralleling 
Wenzlhuemer’s recommended methodological approach to the topic, my study explores 
the British Empire’s use of telegraphy, rather than its telegraph network alone. Unlike his 
study, however, this dissertation examines the culture of the British Empire’s telegraphic 
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communication by examining in detail the telegrams that were used at the time in order 
to understand their practical and daily application. Only through such a focused study can 
we begin to fully understand the complex relationship between the telegraph and power 
in the British Empire.  
 
SOURCES 
 
Given the centrality of telegrams to this dissertation, locating and obtaining observable 
and legible source materials were of utmost importance. Since this dissertation studies the 
function, purpose, and information of telegrams used by Ceylon’s nineteenth-century 
government, it is therefore concerned with colonial government source materials 
themselves. Satisfying this concern required an analysis of materials which are contained 
in the public archive holdings of Ceylon’s colonial government from the period, which 
are currently located in London and Sri Lanka. The primary source materials necessary 
for this study include select documents from the British colonial records of Ceylon, 
found at the National Archives in Kew, London, and the Department of National 
Archives Sri Lanka in Colombo. They include records from the colonial government’s 
correspondence during Britain’s control of the colony, containing letters, memos, 
minutes, telegrams, and other published and non-published materials. The records for 
Ceylon’s colonial government held at the National Archives in London consist of, among 
other sources, letters between the Governor and British government departments, 
particularly the Colonial Office, which was home to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. The Department of National Archives Sri Lanka in Colombo carries the 
records of the colonial government of Ceylon, including the Governor’s correspondence 
and correspondence between him and the various colonial government departments and 
local government agents.53  
                                                            
53 Sources: 
In researching and writing the dissertation, I have surveyed a variety of British colonial records pertaining 
to Ceylon’s colonial government administration and telegraph network. At the National Archives in 
London I examined record groups: 
1. CO/54 “Colonial Office and Predecessors: Ceylon, Original Correspondence,” 
2. CO/337 “Register of Correspondence,” 
3. CO/56 “Ceylon: Acts,” and 
4. CO/59 “Blue Books of Statistics.” 
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There was a significant difference between the state of materials in London and Colombo 
which naturally limited the scope of my analysis. At the former’s institution of records, 
official correspondence was organized and bounded, and telegrams were found organized 
in betwixt the pages of letters and other correspondence materials. There, telegrams were 
treated precisely as letters. This juxtaposition of the mediums left in their original state 
allowed me to compare the flow, content, and timing of telegrams alongside letters, 
which as I will shortly explain, was essential to my methodology. This was not the case 
for the records found in Colombo. Telegrams in this location had been separated from 
their original correspondence, and were not recorded in the correspondence lists. 
Furthermore, many telegrams were missing and no telegrams after 1886 could be found. 
This meant that while I was able to construct a very focused and analytical interpretation 
of telegrams and their use in the channel of communication between the Governor and 
the Secretary of State, I was not able to make the same treatment of the sources related to 
Ceylon’s local administration. In light of these limitations, my methodology took a two 
part case-study approach; I was able to analyze in depth the system of official 
correspondence, that is, the international communication, and unravel the function of 
telegrams in the island, despite having limited conditions, by contextualizing local 
communication in several locatable case studies.      
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
At the Department of National Archives Sri Lanka, in Colombo, Sri Lanka, I examined, from record 
group 6, record numbers: 
1. 2463 “1858 Inspector of Telegraph Reports,” 
2. 2591 “1860 Inspector of Telegraph Reports,” 
3. 2601 “Shipping Intelligence received from Electric Telegraph Office,” 
4. 8127 “1886 Telegrams,” 
5. 6545 “1876-1881 Telegrams (Local) Part 1,” 
6. 6545 “1876-1881 Telegrams (Local) Part 2,” 
7. 6869 “1882-83 Telegrams (Local).” 
From record group 10, I analyzed record numbers: 
1. 70 “Letters and Statements to the Telegraph Superintendent, 1858-1872,” 
2. 166 “Correspondence regarding introduction of telegraph 1852-54,” and 
3. 208 “Telegrams from Galle to Colombo, 1858” 
At the Sri Lanka National Archives, I also examined “Ceylon’s Administration Reports,” pertaining to the 
sections on the Telegraph and Postal Department for the period under consideration, beginning in 1867. 
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METHODS 
 
As my first case study, I focused on the most available, official correspondence, including 
any and all official communication between Ceylon’s Governor and the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. Telegrams had become a regular component of official correspondence 
in Ceylon’s government since 1860, especially during the decades following the 
completion of the Indo-European submarine cable in 1870. The first case study, set in 
chapter three, examines official correspondence telegrams, in relation to more traditional 
forms of official correspondence communication, such as letters and minute sheets, to 
assess their specific functions and the extent to which they benefited Ceylon’s colonial 
government administration and its communication practices. The flow of telegrams 
between the colony and the center were regular and appeared consistently in tandem with 
letters. This case study thus enabled me to ascertain how telegrams operated at the 
highest levels of colonial government and to determine how they functioned in an 
everyday capacity in an everyday administrative context. 
 
To make use of the telegrams located in Sri Lanka’s archives, the second case study 
focused on local events where locatable telegrams were used. Purposefully, these local 
events were chosen to include the antithesis of the everydayness of official 
correspondence telegrams. Rather than being about everyday operations of the 
administration, these events were moments of crises, specifically in relation to three cases: 
the cholera epidemic of 1877-8, the Kotahena Riot of 1883, and the collapse of the 
Oriental Bank Corporation in 1884. These events, each in unique ways, posed significant 
challenges to British authority in the region and pressed the colonial government 
administration to respond with urgency and speed. This environment of emergency was 
implicitly the breeding ground for speedy reactions by the state and therefore presents 
the opportune moments to make use of telegraphic communication. By setting up the 
structure of the dissertation along the lines of these case studies, I was able to overcome 
the difficulty of having limited access to materials; I was able to include local materials; 
and I was able to establish a comparative structure through which I could judge the role 
of telegrams during everyday correspondence and crisis related activities. Doing so thus 
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provided me with a well-rounded approach to the topic that has enabled rich 
interpretative conclusions and scientific assessments.  
 
The dissertation’s treatment of its source materials in these case studies is an essential 
part of its methodology, as source materials themselves and their operation are its main 
focus and concern. Therefore, I have taken careful steps to ensure that the sources 
received the most in-depth attention as possible.  The approach I have taken is my own 
design, and I call it “Inter-media analysis.” I have developed it for this study specifically 
to meet the aims of the dissertation, which is to analyze the role of telegrams in Ceylon’s 
colonial administration. Inter-media analysis, as its name implies, is the analysis of one 
media in relation to another media. Its purpose is to draw meaning about one media by 
comparing its content/language and materiality to that of another.54 This methodology 
worked well for this dissertation which is specifically concerned with how telegrams 
functioned in the context of a colonial administration that had predominately 
communicated via other forms of media for decades. Studying telegrams naturally calls 
into question the efficacy of other media and other forms of communication technology. 
Moreover, Inter-media analysis enabled me to gauge the degree of impact that the 
telegrams had on individual processes and practices and on the system as a whole, and to 
determine how they fared in relation to other media. To practically make use of inter- 
media content analysis, I have drawn from sample sets of telegrams, letters, and their 
official copies from the colonial office records and related holdings pertaining to the 
period under consideration. I then analyzed their content, language, and materiality to 
ascertain how they differed and compared. I looked for similarities and differences in the 
                                                            
54 Content is the subject, purpose, and tone of a message and language are the words, grammar, syntax, 
punctuation, and style in which the message appeared. In plain terms, content was what was said and 
language was how it was said; in essence, they combined to form the message itself, not taking into 
account the materials they appeared on or the conditions in which they were transmitted. The content 
and language of a message served two main purposes. Firstly, they served practical purposes: they were 
the format through which colonial government communicated; they were how information was shared 
and processed. Secondly, they served representational purposes: they constituted the formal aspects of 
colonial government; the signature, respectful words, and cordial headings and closings were all 
fundamental components of correspondence which were the discursive methods of representing the 
formality of Crown Government. Materiality is the physical substance on and by which the messages were 
transferred. For example, telegrams were electric-coding before the message was transferred onto thin 
square sheets of paper, written in ink. Letters were standardized, made of special parchment, and shipped 
via postal carrier. Materiality also included the mode by which the messages were transferred: horseback, 
telegraph wires, steamer, runners, etc. Materiality was thus the object of the message, or what McLuhan 
might have called the medium, the mode or means of the message.   
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subjects the two messages communicated, in the language through which they 
communicated, and in the function of the materiality on and by which they were 
communicated. My analysis was contextualized in the case studies above described.  
 
In line with Wenzlhuemer’s study, this dissertation also departs from the literature by 
taking a methodological shift. I study telegrams, rather than telegraphs, to ascertain how 
the technology was used and impacted on the culture of Ceylon’s nineteenth century 
colonial administration. It is thus the first focused account of the telegraph to assess a 
purely qualitative analysis of telegrams. And, unlike other works, this dissertation focuses 
on the role of telegraphy in the context of colonial government administration. This 
allows for an in-depth analysis on the relationship between technology and power. 
Drawing from John W. Cell’s study on the Colonial Office,55 in which he argued that the 
great dividing point in nineteenth-century colonial administration was the telegraph—but 
did not go into great detail on the subject or show how the technology was incorporated 
into the machinery of government—a primary focus of this dissertation is the adaption 
and utility of telegrams in official correspondence at the Colonial Office.56 The everyday 
administrative processes at the Colonial Office, much more significantly than military 
control and police forces, ruled the empire. It was the administrative decisions there that 
determined the operation of most British colonies, covering issues ranging from revenue 
collection to building permission, policy making, and the livelihoods of colonial agents, 
which were the keystone problems the British Empire faced on a day-to-day basis. Thus, 
by examining telegrams in colonial government administration at the Colonial Office the 
study probes the heart of British imperialism, and the technology’s utility in it, in ways 
which have thus far not been possible by a sustained emphasis on the technology’s 
function in military movements and other extraordinary, one-off, circumstances. 
Secondly, rather than concentrating on telegraph networks and their cables to discern 
results and assess imperial relationships, as nearly all previous scholarship including 
Choudhury and Winseck and Pike has done, this dissertation analyzes the content of 
telegraphic communication, known aptly as telegrams. By studying telegrams, rather than 
                                                            
55 John W. Cell, British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
56 Ibid., 43. 
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cables, it becomes possible to see how telegraphy really functioned in the empire, to 
understand what topics they were used to communicate, and, by relating them to other 
forms of communication such as letters, to draw out and compare its meaning to the 
empire. Thus, the study evaluates telegraphy from a content rather than material approach, 
that is to say it analyzes telegraphy as a means of communication by paying attention to 
the information that it uniquely contained and that which it shared.57 It thus differs from 
McLuhan’s preoccupation with the agency of the medium by concentrating, instead, on 
the words, language, ideas, and expressions which the medium contained. Rather than 
counting telegraph poles and wires to determine what the technology ought and ought 
not to have been used for, and by which faction of society; rather than seeing its 
expansion as an indication of its power or of any underlying insecurities; and rather than 
ascribing any normative principles to it, this study reads the messages which colonial 
officials themselves wrote and sets out to determine what these messages meant in their 
particular context. 
 
This dissertation is, finally, the first in-depth scholarly account of Ceylon’s telegraphic 
history. Previous attention to the island’s telegraph system has included brief descriptions 
of its construction and costs.58 And, cursory descriptions of the network have been 
included in a coffee-table style book by Sri Lanka Telecom.59 By examining the telegraph 
in Ceylon, this study extends the discussion of imperial telegraphy to a part of South Asia 
which has until now been ignored. To date, the history of South Asian telegraphy has 
focused on only India and its network. An examination of Ceylon, which was the second 
British colony after India to receive the technology, provides an understanding of the 
technology outside the discourse which has been dominated by reference to only the 
subcontinent. In contrast to Choudhury’s book, this study does not consider Ceylon in 
the context of the Indian Empire60 but instead as a distinct colonial enterprise with a 
unique telegraphic history. This does not dismiss that much of the island’s telegraphic 
                                                            
57 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964). 
58 S.V. Balasingham, “The Administration of Sir Henry Ward: Governor of Ceylon 1855-60,” The Ceylon 
Historical Journal 11 (1968): 43–44. 
59 Sri Lanka Telecom, Making the Connection: SLT and 150 Years of Telecommunications in Sri Lanka (Colombo: 
Sri Lanka Telecom Limited, 2007). 
60 Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism, 1. 
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history was shared between and born within India but that India and Ceylon were 
individual agents that related on mutually autonomous terms. 
 
CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
 
The body of the dissertation is divided into three chapters. Chapter one provides a broad 
historical overview of the invention of the telegraph in the west and in India, and its 
installation in Ceylon from 1857 to 1858. The chapter is unique in that it provides the 
first focused scholarly account of Ceylon’s nineteenth-century telegraph network, 
detailing its construction, the rationale of its outlay, and its expansion. The chapter also 
seeks to understand the reason telegraphy was introduced into the colony. It suggests that 
the technology was installed for commercial purposes, and it delineates the colony’s 
economic transition from mercantilism to capitalism from the 1830s to illustrate this 
point.  Like the roads, railroads, and steamship routes incorporated into Ceylon’s 
landscape in the wake of plantation agriculture, the telegraph too was designed to serve 
the needs of the merchants, shippers, and planters who contributed to the island’s 
nineteenth-century economic development. Although the colonial government was 
involved in every aspect of the technology’s introduction and operation, telegraphy was 
installed for the merchant and commercial communities, not for direct government 
application. 
 
Half a decade after the technology’s introduction, Ceylon’s colonial government 
administration began to utilize telegraphic communication. Chapter two studies the role 
of telegrams in official correspondence, which I have divided into two sections. The first 
section analyzes and details the system of official correspondence between the Governor 
and the Secretary of State, as it functioned before the introduction of the telegraph. It 
examines the Colonial Office’s system of communication and shows how letters 
functioned in its bureaucratic processes. Section two, then, determines how telegraphic 
communication was fitted and negotiated into this pre-existing system. It examines the 
benefits and limitations of official correspondence telegrams in the Colonial Office. 
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Chapter three examines three unique cases of crisis which the colonial government faced 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. The first case is the Cholera epidemic 
of 1877-78. The second case is the Kotahena Riot of 1883. The third case is the Oriental 
Bank Corporation’s collapse in 1884. The chapter divides each case into two sections. 
The first section delineates and analyzes the history of the crisis, and the second section 
provides a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the role which telegrams played in 
the colonial government’s handling of it. In the chapter’s conclusion, I compare all three 
cases to determine how the particular nature of each crisis influenced how the colonial 
government administration used telegrams to mitigate it. The purpose of the chapter is to 
understand the extent to which telegraphy was useful, or even used, as a medium of crisis 
management in Ceylon during the second half of the nineteenth century.  
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CHAPTER TWO: TECHNO-SOCIAL ORIGINS AND STRUCTURAL 
OUTLAY OF CEYLON’S NINETEENTH-CENTURY TELEGRAPH 
NETWORK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a broad historical overview of the introduction, expansion, and 
institutionalization of Ceylon’s telegraph network during the course of the nineteenth 
century. It is divided into three parts. The first part examines the techno-scientific context 
within which Ceylon’s telegraph network was born; it describes the history of electricity 
and telegraphy in Europe and the United States and the history of William 
O’Shaughnessy’s introduction of electric telegraphy in India. The second part looks at the 
political, social, and economic transformations during the 1830s in Ceylon which fostered 
telegraphy’s introduction in the island later in the century. It suggests that rather than 
being introduced to directly serve the colonial government as a tool of power, the 
telegraph was a product of commercial capitalism, a political and economic rationality that 
had replaced mercantilist policies following the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833 
and the rise of plantation agriculture in the same decade. The telegraph, in other words, 
was introduced to serve the merchant and commercial communities which had grown and 
expanded since this time, not to serve the long-arm of the state. The third part provides 
never-before published information regarding the structural foundations of Ceylon’s 
nineteenth-century network. It details the network’s material presence on the island, 
examining the network’s construction in 1857 and completion in 1858, and assesses the 
labor and materials used therein. It then explores the rationale of the network and its 
institutionalization and organization. This chapter thus provides the historical context in 
which Ceylon’s network was established, delineates the purpose of its erection, and 
illustrates its structural dimensions. All of this is important for the dissertation’s 
subsequent chapters which explore how the colonial government went on to make use of 
the technology in its administration.   
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 PART 1: TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT OF CEYLON’S TELEGRAPH NETWORK 
 
The word telegraph derives from the Greek words τήλε (far) and γράφω (write).61 In 
English, telegraph means “far-writer,” and can encompass any type of device that conveys 
long-distance information. Technically, even smoke signals or drumming could be 
considered forms of telegraphy. However, when thinking about the telegraph today most 
people would consider isolated modern offices connected by lines and wires, with clerks 
bent over at their desks, diligently tapping away at strange contraptions emitting clicking 
noises and messenger boys speedily delivering the telegram. They would imagine the 
characteristics of the electric telegraph, a nineteenth-century technology, invented in the 
west—and as we shall see, in India as well.62  
 
Overland and submarine wires, batteries and transmitters: these were the simple 
ingredients that when combined formed an electric telegraph system. What an electric 
telegraph is and how it functions are today questions which any elementary-age child 
could answer.63 All that is required are batteries, an electric wire, and a light bulb. The 
bulb attached to the wire can be connected and disconnected from the battery to emit a 
blinking light, which can be translated into a coded language of the child’s choosing. The 
technology of a nineteenth-century electric telegraph operated along similar basic 
principles, albeit more complexly and socially conditioned. For example, the standard 
Morse-code telegraph system, named after its progenitor, Samuel Morse, transmitted 
messages by sending electrical impulses over telegraph wires. Messages were formed by 
making and breaking electrical contact with a telegraph key, which resulted in an audible 
signal produced by a telegraph sounder, which was then interpreted and transcribed by a 
clerk. The message was then conveyed by human agency to the message’s recipient. The 
                                                            
61 Peter J. Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 25. 
62 There is evidence that a man was trying to invent his own sort of telegraph system in Ceylon but failed. 
It may have been a Dr. Jones Lamprey, born in 1825 in Dublin; he was a Principal Medical Officer of the 
Army Medical Department. SLNA 10/166 “Correspondence Regarding the Introduction of 
the Telegraph, 1852-1854.” For a short biography, see: 
http://www.pelteret.co.za/pdf/numismatics/lamprey_j.pdf. More information is needed to confirm his 
association with the telegraph.     
63 For more information about how a telegraph works please visit and explore the Online Porthcurno 
Telegraph Museum: “Porthcurno Telegraph Museum,” Porthcurno Telegraph Museum, June 23, 2011, 
http://www.porthcurno.org.uk/index.php. 
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order of the operation was reversed for outbound messages. Other models existed but 
they nevertheless operated along similar principles. There were two general types of 
telegraph lines used: overland and submarine. The former were typically uninsulated iron 
or copper wires strung along ceramic insulators usually on the cross arms of wooden 
posts, and the latter were insulated with Gutta Percha and other materials to prevent 
water damages.64 The rather simplistic technology of electric telegraphy, however, became 
one of the most advanced methods of global communication of the nineteenth century,65 
unprecedented in its speed and dynamism. It has been named the Victorian Internet 
because of its impact on everyday global communications,66 and its wires and connections 
have been likened to the nervous system of the human body, providing the electric pulse 
that characterizes modern society.67  Indeed, from its germination in Europe and the 
United States with the discovery of electricity to its manifestation as an institutionalized 
system controlled by both private companies and governments across the North 
American, European, Asian, and African continents, the history of the electric telegraph 
provides a fascinating history. The following is a synopsis of the history of electric 
telegraphy and its scientific origins, underpinning its extension into Ceylon.  
 
Origins of Electric Telegraphy 
 
By the time Ceylon’s telegraph was installed in 1858, the technology already had a long 
and complex history, the origins of which can be traced back to the optical semaphore 
telegraph system which had existed in various parts of the world for almost 150 years, 
since its invention by Claude Chappe at the end of the eighteenth century. The 
semaphore telegraph system conveyed information visually by using towers with pivoting 
shutters that could send complex messages using combinations of simple signs. If there 
was no darkness or fog, it could convey information quite quickly. A message between 
Paris and Strasbourg, for example, took about six minutes with good visibility. While the 
                                                            
64 Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844, 28. 
65 Roland Wenzlhuemer, “The Dematerialization of Telecommunication: Communication Centres and 
Peripheries in Europe and the World, 1850-1920,” Journal of Global History 2, no. 03 (2007): 350–1. 
66 Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s On-line 
Pioneers (New York: Walker & Company, 1998). 
67 Iwan Rhys Morus, “‘The Nervous System of Britain’: Space, Time and the Electric Telegraph in the 
Victorian Age,” The British Journal for the History of Science 33, no. 4 (2000): 455–475. 
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system was used primarily in French territories, and developed extensively under 
Napoleon, types of semaphore telegraphs were used in the United Kingdom with 
Murray’s shutter system, in Sweden, Prussia, Russia, Canada, the United States, Ireland, 
Denmark, and India. The semaphore telegraph proved useful for military and commercial 
matters, such as Napoleon’s Milano campaign. But unlike the electric telegraph which it 
inspired, the general public had little or no access to it.   
 
Also, the history of the electric telegraph extends to the discoveries and inventions of 
electricity of the sixteenth century—when, for example, William Gilbert, an English 
physician, physicist, and natural philosopher, coined the term “electricity”68  from the 
Greek “Ήλεκτρον,” meaning “amber,” to describe the force that two substances exert 
when rubbed together.69 The history of electricity proceeded into the seventeenth century 
when many electricity-related discoveries and inventions were made, such as Otto Von 
Guericke’s development of the early electrostatic generator,70 the differentiation between 
negative and positive currents,71 and the classification of electrical materials like insulators 
and conductors.72 However, the majority of discoveries and innovations that led to the 
establishment of the electric telegraph began in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries. 
 
One of the earliest recorded moments when electricity passed through a wire was in April 
1746, when a chain of Carthusian monks joined in a large circle, each grabbing part of a 
5,400-foot cable, received simultaneously an electric shock when Abbé Nollet sent an 
electric charge through a Leyden jar73 attached to the cable.74 It was not long before others 
took up the experiment in other contexts. In 1747, Sir William Watson, a member of the 
Royal Society, sent electricity through “9,000 feet of earth and water on the Thames and 
                                                            
68 He wrote “electricus” from Latin, meaning “like amber.”  
69 William Gilbert, De Magnete (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1991), 86, 97. 
70 Michael Brian Schiffer, Draw the Lightning Down: Benjamin Franklin and Electrical Technology in the Age of 
Enlightenment, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2006), 18–19. 
71 Ibid., 30–31. 
72 Ibid., 28. 
73 A device that keeps static electricity between two electrodes. 
74 Jeffrey L. Kieve, The Electric Telegraph: A Social and Economic History (Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 
1973), 13. 
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through 10,000 ft of wire suspended at Shooter’s Hill.”75 Benjamin Franklin famously 
invented the lightning rod by attaching a key to a kite during a lightning storm in 1752; 
and, Du Lac experimented with transmitting electricity across Lake Geneva in 1749. All 
such experiments provided evidence that electricity could travel through specific materials 
and seemingly transcend time, a fundamental characteristic of the electric telegraph. 
  
These inventions and experiments also fed continued research into the possibility of using 
the properties of electricity to transmit information. For example, an anonymous author, 
with the initials “C.M.,” published a letter in Scots Magazine in February of 1753, indicating 
that he had invented a machine that could transmit alphabetic code along electric wires by 
using a separate wire for each letter of the alphabet.76 In 1795, Francisco Salva read a 
paper before the Academy of Sciences at Barcelona regarding a multi-wire contraption 
that could potentially send messages by various combinations of signals from a limited 
number of wires.77 Neither experiment was demonstrated publically. But their research 
indicated the possibility of using electricity to transmit information in such ways.  
 
During the early part of the nineteenth century, scientists and technicians turned their 
attention toward the practical applications of electricity, away from electrochemical and 
toward electromechanical signaling, thus making an important step from science to 
technology. For instance, in 1800 Alessandro Volta created the Volta pile, also known as 
the electric battery, which was the first device able to render a steady electric current.78 
Michael Faraday invented the dynamo in 1831, which was a crude precursor to the 
modern generator.79 These inventions made electricity viable for technology since they 
could provide instruments with a constant source of electric energy.  
 
Between the publication of C.M.’s article and 1837, at least sixty experimental devices 
were invented by independent researchers attempting to communicate electrically over 
                                                            
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 14. 
77 R.M. Black, The History of Electric Wires and Cables (London: Institution Of Engineering And Technology, 
1983), 1–2. 
78 Giuliano Pancaldi, Volta: Science and Culture in the Age of Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 247. 
79  Peter Day, The Philosopher’s Tree: A Selection of Michael Faraday’s Writings, 1st ed. (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1999), 118. 
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long distances. 80  However successful some of them were, such as Francis Ronald’s 
telegraph in 1816,81 they did not make it past experimental stages. Governments of both 
the United States and Britain were skeptical of technological innovations and did not 
financially support large-scale telegraphic inventions. Rather, they continued to rely on the 
conventionally established semaphores as telecommunication. For this reason, many 
inventors did not have the means of testing the practical application of their devices. The 
birth of the modern electric telegraph, although scientifically and technologically possible 
since the beginning of the century, did not materialize until the late 1830s.  
On 9 April 1839, Charles Wheatstone and William Cooke— after much unsuccessful 
appeal to the Admiralty and English government—opened the first functioning, 
practically applied electric telegraph line on the Great Western Railway, over 
thirteen miles from Paddington Station to West Drayton. Then, on 24 May 1844, Samuel 
Morse, after experiencing much resistance to his experiments, opened the first telegraph 
line in the United States, between Washington and Baltimore and transmitted the famous 
first words: “What Hath God Wrought!” Both occasions marked the first successful 
application of the electric telegraph in the western world. 82  The five year separation 
between them is explained by the fact that Morse and Wheatstone and Cooke’s 
technologies were developed independently and were distinct from each other in a 
number of ways; Samuel Morse’s Morse code is one distinguishing feature that the other 
system did not have. Interestingly, Ceylon’s telegraph network, created almost twenty 
years after them was not directly based on their models. Rather, it was made of the 
technology that William O’Shaughnessy had invented, experimented with, and applied in 
British India from 1834. Before turning to this part of the electric telegraph’s history, it 
should also be known that by the time Ceylon’s network was laid, the electric telegraphs 
in the United States and Britain became a success, the network of electric telegraphs 
expanded exponentially, and spread to other western countries.  In the United States, the 
40 miles of experimental line that Morse had established in 1844 between Baltimore and 
Washington, according to Scientific American, gave way to 1,234 miles of operable line in 
                                                            
80 Standage, The Victorian Internet, 18–19. 
81  Tal P. Shaffner, The Telegraph Manual: a Complete History and Description of the Semaphoric, Electric and 
Magnetic Telegraphs of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, ... Six Hundred and Twenty-five Illustrations (Berlin: 
Nabu Press, 2010). 
82  Standage, The Victorian Internet, 18–19. 
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October of 1846.83 By 1852, there were over 23,000 miles of telegraph line and 10,000 
more miles under construction across the continental United States.84 Although Britain’s 
telegraphic expansion had been more sober than in the United States, it was nevertheless 
substantial. By 1851, England was connected to continental Europe and by 1857 most of 
its large towns and railroads were linked telegraphically. European countries quickly 
followed suit: France, Prussia, Austria, Canada, Tuscany, Saxony, Bavaria, Spain, Russia, 
and Holland all established, to some extent, an electric telegraph network. In 1857, the 
first attempt had even been made to lay a submarine cable across the Atlantic Ocean, 
which would not be successfully in place until 1865.  
 
But, as stated above, the electric telegraph is not an entirely western success story. Yes, 
the man who created it in India was Irish by birth but the technology he invented was 
specifically tailored to the Indian context and would later be tailored again in some ways 
to fit the particular context of Ceylon when it was introduced there. It was 
O’Shaughnessy’s telegraph system, not Wheatstone and Cooke’s or Morse’s models that 
was adopted and diffused in Ceylon in 1858. When Ceylon’s telegraph network was 
implemented, India’s government, Indian businessmen and merchants, news agencies, 
and military personnel were making substantial use of the already expanding and 
flourishing electric telegraph system that William O’Shaughnessy had erected and 
maintained since 1851.    
 
The History of the British Empire’s Telegraph Network in India 
 
While Morse’s and Wheatstone/Cooke’s telegraph systems spread throughout the United 
States and Europe, William O’Shaughnessy of the East India Company conceptualized, 
experimented with, and implemented his own adaptation of electric telegraphy, based on 
scientific ideas from Europe, in British India between 1834 and 1851. Because he was 
working outside Britain, O’Shaughnessy did not have the right to patent his device and its 
adoption was limited to the frontiers of British India.  
 
                                                            
83 Scientific American, October 10, 1846, 17–24. 
84 Standage, The Victorian Internet, 58–59. 
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William O’Shaughnessy was born in Ireland in 1809. Although not as far a leap as Samuel 
Morse had made from mediocre painter to acclaimed electrician and inventor of modern 
telegraphy, O’Shaughnessy had become interested in telegraphy after graduating in 
surgery and chemistry at the University of Edinburgh’s Medical School in 1829 and sailing 
to India in 1833 to begin a career as a surgeon of the East India Company.85 His list of 
achievements is notable. In 1833 he became Professor of Chemistry at the Medical 
College in Calcutta and from 1837 he was a member, and later chairman, of the Royal 
Asiatic Society of Bengal. In 1834, O’Shaughnessy obtained a high-ranking position at the 
Calcutta Mint. 86  Prior to his involvement in the development of telegraphy, he had 
invented an advanced type of electric motor, the silver chloride battery, and “had 
acquitted himself of a controversy with Faraday, Daniell, and Wheatstone concerning 
lightning rods of his own design.” 87  Because of his diverse range of talents and 
competence, coupled with the demonstrations of his experiments in Calcutta Salons and 
at select government gatherings, O’Shaughnessy gained administrative support and 
financial backing for his experiments from donors.88 O’Shaughnessy began to experiment 
with telegraphy between 1834 and 1837 and in 1839 he made the first public 
demonstration of his research. He constructed and successfully deployed a 20-kilometer 
telegraph line, part of which went through the River Hugli near Calcutta, to transmit a 
message.  
 
Although the experiment was a success, it did not signal the immediate espousal of the 
technology by the Indian government. Like in Britain and the United States, British 
Indian Officials were not initially interested in using telegraphic communication. Unlike in 
Britain and the United States, however, the technology was not presented to the 
government and refused on the grounds of unnecessary public expenditure; rather, in 
                                                            
85 Both Morse and O’Shaughnessy followed a divergent path if compared to William Cooke, who had 
been introduced to telegraphy at Heidelberg University by Professor Münke’s lectures that included the 
demonstration of a telegraphic device on the principles introduced by Baron Schilling in 1835; and 
Charles Wheatstone, who had already worked closely on topics of optics and electricity well before Cooke 
proposed the idea to him of commercial telegraphy. 
86  Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism: Crisis and Panic in the Indian Empire, C.1830 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 16. 
87 Mel Gorman, “Sir William O’Shaughnessy, Lord Dalhousie, and the Establishment of the Telegraph 
System in India,” Technology and Culture 12, no. 4 (1971): 582. 
88 Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism, 16. 
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India, O’Shaughnessy’s telegraph was confined to audiences among the academic circles 
of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal and until Governor-General Lord Dalhousie (1847-
1856) took office in Calcutta, neither military nor civil administrators regarded the electric 
telegraph as a viable means of long-distance communication, especially since 89  a 
semaphore system had already been in operation in Bengal and Bihar since the 1820s.90  
 
Figure 1. Notice the semaphore tower on top of the central hill. A sketch, pen and ink on paper, titled, 
“View of the village of Silwar (Bihar) at the foot of the hill with signaling tower.13 February 1823.” 
Source: British Library. 
http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/apac/other/019wdz000002060u00028000.html 
 
In 1850, the East India Company’s Court of Directors agreed to establish an 82 mile 
experimental telegraph line from Calcutta to Kedgeree. The decision was approved 
                                                            
89 Governor General Dalhousie’s career was marked by territorial expansion and acquisitions. As well as 
being considered a lucid, strategic, detailed, and indefatigable administrator, Dalhousie was also a 
“modern” visionary who implemented a number of measures and technologies to secure and consolidate 
newly annexed territories in India. Among these included the railway, military educational reforms, and 
after some advocating and proposal from the inventor, the adoption of O’Shaughnessy’s telegraph 
technology.  It was during Dalhousie’s modernization of India that the telegraph, along with many other 
nineteenth century technologies, was implemented.  
90 An India-wide semaphore system, seriously considered from 1820 to 1830 by the East India Company, 
never materialized.  
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enthusiastically by Dalhousie—who regarded it as a matter of British national interest and 
an imperial investment in the promotion of uniform management and authority—and 
duly executed by O’Shaughnessy. The experiment proved successful and Dalhousie 
approved O’Shaughnessy’s plans to extend the network throughout India.  
 
The first telegraph line in India went from Alipore to Diamond Harbour, three miles 
south of Calcutta, and was operable by 8 March 1851. The line was opened to the public 
on 5 December 1851 and the semaphore telegraphs were removed. Large-scale 
construction of India’s telegraph network began on 1 November 1853 91  and was 
completed on the 31st of December 1854 and opened to the public on 1 February 1855.92 
Like the main railway lines constructed later, the telegraph replicated established patterns 
of Mughal information routes, which had since become sites of British administration and 
military cantonments. The trunk line of the network followed the arterial road from 
Dhaka to Peshawar. There was a branch line that connected the previous Mughal 
residence of Agra with Bombay which, being close to Surat, was once one of the most 
important port cities of the Mughal Empire. From Bombay, a line crossed the peninsula 
towards Madras and Chennai. From a bird’s-eye-view, the network was “Z” shaped and 
connected all major British settlements and places of colonial authority. The original 
network consisted of 3,000 miles of telegraph line. Both English and Indian mercantile 
communities made extensive use of the network and within the first year of the 
technology’s operation, Indians accounted for one-third of all messages sent.93      
 
O’Shaughnessy’s telegraph system differed from those in the United States, Britain, and 
Europe in a number of substantial ways. Firstly, the signaling instrument that was used, 
which by 1853 had matured into the Single Needle Horizontal telegraph, replaced the 
English Vertical needle and the American Dotter.94 Because of the rapid polarization of 
the magnetic needle, especially during monsoons, western-style instruments were not 
                                                            
91  Choudhury, “Beyond the Reach of Monkeys and Men’? O’Shaughnessy and the Telegraph in India C. 
1836-56,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 37, no. 3 (2000): 348. 
92 Gorman, “Sir William O’Shaughnessy, Lord Dalhousie, and the Establishment of the Telegraph System 
in India,” 594. 
93 Ibid., 597. 
94  In 1857, Morse’s signaling instrument replaced O’Shaughnessy’s. 
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sufficient for the Indian environment.95 Secondly, O’Shaughnessy used materials from 
India. Bamboo, a flexible and cheaper alternative to timber posts, was used to construct 
the telegraph poles. Iron rods transported by Indian elephants and produced by local 
forgers were used instead of wires since they were not as susceptible to damage from 
“gusts of wind or ordinary mechanical violence,” which was thought to prevail in the 
subcontinent. Thirdly, O’Shaughnessy employed his own brand of platinum and zinc 
plated batteries in his system. Finally, local Indians, not Europeans, produced the electric 
devices used in telegraphy—for example, Messrs. Grindle and Crible in Calcutta—and 
constituted the bulk of labor used in erecting the network.96 O’Shaughnessy’s telegraph 
system was, therefore, not a product of west-to-east technological expansion. Instead, it 
was a device that was created within and applied to the particular context of India by 
Indian materials and peoples.97 
 
 By the end of Dalhousie’s administration in 1856, O’Shaughnessy had become the 
superintendent of the Indian Telegraph Department, which was a unique government 
department for operating, maintaining, and managing India’s telegraphs. Also, the basic 
structure of the Indian telegraph system had been laid, over 4,000 miles of telegraph were 
in operation, and the entire line from Sagar Island, off the coast of Calcutta, to the 
military cantonments—located in northern and central India—and Peshawar was 
complete.98 And the network expanded throughout the subcontinent and the century. In 
1856, the Indian government set its sights on connecting its Madras lines to Galle in 
Ceylon, one of the most significant port cities in the Indian Ocean region and a crucial 
port of entry for imperial information flows. As a result, discussions ensued between 
India’s and Ceylon’s governments to establish telegraphy in Ceylon and connect it to 
India. However, the Indian government was met with the fact that Ceylon’s government 
had its own interests in telegraphy that stemmed from the substantial transformations of 
                                                            
95 Choudhury quotes: Home Department, Public Proceedings, no. 4, 11 April 1850, no. 429. From Sir 
Henry Elliot, Secretary, Government of India, with enclosures including O’Shaughnessy’s “Abstract 
account of the construction of the experimental line from Calcutta to Kedgeree,” and a Minute by the 
Governor General. NAI Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism, 19. 
96 Ibid., 18–20. 
97 Choudhury, “Beyond the Reach of Monkeys and Men’? O’Shaughnessy and the Telegraph in India C. 
1836-56,” 339–340. 
98 Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism, 22. 
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the island’s economy and political culture during the course of the first half of the century.  
The following subchapter explores this issue in detail.  
 
PART 2: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CEYLON’S NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
TELEGRAPH NETWORK 
 
Ceylon’s telegraph network was a product of the island’s political and economic 
transformations that occurred during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Before the 1830s, Ceylon’s economy and political agenda were fundamentally state-
focused and the colonial government did not invest in trade and industry to benefit the 
island’s population. Then, a series of significant events in Europe and within the colony 
influenced the colony’s transition to capitalism.  It was with the rise of capitalism from 
the mid to late 1830s that Ceylon’s government began to invest in infrastructure to 
facilitate and support long-term capital growth. From Governor Edward Barnes’ road 
construction projects in the 1830s to Governor Henry Ward’s £1 million expenditure 
during his five-year tenure (1855-1860) on roads and bridges, his spending on railroads, 
steamships, and telegraphs, and successive governors’ comparable investments—Ceylon’s 
government from the 1830s became actively involved in transforming the colony’s 
population into a vanguard community of merchants and planters. Technologies like the 
telegraph, roads, the railway, bridges, etc. were among the main ingredients in the process 
of commercialization and capital transformation. This subsection explores these 
transformations and their influence on the birth of Ceylon’s telegraph network in 1858.  
 
Economic History of Nineteenth-Century Ceylon 
 
Until the 1830s, Ceylon’s economy was ruled under the mercantilist policies continued 
from Dutch practices.99 After acquiring the Maritime Provinces from the Dutch in 1796, 
                                                            
99 According to Laura Lahaye, Adam Smith coined the term “mercantile system” to describe the system of 
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2008), <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Mercantilism.html>. 
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the British continued the mercantilist economic policies which the Dutch had taken from 
the Portuguese during the first decades of their rule. Monopolies in cinnamon and salt 
were retained, for example. The principal object of the British during this early period was 
the extraction of tribute for the security and enhancement of the state and crown by 
taking service, revenue, and products for trade through existing tenurial relations.100 Labor 
was commonly derived from the rajakariya system which was, in essence, state enforced 
labor that had been regularly exercised by the Portuguese and the Dutch. The regulatory 
mechanisms of the state were strongly state-centered as well. The bureaucracy of the state 
provided the daily, overall “efficient” administration; and, troops, police, prisons, and law 
courts gave the necessary backing of force to ensure “law and order.”101  
 
Under mercantilism, the colonial government encouraged trade but “discouraged 
investment and the development of agricultural enterprise.”102 Very few investments were 
made that were not concerned with revenue extraction. There was no incentive to 
transform the “native social order and to invest in infrastructure which would not benefit 
the state’s extractive policies.”103 One of the only notable investments made during the 
1820s was the construction of Kandy Road, built after the fall of the Kandyan Kingdom 
in 1815. However, the road was constructed for military purposes, government 
commercial projects, the transport of enforced labor, and to symbolize the Kingdom’s 
defeat. It was not intended to stimulate local commerce.104 
 
The political and economic changes in Britain during the first few decades of the 
nineteenth century led to the gradual abandonment of mercantilism in Ceylon. With the 
rise of the British middle classes during the beginning of the nineteenth century—and 
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their affinity for free trade, utilitarianism, and evangelicalism—mercantilism became 
increasingly challenged both in Britain and in the colonies. By the 1830s, the industrial 
revolution was well underway in Britain and with the growth of capitalism there was a rise 
in new economic and political ideologies and campaigns against feudalism and slavery.105 
A new form of political thought had emerged, influenced by the reformist political 
ideology articulated by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, which “promised to change 
fundamentally Britain’s relationship to its colonies.”106 They sought to abolish mercantilist 
and feudal restraints, including hereditary privileges, and demanded equality before the 
law and equal opportunity for the Bourgeoisie, with freedom of trade and enterprise, and 
rights of political representation. 107  In the colonial context, these had very specific 
meanings. According to Kumari Jayawardena, “these concepts theoretically favoured 
measures conducive to capitalist expansion: the abolition of pre-capitalist land tenures, 
monopolies, privileges based on caste and birth, vexatious laws and taxes which were 
counterproductive and in restraint of trade, and an end to various forms of discrimination 
and the creation of new political and administrative institutions.”108 In Ceylon, the most 
important aspect of these reforms was the opening up of the island to investment capital 
for plantation agriculture.109 
 
Ideologically, the shift from mercantilism could not have happened without the 
Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833.110 The Reforms affected multiple interfaces of 
colonial government, reducing the Governor’s arbitrary powers and creating an Executive 
Council composed of key officials.111 Another innovation was a Legislative Council of the 
“principal officers of government” and “respectable inhabitants, European or native.”112 
The island was divided into separate administrative regions, each placed under the 
authority of its own regional office. The cinnamon monopoly and the rajakariya system 
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were, at least in theory, abandoned.113 They were believed to slow the growth of private 
enterprise, impede the creation of a land market, and interfere with the free movement of 
labor.114 The accommedessan, which was the granting of land for cultivation rather than for 
its outright sale, was also removed.115 Agency Houses were opened throughout the island 
to promote and provide loans to investors. Finally, Ceylon was opened to foreign 
investment capital for plantation agriculture.  A major effect of the reforms was to 
transfer the colonial state’s direct engagement in the economy to the creation of capitalist 
enterprise;116 but the colonial state continued to receive revenue indirectly by introducing 
a variety of taxes on imports and exports.117 Mercantilism, in other words, was ended by 
the Reforms and in its place the colonial government opened its markets to speculators, 
traders, and agricultural capitalists. Consequently, the state began to invest in 
infrastructure and communication technologies to stimulate capital growth.  
 
As James Duncan has noted,118 the Reforms have historically been understood as being 
part of a “teleological narrative of modernization.” According to Asoka Bandarage, for 
example, it was the “Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833 that provided the politico-
juridical framework for the ‘modernization’, specifically the capitalist development of 
Ceylon, and provided a definite watershed in the history of the island.”119 G.C. Mendis, 
too, the first professional modern Sri Lankan historian, described the Reforms as a crucial 
moment in “an approved journey of progress,” linking modernity and the nation state.120 
In contrast, historian David Scott has reconsidered the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms, 
not in terms of “modernization,” but rather as a kind of paradigmatic shift that resulted in 
the transformation of one type of political rationality—mercantilism—for another—
governmentality—by which not just the “rules of the political game but the political game 
itself changed.”  
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Drawing heavily from Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which seeks to build 
an understanding of the multiple “techniques and strategies by which a society is rendered 
governable,”121  David Scott suggests that under mercantilism, the British were largely 
concerned with the extraction of wealth and as long as the local peoples cooperated there 
was no reason for British administrators to concern themselves with the lives of the 
colonized.122 The Reforms, Scott argued, were designed to alter the colonial project so 
that society itself became the point and focus of state power. It was to be a system that 
encouraged free will, free trade, and active societal-wide participation; “a governmental 
redefinition and reordering of the colonial world was…the design of institutions so that, 
following their own self-interest, natives would do what they ought.” 123   From this 
perspective, during the 1830s and under the influence of the Colebrooke-Cameron 
Reforms there was a fundamental reconfiguring of the colonial state, a transition from 
one to another entirely distinct political rationality. It would be a leap of faith, however, to 
believe that the Reforms initiated the changes exactly as Scott proposed. Vestiges of the 
old mercantile system like rajakariya remained, in the guise of the Road Ordinance of 1848 
and in policies which favored cheaper south Indian labor, rather than Ceylonese labor, at 
almost slave-like conditions. And, the Governor retained a significant amount of 
autonomy. David Scott is correct to assume though that change, however substantial, was 
underway in the 1830s. But, while the Reforms laid the discursive political foundation for 
the shift from mercantilism to capitalism, the emergence and acceleration of commercial 
capitalism in the form of plantation agriculture, primarily that of coffee production from 
the late 1830s, was the real impetus behind the expansion of commercial capitalism, thus 
establishing the groundwork for telegraphy in British Ceylon.   
  
The Rise of the Plantation System and its Social Effects 
 
Central to the state’s shift to capitalism was the rise of the plantation system during the 
1830s. While a variety of cash crops such as indigo, cotton, coffee, and sugar 
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characterized European plantation agriculture from the early 1820s to the 1840s, it was 
coffee, gaining real ascendancy in the 1840s,124 that became the most lucrative of all crops 
grown in Ceylon and drove the island’s economy for a half century.125 The choice to grow 
and produce coffee in Ceylon was influenced by a number of factors. The interior of the 
island had a long history of peasant coffee production dating back to Portuguese and 
continuing with Dutch control. Following the fall of the Kandyan Kingdom, the British 
began to revive the practice, and the roads which had been constructed in the interior 
under Barnes stimulated capital investment. The significant rise in coffee consumption in 
Britain during the nineteenth century, the decline in coffee production in the West Indies 
after the abolition of slavery, and the removal of import tax on Ceylonese coffee in 
Britain spurned the coffee industry in Ceylon. 126  Also, the colonial government 
encouraged speculators by organizing land at low prices. Between 1833 and 1843, 258,000 
acres of land were sold by the government at 5 schillings per acre. Within just a decade of 
the removal of mercantilism and the rise of commercial capitalism, the cultivation and 
exportation of coffee had become the island’s most lucrative industry and the raison d’être 
of the British Crown Colony.127 From 1850 onwards, the sale of coffee more than trebled. 
The price on the London market for coffee from Ceylon was 278,000 cwt128 in 1850 and 
1,054,000 cwt in 1870.129 This continued until the industry’s collapse in the 1880s when 
the cultivation of tea replaced the production coffee. The coffee leaf rust disease Hemileia 
vastatrix devastated coffee crops and made growing it nearly impossible. Before tea 
replaced coffee, however, a number of substantial societal-wide transformations occurred.  
 
One of the most substantial changes wrought by the coffee plantations was the rising 
significance of foreign investment and immigrant labor. The plantations were owned 
mostly by foreigners from Europe and required a seasonal labor force that was comprised 
primarily of south Indian Tamils. There was also an annual need for other closely 
associated jobs such as “weeding, pruning, fertilizing, staking, digging drains, planting 
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grass, transporting rice, and other foodstuffs, along with duties necessary for the 
maintenance of the residential population.”130 Each year thousands of Indian laborers 
traveled back and forth to Ceylon to work on the plantations or in related jobs; many of 
them settled permanently. Thus, the plantations also affected significant transformations 
among the Ceylonese population.  
 
The plantation system offered Ceylonese merchant capitalists a range of new possibilities 
toward capital accumulation by creating livelihoods servicing the plantation communities. 
According to Kumari Jayawardena in a recent study on the topic, “Forests had to be 
cleared for plantations and supplies were brought in by carts. Timber and building 
materials were acquired to build houses for planters and ‘line rooms’ for workers.”131 The 
plantations themselves stimulated the operation of satellite businesses and industries. 
Demands for barrels of coffee and furniture for houses and offices arose, and there was 
an increasing demand for food and drink.132 Other satellite businesses operated by the 
Ceylonese included boat building and coastal transportation, internal trade by carts, 
construction work, repair shops, land accumulation, and the farming of paddy, fish, and 
toll rents.133 The most lucrative of local capital ventures was the arrack trade, the details of 
which Jayawardena delves into greatly and credits as the source of capital accumulation 
principally responsible for the emergence of the modern bourgeoisie in Ceylon. The 
business of arrack alcohol was closely associated with life on the plantations, as the arrack 
was taken by workers to help them cope with and relieve the hardships they 
experienced.134 There was a direct correlation between arrack and coffee sales. The busiest 
plantations were also the places which enjoyed the most alcohol consumption. Combined, 
these businesses and commercial activities reshaped Ceylon’s economy and reflected the 
diversified areas of commerce and business created and affected by the emergence of the 
plantation system.  
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A salient feature of Ceylon’s plantation-based economy was the continual movement of 
capital, goods, and labor between the island’s interior and the coast. Prior to the 
plantation system, capital was concentrated in government monopolies primarily along 
the coastal regions of the island. The plantation system, located in the central highlands, 
shifted the geographic focus of the colonial government toward the interior but a close 
relationship between the interior and the coastal areas was maintained. The production of 
coffee required the continual circulation of labor from the island’s ports to the central 
highlands. Since coffee was harvested in the interior, auctioned in and distributed 
worldwide from ports such as Colombo and Galle, there was a regular flow of raw and 
refined coffee moving between the highlands and the coastal areas. More detailed 
connections existed too. If a plantation machine broke in the interior, for instance, it was 
very likely that an engineer would have to commute from Colombo or a neighboring 
coastal town to fix it. The attendant Ceylonese industries operated within the interior and 
along the coast servicing all sectors of commercial life. The plantation system thus 
transformed the island’s geography into a nexus of interconnected commercial activities 
and businesses. Labor had to travel, goods had to circulate, and market information had 
to be shared. A communication network to support these movements and connections 
was a necessary component of Ceylon’s transition to commercial capitalism. Roads were 
the primary agents of the island’s communication channels and it was in the wake of their 
expansion that other communication systems, like the telegraph, were installed.   
 
Communication Infrastructure and the Colonial State 
 
Under the aegis of mercantilism, L.A. Wickremeratne writes, “military exigencies rather 
than economic considerations were the determining factors in the construction of roads 
by the colonial government.” 135  Although much attention was placed on road 
development in the annexed territories of the Kandyan Kingdom, roads built for 
nonmilitary means were few: “The roads from Colombo to Galle, Matara and thence to 
Batticaloa, as well as the roads from Mannar to Colombo, ‘the carriage roads’ to which 
writers like Percival make reference—were in truth nothing more than ‘mere clearings 
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through forests…practicable for rough cart traffic during the dry season but impassible 
during the rains.’” 136  The success of the coffee plantations, however, signaled the 
development of road networks into the plantation areas and commercial sectors. 
 Road construction commenced from the 1830s, under Governor Barnes. But the island 
experienced its most extensive road construction after the depression of 1847-48, during 
Governor General Henry Ward’s tenure from 1855 to 1860. One significant reason for 
this was the introduction of the Road Ordinance of 1848, which introduced a form of 
rajakariya requiring six days free labor on roads or payment of a cash equivalent.137 Also, 
road construction had begun in response to the agitations made by the Planter’s 
Association of Ceylon since their formation in 1854,138 based on plans as early as 1845 by 
the Chamber of Commerce139 for a railway between Colombo and Kandy, bridges, and an 
arterial road system facilitating commercial transportation.140 Finally, Governor Ward had 
taken advantage of increasing revenue accumulated by his predecessor in order to 
construct his projects. According to K.M. de Silva, Governor Ward “adopted energetic 
measures for the extension of the existing roads and the construction of new roads for 
the specific purpose of serving the plantations. Between 1855 and 1860 he spent over £1 
million on the construction of roads and bridges. On his departure from the island he left 
4,800 km of roads in good repair and all the major roads were adequately bridged.”141 The 
road systems he installed brought noticeable benefits to the planters. In his annual address 
to the Legislative Council on 28 July 1858, Ward stated that “for every new Road gives 
fresh opportunities of turning Land to profitable account, and the increase of £9,152 in 
the toll rents of the year, shows how fully this advantage is appreciated.”142  But it was not 
only roads that concerned Governor Ward.   
      
In addition to roads and bridges, Governor Ward also introduced plans for the railway, a 
new technology at the time; he instigated an Irrigation Act to revive the once flourishing 
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northern dry-lands of the island; he implemented a steam communications route round 
the island’s coast—steam ships were also a new modern technology; he rendered a Penny 
Postage Ordinance in the model of England’s; and he installed the Electric Telegraph 
which had only four years before made headway in India—all of which, according to him 
in a speech in 1857, “are all inchoate benefits that require time to bring them to maturity.” 
Like the roads, they were long-term investments that would gradually foster the “benefits” 
of capital growth and commercial expansion.   
 
Like Lord Dalhousie in India, Governor Ward introduced communication infrastructure 
on the basis that long-term commercial “progress” could be achieved through utilitarian 
means such as technological development; that exogenous factors such as technology 
could extend the frontiers of the economy in a positive direction. The roads would 
improve the fluidity of goods and people in and around the coastal and commercial 
centers; railroads would speed up the process; and the telegraph would provide the 
merchant communities with a device by which they could share at “lightning speed” 
shipping and freight information without the hassle of the post or message runners. Trade 
would therefore benefit from the technologies and the colony itself would benefit from 
the additional tax revenue. Commercial capitalism could expand at the same rate as the 
expansion of plantation agriculture.  
 
In many of Governor Ward’s speeches, it is clear that he reveled in the prospect of 
technological development and the prosperity he believed it would bring to the colony. 
For example, in a speech before 132 guests attending his 1857 New Year’s Eve Ball at the 
Kandyan Pavilion, Governor Ward announced publically his enthusiasm for his legislation:  
 
I know no instance in Colonial Legislation—certainly, none in the Legislation of 
Ceylon—in which so many important measures have been compressed into a 
single Session. The Railway, the Electric Telegraph, a monthly Steamer running 
round the coast, Penny Postage, liberal and well considered Votes for Roads, 
Bridges, Hospitals, Public Buildings, and Irrigation Works, upon which the 
restoration of native Industry depends…all these are measures, any one of which 
must have exercised a considerable influence upon the fortune of a rising 
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community, but which, taken together, and vigorously carried out, in a young and 
healthy colony like this; full of energy and life, where all the great difficulties have 
been surmounted, and where the capital invested is already yielding a rich return, 
cannot fail to produce changes, the effects of which it is difficult to overrate.143 
 
It was in the spirit of Ward’s enthusiasm for technological development that the telegraph 
network was constructed, that roads were expanded, and that so many of the modern 
technologies which still remain in Sri Lanka today were first tried and implemented. I turn 
now to highlight the evidence that directly connects the introduction of telegraphy to 
commercial capitalism.    
 
The Connection between Telegraphy and Commerce 
 
The relationship between the telegraph’s introduction and commercial capitalism is 
somewhat perplexed. Until recently, with Winseck/Pike’s publication Communication and 
Empire,144  many historians postulated that the British Empire’s telegraph network was 
introduced for the purpose of serving government as a tool of power; that it was installed 
to centralize the empire and intended as a technology of imperial control over the colonial 
governors. 145  However fitting these theories may be in other contexts, which this 
dissertation does not intend to prove or disprove, the case of Ceylon’s telegraph network 
presents itself entirely differently. Evidence found at the National Archives in London 
and the archives in Sri Lanka strongly suggests that Ceylon’s telegraph network was 
introduced for the purpose of serving commerce. Yes, the colonial government benefited 
from tariff charges. Yes, the government used telegraphy in governmental 
correspondence as subsequent chapters will analyze. But, the network was originally 
installed to serve commercial capitalism; this is important to recognize because it in turn 
impacted the government’s ability to use it in its subsequent adaptation of the technology.  
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There is sufficient evidence to support this claim.  Firstly, according to S.V. Balasingham, 
the first and only historian to have written at any length—a few pages—on the case of 
Ceylon’s telegraph network, it was the merchant community that, in 1846, first brought 
the government’s attention to the possibility of establishing telegraphy between Galle and 
Colombo.146, 147 Despite the merchant community’s request, however, the telegraph was 
not introduced during the 1840s. The ensuing economic crisis of the following years 
made the prospect of government expenditure on the technology unrealistic.  
 
Nevertheless, agitation for the construction of the telegraph commenced “again after 
1853 and increased in volume when the telegraph was installed in India…”148 Again, 
agitation came from the merchant community.  According to Balasingham, there were 
four reasons the technology appealed to the merchant community. Firstly, they desired 
the telegraph for trade with India, since Ceylon was South India’s grain market and India 
was the site of the island’s currency exchange.149 Secondly, they believed the telegraph 
would become a useful tool for port calls and for the spread of market news and prices: 
“All ships from India called at Galle and wasted time,” Balasingham wrote, “visiting all 
ports for advices regarding their freights, information regarding which was given to them 
by ordinary mail. This led to extra port charges, wear and tear and additional interest on 
the value of the cargoes detained.”150 These expenses would be reduced, the community 
suggested, if the telegraph were installed. Thirdly, “Ceylon occupied a very strategic 
position in the Indian Ocean and lay equidistant between the other parts of the Empire in 
the Far East and the Cape.”151  It would therefore benefit global trade communications. 
Finally, he stated that “the telegraph had proved to be of great value during the Crimean 
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War and hence would be extremely useful for the quick and cheap transmission of news 
and market prices.”152 
 
Missing from his examination, however, is evidence to substantiate his writings. In fact, 
the Ceylon Times on 6 June 1855 was the only material he used to examine what the 
merchants thought of the telegraph. Furthermore, his research does not directly tackle the 
relationship between the technology and government. For, did the colonial government 
also regard the technology as something which could benefit commerce? Did the colonial 
government have any other interests in obtaining the device, and if so, what were they? In 
what follows I shed light on how the colonial government thought about telegraphy and 
its relationship with commerce.  
  
The “Correspondence Regarding the Introduction of the Telegraph, 1852-1854,” 153 
located at the Sri Lankan National Archives, is a collection of letters associated with the 
telegraph’s introduction during the times indicated in the title. Evidence therein attests 
that the merchant community did indeed desire the telegraph for its utility in commerce 
and that it had asked the government to install it. It also provides evidence that Ceylon’s 
government understood the technology similarly. That the government understood the 
telegraph as a technology for commerce is evident, first, in the fact that the Governor had 
appointed two government bodies to determine the efficacy and value of the technology 
to the colony. According to the records, on 18 October 1852, the Governor requested 
that Dr. Lamprey, a surgeon in Ceylon and member and Joint Secretary (1852 and 1853-
54) of the Royal Asiatic Society of Ceylon; Major Cole, Commissioner of Roads; and 
Captain James Stuart, Master Attendant, “establish themselves as a committee”154 to look 
into the feasibility of establishing an electric telegraph between Colombo and Point de 
Galle, and assess the probable construction expenses.155 On 1 December of the same year, 
the Governor appointed another committee, consisting of W.A. Simms, Surveyor General, 
F. Saunders, Collector of Customs for the Western Province, and Mr. Armitage and Mr. 
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Smith, unofficial members. 156  It was their opinions that ultimately persuaded the 
government to construct the network in 1857.   
  
The opinions they submitted in their reports varied, but nonetheless, they each spoke 
highly of the prospect of the electric telegraph. Some wrote that the telegraph would be 
more useful if connected to Kandy as well as to Galle; two of them proposed that the 
government would not benefit directly from the technology “except in returns of 
revenue.” 157  They all agreed, however, that the technology would primarily benefit 
mercantile traders calling at Galle and that the technology would rectify some of the 
major problems that the mercantile and shipping communities experienced at port. This 
opinion was expressed clearly by Mr. Simms in his report:  
 
The source of returns would arise principally from the transactions of mercantile 
messages and messages from the Captains seeking ships. Ships are prevented 
coming in by the detention they at present experience. The probability of our 
giving employment to chartered ships would be increased. Merchants here have 
often authority to charter vessels for other ports as well as Colombo, such as 
Maulmain, Cochin, Trincomalee. One objection of Captains touching at Galle is 
that it involves a journey to Colombo. A letter involves at least one answer and 
often more, therefore the Captain comes up, but with an electric telegraph he 
could get answers and do his business in a few minutes.158  
 
Also, they unanimously decided that the island would gain the most out of telegraphic 
connection if it also connected with the lines in construction in India. In the final report 
submitted to the Governor159 they opined that an “electric telegraph between Colombo 
and Galle would in itself be desirable, but that connected with the great chain of such 
communication which they understand to be contemplated in India it would become of 
                                                            
156  Ibid., 18 October 1852 
157  For example, “I do not think government would benefit materially by an electric telegraph except in 
the Post Office Department, but I think for that only the line is necessary. The steamers do not regard 
Colombo of importance as compared with Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and will not wait for our mails 
as it cannot be their interest to do so.”  
158  SLNA 10/166, “Correspondence Regarding the Introduction of the Telegraph, 1852-1854.” Date 
unknown.  
159 Ibid. No date is given on the record.  
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vital importance to this Colony.” Their opinion was based on the assumption that, “in a 
commercial point of view, it must always be of the greatest importance that we should be 
placed on an equal footing with the Presidencies of India. Merchants in Bombay, Madras, 
and the Straits could communicate via Calcutta with China to the exclusion of the 
merchants in Ceylon.”160 The telegraph would thus enable Ceylon’s merchants to compete 
with India. According to Armitage, it would also bring advantages to bankers:  
 
As far as Calcutta is concerned the line from Bombay might militate with the 
interests of the Ceylon line. In England messages are often sent along the line by 
medical men who consult with each other and arrange meetings by their channel. 
This would probably be the case here.  A telegraph would also be of importance by 
facilitating exchange operations. There is a practice among shippers from England 
to ship goods to Ceylon or Madras. Suppose that the manager of the Oriental 
Bank in China or Singapore were to ship specie for these places by steamer to 
Bombay, the manager of the Bank here might detain the specie at Galle for use 
here, or for shipment to Calcutta, Madras or Mauritius as he might find most to 
the advantage of the Bank in case of any sudden alteration in exchange. 
Remittances in species arriving by the overland mail could also be detained at Galle 
and their destination charged as the managers of the Bank might find necessary on 
account of any alteration that might take place in exchange after the date of the 
advices from which the bank in London had made the remittance.161  
 
The question of telegraphy was not resolved until Governor Henry Ward took office in 
1855. It was under his governorship that the telegraph was to be realized. And as 
indicated in his speeches, Ward’s decision to construct the network reflected the views 
submitted by the abovementioned committee members. Like them, he favored telegraphy 
for its projected returns to commerce. He placed telegraphy on the same level of 
significance as roads and other communication infrastructure which he installed during 
his tenure, all of which were intended to benefit the island’s “youthful and growing” 
industries. Finally, that the network connected Galle, Colombo, Kandy, and India is quite 
                                                            
160 Ibid., no date given.  
161 Ibid. 
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telling of the direction in which the network was going: towards the most important 
commercial centers of the island. Although Ward did not say directly, “the telegraph is 
installed to serve the merchants in such and such a manner,” I believe that the available 
evidence strongly puts forward that it was commerce, not power, centralization, and 
control that informed the government’s decision to install the telegraph in 1857; that 
commerce had informed the committees’ desire to install the technology between 1852 
and 1854; that merchants were the perceived benefactors of the technology, and alongside 
exchange bankers they would constitute the majority of the technology’s users; and that 
even as early as the 1840s, according to Balasingham, the merchant community, not the 
imperial center, had initiated the installation of the telegraph. The telegraph was used in 
government correspondence which chapters three and four explain, but the technology 
was foremost a technology of commercial capitalism that saw its historical development 
during the first half of the nineteenth century in the rise of commercial capitalism and was 
buoyed by the plantation system. The following subchapter maps out the structure of the 
network, detailing its construction and material outlay to fortify our understanding of the 
network and further support my claim that the telegraph was constructed to support 
commerce.  
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PART 3:  THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF CEYLON’S NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
TELEGRAPH NETWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of Ceylon. Dutch Sketch. I superimposed the red lines on the map 
to show the original telegraph network. This is only an abstract representation 
and should not be taken to scale. No maps of the original network are locatable, 
unfortunately. Image taken from the National Archives in Kew, London.  
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The purpose of part three is to illustrate the construction and growth of Ceylon’s 
telegraph network during the course of the nineteenth century. It is divided into three 
sections. The first one describes the material outlay and structural expansion of the 
network. Section two focuses on the construction of the network, particularly on its 
original construction. Section three grapples with the rationale of the network to 
determine why the lines were laid where they were and not in other places. This third part 
of chapter two provides the grounds on which later examinations regarding the 
technology’s relationship to colonial government can be made.  
 
 
Section One: Material Overview of Ceylon’s Nineteenth-Century Telegraph Network 
 
Ceylon’s colonial government began construction on its telegraph network in 1857.162 The 
system was operable the following year. When completed, it connected Galle and Madras 
via telegraph offices in, and lines between, Colombo, Kandy, and Manaar; a submarine 
line was submerged under the Paumben Strait connecting Talamanaar and the south coast 
of India, from where a line was extended north to Madras. This initial network was 300 
miles in length.  The network was not completed at once but in parts throughout the year. 
The first section of the network, an overland line between Galle and Colombo, opened 
on 1 January 1858.163 On 1 July, the line between Colombo and Kandy was opened.164 A 
submarine cable, connecting Ceylon with India, was laid between Thanaikai Point and 
Talamannar on 17 September. Then the line from Kandy to Manaar via Mihintale was 
finished in October. On 1 November Ceylon’s entire network was completed and opened 
to the public.165  
 
From this initial outlay, the network expanded to different parts of the colony throughout 
the century. In 1874, Colombo was connected with Polgahawela, Kurunegala, and 
                                                            
162 CO 54 27 August 1857. Governor Ward to Secretary of State. “”Line from Galle to Manaar is in rapid 
progress…”  
163  Michael Liyanage, The History of the Sri Lanka Post Office: 1815-1987 (Colombo: Union of Post & 
Telecommunication Officers, Sri Lanka, 1987), 46. 
164  SLNA 6/2463, “1858 Electric Telegraph Department,” 26 June 1858, Notice from the Electric 
Telegraph Department 
165 SLNA 6/2463, “1858 Electric Telegraph Department,” 28 October 1858, Notice from the Inspector of 
the Telegraph 
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Adhuradapura. In 1876, it was connected to Batticaloa. In 1887, a line was constructed 
from Colombo to Negombo, to Ratnapura in 1888, and from Negombo to Puttalam in 
1890. During the governorship of Havelock (1890-1895), telegraph lines were constructed 
to Maskeliya, Bagawantalawa and Agrapatana. The line to Puttalam was extended to 
Mannar and then to Anuradhapura via Vavuniya and Jaffna. From there, it extended from 
Puttalam to Kankesanthurai.166 By 1900, the island’s telegraph network was 1,437 miles.167 
The choice of these locations provide further proof that the network was intended to 
serve commerce, a point which I will take up later in the subchapter.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 below are taken from Ceylon’s Blue Book of Statistics for the years 1880 and 
1900, respectively, and indicate the length and location of the network’s connections in 
Ceylon during these periods. Even a cursory comparison shows that the network 
experienced significant growth and expansion into many parts of the island between the 
two periods. 
  
  
Figure 3. Telegraph Network in 1880168 
 
Location Distance 
in miles
Colombo to Galle 72.50 
Colombo to Kalutara (railway line) 27.50 
Colombo to Kandy (railway line) 75.00 
Colombo to Kandy (second railway line) 76.70 
Extra wire from Rambukka to 
Kadugamawa (railway line)
12.75 
Colombo Breakwater Engineer’s Office 
to Mahara Quarry (railway line) 
12.25 
Kandy to Gampola 12.45 
                                                            
166 Liyanage, The History of the Sri Lanka Post Office: 1815-1987, 40–41. 
167 “Ceylon Blue Book of Statistics”, 1900. 
168 Telegraph lines are measured. Ibid.1880. 
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Peradeniya Junction to Nawalapitiya 
(railway line) 
17.50 
Kandy to Dambulla Junction (main line) 43.64 
Dambulla Junction to Anuradhapura 
(main line) 
47.50 
Anuradhapura to Mannar (main line) 74.8 
Mannar to Talaimannar (main line) 17.00 
Kandy to Dambulla Junction (branch 
line) 
43.64 
Dambulla to Trincomalee (branch line) 69.50 
Mannar to Jaffna (branch line) 70.97 
Gampola to Nuwara Eliya (branch line) 20.55 
Nuwara Eliya to Badulla (branch line) 27.00 
Badulla to Batticaloa (branch line) 94.87 
Line across Paumben Strait 53.00 
Total 813.12 
 
 
 
Figure 4.Telegraph Network in 1900169 
Location Distance (measured in miles of posts) 
General Post Office, Colombo to Beira 0
Beira Junction to Maradana Junction 1
Miscellaneous signal wires -
Maradana Junction to Maradana Post Office 1
Maradana Junction to Kandy Post Office 74
Maradana Junction to Avisawella Junction -
Maradana Junction to Grandpass -
Maradana Junction to Negombo Junction -
Maradana Junction to Polgahawela -
Veyangoda Loop 0
Polgahawela Loop 0
Polgahawela Railway Station to Kurunegala 13
Kurunegala Post Office to Kurunegala 1
Polgahawela Railway Station to Kegalla Post 8
                                                            
169 “Ceylon Blue Book of Statistics,” 1900. 
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Rambukkana Railway Station to -
Peradeniya Junction to Kandy Railway -
Kandy Post Office Junction to Peradeniya 0
Kandy Post Office Junction to Kandy Post 0
Junction for Courts to Courts Post Office 0
Junction for Grandpass to Mutwal Post 3
Junction for Avisawela to Rawkana Post 75
Avisawella Post Office to Ruanawella 8
Yatiyantota Loop -
Ratnapura to Haputale 56
Negombo Junction to Negombo 15
Negombo to Puttalam 61
Puttalam to Mannar 64
Mannar Post Office to Talamannar 17
Mannar Post Office to Junction for Jaffna 1
Junction for Jaffna to Jaffna 65
Jaffna to Manipay 5
Jaffna to Kakesanturai 11
Kankesanturai to Velvettitturai 10
Velvettitturai to Point Pedro 5
Kandy Post Office Junction to Matale 18
Matale Railway Station to Anuradhapura 73
Anuradhapura to Trincomalee 63
Anuradhapura to Madawachchiya 17
Madawachchiya to Mannar 51
Madawachchiya to Vavuniya 32
Vavuniya to Mankulam 29
Mankulam to Mullaittivu 30
Mankulam to Jaffna 60
Wattegama to Madulkele 10
Beira Junction to Galle Railway Station 71
General Post Office to Galkissa 7
General Post Office to Kollupitiya -
Galkissa to Galle Railway Station -
Moratuwa Post Office to Loop 0
Kalutara Railway Station to Kalutara Post 0
Bentota Railway Station to Bentota Post 0
Galle Railway Station to Galle Post Office 0
Galle Railway Station to Matara Railway 26
Kataluwa Railway Station to Kataluwa Post 0
Matara Railway Station to Matara Post 1
Matara Post Office to Tangalla Junction 22
Tangalla Loop 0
Tangalla Junction to Hambantota 26
Peradeniya Junction to Gampola 7
Gampola to Nuwara Eliya via Ramboda 21
Gampola to Watagoda Railway Station 41
Hatton Post Office to Watawala Post Office 5
Hatton Post Office to Norwood Post 6
Norwood to Maskeliya 7
 70 
 
Norwood to Bogawantalawa 7
Talawakele to Agrapatana 10
Talawakele to Nuwara Eliya 22
Nuwara Eliya to Uda Pussellawa 12
Kandapola to Maturata 8
Nuwara Eliya to Badulla via Welimada 34
Nuwara Eliya to Nanu-oya 4
Nanu-oya to Bandarawela 34
Bandarawela to Badulla 16
Haputale to Koslanda 7
Junction for Boer Camp to Diyatalawa 2
Diyatalawa Station to Boer Camp 1
Loops to Railway Station 10
Badulla to Batticaloa 8
Kalmunai to Batticaloa 16
Batticaloa to Kalkuda 11
Batticaloa to Bar 2
Total170  1,437
 
Section Two: Construction of the Network 
 
The construction of Ceylon’s telegraph network is best understood as a mutual project 
between Ceylon’s and India’s governments. Indian managers were in charge of installing it 
and the Indian Telegraph Department supplied the necessary materials at low costs; and 
Ceylon’s government paid for the materials and labor. This not only highlights the fact 
that India’s system became the de facto model of the British Empire in south Asia but also 
describes the dependency of Ceylon on the technology and knowledge of India in 
rendering its own network.171 The transfer of Ceylon’s telegraphic technology, therefore, 
did not function on a west-to-east model, but rather, was derived from the system 
O’Shaughnessy had developed in India in the 1830s. However, O’Shaughnessy was not 
directly involved in the network’s initial construction. He was on leave during this time 
and was temporarily replaced by Lieutenant Stewart—who was simultaneously occupied 
with fixing the damages incurred to India’s telegraph network in light of the 1857 
                                                            
170 This total is taken from the Blue Book of Statistics, 1900. It does not equal the sum of the distance of post 
measured in miles. I believe that the numbers given were just averages and only included whole numbers. However, 
the total presented here is approximate.  
171 There were earlier attempts at creating telegraphy in Ceylon, however. 
 71 
 
Mutiny.172 Nevertheless, it was O’Shaughnessy’s ingenuity which constituted the original 
structural and material rendering of Ceylon’s telegraph system.  
 
In exchange for connecting Ceylon’s network to India, India’s government, through the 
agency of the Indian Telegraph Department, provided the materials and experts needed 
to construct it. It provided “the services of persons skilled in constructing and working 
the telegraph on the Indian System”;173 and, it supplied “at cost price, including freight 
from England, the necessary quantity of wire” required to construct Ceylon’s network—
174 the price of which, at the time, was estimated at £50 per mile.175 Additionally, it paid for 
the entire cost, including the labor and materials, of the Paumben Strait submarine cable. 
Ceylon’s government covered the unmet costs. According to Ceylon’s Blue Book of 
Statistics, Ceylon’s government spent £4,840 in 1857176 which stemmed from the £17,000 
provided by the Surplus Fund Ordinance for the purpose of constructing the network.177 
The total cost of the operation upon completion was approximately £15,000.178 Ceylon 
also provided the unskilled labor used in installing the telegraph lines.   
 
Labor 
 
The person in charge of the telegraph network’s construction was B.C. Bailey from the 
Indian Telegraph Department.179 He had arrived in Ceylon in April 1857 and commenced 
his operatives on 1 June. There were three assistants under Bailey’s authority: Mr. 
Biallobtzky, Mr. La Fey, and Mr. Mackey. Each of them headed various teams of workers 
on different sections of the network, clearing and preparing the routes to put up the 
telegraph lines. Bailey’s role in the network’s construction was substantial and notable. 
Not only did he oversee the construction of all portions of the lines between Galle and 
                                                            
172 Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism. 
173 CO/54 1 April 1857 658-664. 
174 CO/54 1 April 1857 658-664. 
175 William O’Shaughnessy’s estimation: CO 54, 3 July 1857. 
176 Blue Book, 1857. 
177 CO/54 24 October 1857. 
178  Balasingham, “The Administration of Sir Henry Ward," 43–44. 
179 SLNA 6/2463 “Inspector of the Electric Telegraph Reports,” 6 November 1858.  
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Manaar, 180  he also organized the labor used to build the network; 181  he managed the 
training of the telegraph office clerks; and from the network’s completion in 1858 until 
1860 he acted as the first Superintendent of the Electric Telegraph Department of Ceylon. 
In such a role, he also became the intermediary between the technology and the public, 
making notices about the telegraphs’ operation and moderating its prices.182  
 
The telegraph network was created by the collective efforts of many individual laborers. 
Laborers worked on different sections of the network in small teams or camps, under the 
authority of an overseer, either Bailey or one his assistants. Workers within a camp 
focused on different tasks: clearing the jungle and woods and carting supplies through 
them; digging holes; sawing, carrying and laying posts; installing brackets and insulators; 
and connecting the wires. They worked, ate, and slept on site in work camps.  
 
The laborers employed in the work camps were primarily south Indians who had 
traditionally found employment in the services of the island’s plantations. Why south 
Indians, rather than the Ceylonese, were involved in the network’s construction was 
perhaps a consequence of the labor itself. Constructing a telegraph network from Galle to 
Manaar required laborers to travel great distances. Some portions of the network were 
100 miles in length like the Dambool to Mantotte line. According to Bailey, Ceylonese 
workers engaged in the stations of the local authorities refused to travel more than two or 
three miles beyond their houses, and many villagers declined to leave their fields.183 I 
would suggest, also, that the colonial government focused primarily on the procurement 
of south Indians rather than Ceylonese since the Deputy Collector was involved in 
recruitment. South Indians had for decades been recruited for plantation work by the 
Deputy Collector and it was easy to procure telegraph labor by similar methods. Local 
participation was not precluded, however. For example, in July of 1858 Bailey requested 
the use of 30 or 40 prisoners to be employed “in the Galle Fort for two or three days in 
running an over ground line from the Ramparts to the House just vacated by the Oriental 
                                                            
180 Ibid., 25 July 1858. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid., 28 October 1858. 
183Ibid., 13 May 1858. 
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Bank.”184 Bailey wrote that each camp contained at least ten laborers and normally 30 to 
40 people were employed at any one time on each portion of the network.185 But never 
more than 50 workers were engaged at once. And Bailey was assisted intermittently by 
officials of the districts through which the lines were taken and by “the authority not only 
of the district officers but the Head of the Public Works Department,” Major Skinner.186 
 
The amount the laborers earned is not known,187 nor which incentives were given so that 
they chose to work on telegraphs rather than in agriculture. But obtaining and keeping 
labor was a constant problem for Bailey and contributed to major delays in the 
technology’s construction. 188  There were a number of reasons which darkened the 
prospect of working on telegraph construction. There were firstly rumors among the 
laborers that there were cholera outbreaks along the routes of telegraphic construction 
which made the prospect of working in telegraphy quite unsettling. (This is true, there 
were cholera-related casualties among telegraph workers and numerous occurrences of 
fevers and other maladies). Also, the work was tremendously laborious and this also 
limited the entrance of new recruits. In the island of Manaar and in the district between 
Mehintelle and Dambool, for example, no carts or oxen could be obtained at any price, 
and the whole of the work, moving heavy posts and carrying supplies, had to be done by 
hand. 189  But these were just a few of difficulties which telegraphic construction had 
entailed.  
 
Installing the poles and hanging the lines were arduous tasks especially in and around the 
highlands and interior jungles. Workers had to cut down trees, whack away bushes, and 
make room for the poles to be laid and secured. Telegraph construction generally 
followed the existing networks of roads but this was not always possible. Roads 
                                                            
184 Ibid., 10 April 1858.  
185 Ibid., 31 October 1857.   
186 Ibid., 25 July 1858.  
187 CO/57 24 August 1857: Governor Ward wrote: “Rates for labor are very different in India and 
Ceylon,” but he did not specify what these wages were. I cannot locate this data in any of the source 
material, unfortunately.   
188 SLNA 6/2463 “Inspector of the Electric Telegraph Reports,” 31 December 1857, 13 January 1858, 25 
July 1858. 
189 CO/57 24 August 1857. 
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sometimes meandered wildly or were too narrow to set up telegraph poles alongside them, 
so the network had to deviate.  
 
The work succumbed to numerous delays. In the construction of the line between Kandy 
and Tallmannar, for instance, interdepartmental struggles caused massive delays and 
difficult detours. In Kandy, the Royal Engineers prevented the laborers from crossing 
their “reserves” which meant that the line had to be moved and run over “a jungle 
covered hill 400 or 500 feet above the level of the town.”190 The camp had to trek uphill 
and clear bushes and trees and erect the very heavy ironwood telegraph posts that were 
being used at the time.191 This caused a fortnight delay in production.192 One of Bailey’s 
three assistant overseers, Mr. Biallobtzky, resigned in the middle of this portion of the 
line’s construction. The labor was too demanding and he was afraid he would catch 
cholera from his workers, some of whom had caught the disease and died under his 
command.193 This in turn caused more delay and discouraged those under his employ. 
Some laborers also resigned. The “wire parties,” i.e. the laborers who installed telegraph 
wires, which commenced at Matalle on 21 July, were brought to a standstill by sickness 
which “prostrated the European in charge of one party and frightened away the coolies 
from another.”194 Even the offer of double wages would not always sway laborers to stay 
on.195  
 
The work was even too hard at times on the animals (elephants and oxen) that they had 
rented. According to a letter to Bailey from assistant overseer Mr. Brown, “the sawyers 
and transporters kept absconding almost as fast as procured when they went to the estate 
and saw the nature of the work they were required to do…The posts being cut out of 
large old seasoned wood are very heavy. To meet this difficulty I engaged Elephants, but 
they only went one trip…I tried Bullocks. They also failed, their owners refusing to bring 
them a second time to such work. I have consequently had to employ a large force of my 
                                                            
190 6/2463 “1858 Inspector of the Electric Telegraph Reports,” 25 July 1858. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid., 31 October 1857.   
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estate coolies…I have had to raft them down a river about 20 miles and then cart them 
up the road another 20 miles at great expense.”196  
 
Materials 
 
The materials used in Ceylon’s telegraph network derived from India and therefore shared 
similar characteristics with those employed there. O’Shaughnessy’s single needle 
transmitter was used until 1859 when the Morse system was introduced.197 In 1878, there 
was discussion about using a Mance Heliograph—a device that communicates with 
Morse-code flashes of sunlight—not to replace the existing network but to compliment 
it.198 This device would have made Ceylon’s network different from India’s. Discussion 
was quickly muted, so I doubt it was adopted in any context. The electric wires used in 
the network were brought from India and, therefore, were made of iron. The materials 
were shipped directly from India to Ceylon on large freight ships such as the “Pelorus.” 
The purpose of using Indian technology, according to the Secretary to the Governor of 
India, was “to maintain uniformity in the working of the system throughout the British 
possessions” and to establish less competitive telegraph tariffs. However, the island’s 
network had many unique characteristics unrelated to India’s system. For example, the 
telegraph posts were not made of bamboo like in India. Instead, they were taken from the 
trees found on the island and fitted to the island’s particular topography and geography.  
 
Rather than achieving uniformity, as was the intention, nearly each section of the network 
was distinct in some way. The section between Galle and Colombo used the ubiquitous 
coconut trees that lined the coast as posts to which they mounted the wires using 
Jackwood brackets. Stop-posts were placed every mile to protect the wires against falling 
trees and the telegraph line was suspended with a deflection of four feet between the 
support posts so that it would be able to give way to any heavy weight falling on it. The 
meandering and mountainous terrain between Colombo and Kandy required a team of 
laborers to clear jungle and lay posts made of iron and Moulmein Teak; these high quality 
                                                            
196 Ibid., 31 October 1857.   
197 Liyanage, The History of the Sri Lanka Post Office: 1815-1987, 46. 
198 CO/54, 16 November 1878. 
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posts were procured under contracts between Mr. Layard, the Assistant Government 
Agent of the district, and the headmen of different villages in 1857. From Kandy to 
Tallamannar Bailey’s team had to cut a road twelve feet wide through forests for about 
five miles and through low jungles for about eight miles. Rocky soil had to be dug to fit 
ironwood posts of a lesser quality than those used in the second section. Along the route 
from Dambool to Mantotte jungle had to be cleared and the telegraph posts there had to 
be able to withstand attacks by packs of wild elephants. Here they used large, top-quality 
posts, two to three feet in circumference and fourteen to twenty-two feet in length, made 
of iron and satin woods which were predicted to last at least 20 years. They were taken 
from young trees stripped clear and cut to the desired length. They were supplied in 1857 
on contracts through the Assistant Government Agents of Anuradhapura and Manaar. 
The section connecting the Manaar Flats was a body of water, two miles wide, which 
separated the island of Manaar from the mainland of Ceylon. The water was mostly 
shallow–two and a half feet deep–except in the channel at the opposite side where it was 
deep enough to float vessels of “one hundred ton burden.”199 Here, a submarine cable was 
cut from part of the Mannar Strait’s cable—and laid by Indian vessels and workers—
across the flats through an intermediate testing house on a dry mound in the center. The 
sixth and final section, crossing Manaar Island, was quite a difficult task given the density 
of the jungle, through which posts made of the same material as those of the Dambool to 
Mantotte line were installed. A lack of uniformity in the network is telling, revealing the 
multifarious dimensions of technological adaptation. It also shows that it was not a west 
to east expansion but something which assimilated to the local context. Commerce and 
the natural environment shaped the network and its material dimensions.  
 
Over the course of the century, as the network expanded and changed so too did the 
materials used. By 1867 the Colombo to Kandy line had been dismantled and the wire 
was brought to Colombo to replace the line on the Galle Road. The Colombo to Kandy 
line was replaced by an entirely new line constructed alongside the railway and was 
supported by iron posts insulated by Siemens insulators.200 And, a flying line supported on 
                                                            
199 6/2463 “1858 Inspector of the Electric Telegraph Report,” 31 October 1857. 
200  SLNA 31st October 1857 6/2463 1858 Inspector of Electric Telegraph Reports: This was a big 
improvement given that the first insulators used on the Ceylon lines were made of an earthenware block 
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“good sound posts” was erected across the Manaar Flats replacing the submarine cable 
laid by Bailey. In 1891 a telegraph line from Jaffna to Point Pedro was erected. Instead of 
being strewn across timber or Siemens posts, it was suspended on posts which were also 
sections of the local Palmyra tree,201 saving transportation costs.202 In 1894, the telegraph 
line from Ambalangoda to Galle was constructed and on the portion closest to the sea 
Weiller’s patent bronze wire was used.203 In the same year, the Nuwara Eliya to Uda 
Pusselluvia line was carried on steel rails. 204  
 
In addition to costs and durability, the materials of the telegraph network were also 
adapted to extraneous circumstances. According to the Superintendent of the Post and 
Telegraph Department, on main roads, especially between Galle and Hambantota and 
between Lanngala and Batticaloa, men and boys “amuse themselves with throwing stones 
at the insulators,” 50 percent of which had been broken by 1894. Because of this, it was 
reported, brown earthenware insulators, less conspicuous to the eye, were used to replace 
them; however, damages continued and non-breakable ones made of vulcanite rather than 
porcelain and earthenware were used to replace all of them.205 These acts of destruction 
interest me greatly, but unfortunately I have not found other information or reports to 
make any assessment on them, beyond speculation. They may have been sabotage or, as 
the reports suggest, boys being boys. It does suggest a social gap between the natives and 
those who used the telegraph, and throwing the stones can be read as a symbol of 
inequality between those wealthy enough to employ the technology and those who were 
not.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
divided in two pieces, two inches square and two and a half inches deep, fitted into the top of the post 
and secured to it by an iron strap. According to Bailey, these insulators were “all of the worst description 
and in my poor opinion of no greater protection from the wet than would be pieces of common brick.” 
The glass coating was either missing or came off easily and the brackets were liable to leakages. Even in 
dry weather the insulators worked poorly. Batteries of 400 and 500 cells had to be used to send messages 
over them whereas India’s network functioned on 40-cell batteries.   Administration Report 1867 for the 
Post, p. 295 
201 A local fan palm that could grow to 30m high.  
202 Administration Report, 1891, p.284 B6.  
203 Administration Report, 1894, B11. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid., B12. 
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The Rationale of the Network 
 
We now know where and how the network was laid. But it still remains to be seen why it 
was laid in the places it was. Why were Galle, Colombo, Kandy, Mannar, and south India 
connected? Why were other locations excluded? Why did it expand in the patterns and 
ways that it did and not in others? Environmental and engineering factors certainly played 
a part but they did not make up the entire answer. While there is little in the way of direct 
evidence, there are a few possible explanations for the network’s particular outlay and 
growth. Knowing why the network expanded is important for us because it, firstly, brings 
us a visual image of the ideas that went into the network, especially those intended to 
foster commerce. Secondly, it enables us to understand more deeply the relationship 
between colonial government and technology. As I show, the technology was established 
for commercial ends, but Ceylon’s telegraph network was, nevertheless, a technology of 
colonial government. Ceylon’s government had its hands in all manners of the technology 
from its development to its operation.  
 
It was the critical relationship between Galle and Colombo and the desire to complement 
its preexisting connection with telegraphy that had first and foremost made establishing 
telegraphic communication in Ceylon a reality. Without the important relationship 
between Galle and Colombo and the need for fast communication between the two areas, 
it is likely that the telegraph would not have been established anywhere in Ceylon in 1858. 
Across the board the significance of this portion of the network is clear: Ceylon’s 
government agreed to connect the network to India only if Galle and Colombo were first 
telegraphically joined; the topic of concern for the committee and subcommittee had been 
the relevance of connecting Galle and Colombo, not other locations; the merchant and 
commercial communities had emphasized their desire for telegraphy between Galle and 
Colombo and nowhere else; and, it was this part of the network that first completed in 
1858. The connection of these two locations was not just influential, but foundational, to 
the telegraph network in Ceylon.  
  
The natural harbor at Galle made the city one of the most important trading centers of 
the Indian Ocean for centuries—even before the island’s experience with western 
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colonialism. Persians, Arabs, Greeks, Romans, Malays, and Indians traded there and 
James Emerson Tennent conjectured that its trading history may even be documented in 
the Judeo-Christian Bible, as it “may possibly have been from Ceylon and certainly from 
India that the fleets of Solomon were returning when once in every three years came the 
ships of Tarshish, bringing gold and silver, ivory, apes, and peacocks.”206 He believed that 
Solomon’s ships had sailed from Point de Galle.207 Under European control Galle retained 
its importance as a trading center and functioned as a main port of call for the Portuguese 
and the Dutch. Under British occupation, until the completion of the Colombo 
breakwater in 1883, Galle was the island’s main port for receiving and transmitting goods, 
people, and political information. It was also a fueling station for ships and steamers 
traveling through the Indian Ocean region, since it was nearly equidistant from the 
eastern colonies and the Middle East. Connecting Galle to Colombo was significant 
because, Colombo, located 72 miles north of Galle, was the British colony’s political 
capital. The capital was established after the fall of the Kandyan Kingdom in 1815. Before 
then, Colombo had functioned primarily as a military base for the British as well as the 
Dutch and the Portuguese. Its location in the center of cinnamon production had also 
made it a significant entrepôt in the cinnamon trade.  
 
The connection between Colombo and Galle was considerably important for the colony 
throughout European and, in particular, British rule. Firstly, the cinnamon harvested in 
and around Colombo was sold to merchants whose ships departed from Galle. Secondly, 
after Colombo had become the colonial capital of the British, the two cities linked the 
administrative flow of information and news. Political mail and public news traveled 
regularly between Colombo and Galle. Correspondence from Colombo to London left 
the colony from Galle and correspondence from the metropolitan government was 
introduced to the colony through Galle. Also, Galle functioned as the gateway between 
Western and Eastern colonies. Imperial mail addressed to locations in India and Great 
Britain traveled frequently through Galle from Australia, Singapore, and other Eastern 
colonies—and vice versa. Thirdly, as expressed by the minutes of the committee and 
                                                            
206 James Tennent Emerson, Ceylon: An Account of the Island, Physical, Historical, and Topographical with Notices 
of Its Natural History, Antiquities and Productions, 1860, 555.  
207 Ibid. 
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subcommittee, the connection was critical for local merchants who required knowledge of 
market and shipping information between the two areas. Communication between Galle 
and Colombo was therefore critical for an array of people and associations both politically 
and commercially.  
 
Prior to the establishment of the telegraph, a communication network formed by human 
and animal agencies had linked Galle and Colombo. During Dutch occupation messages 
were relayed by message runners who traveled the distance between Galle and Colombo 
along coastal roads. The trip took up to 72 hours. The Dutch also established a pigeon 
service that operated between the various Dutch forts in Colombo and Galle as well as in 
Jaffna and Batticaloa. The British continued this practice. News that was shipped to the 
port of Galle was transferred by bullock carts, horse coaches, and mail runners which 
could make the journey to Colombo in at least nine hours. From 1850 to 1858, the Ceylon 
Observer used pigeons to send abstracts of news ahead of the carts traveling to the printers 
in Colombo.  
 
The importance of establishing telegraphic communication in Ceylon was initially to 
substantiate the important relationship between Galle and Colombo and to improve upon 
the system of communications which had existed between these two areas. Telegraphic 
news was thought to travel more quickly than pigeons (this was not true in the early years, 
however). Moreover, merchants and shippers would have quicker access to market and 
docking information, much more readily than information obtained from posted materials. 
The establishment of the telegraph between Galle and Colombo did not replace but 
rather supplemented preexisting methods of communication; mail carts and message 
runners existed alongside telegraphic communication.208 The pigeon service, however, was 
disbanded in the same year that the telegraph was introduced, which may or may not have 
been a coincidence. 
 
In addition to the relationship between Galle and Colombo, India’s government also 
played a substantial role in determining the outlay of Ceylon’s telegraph network. It not 
                                                            
208 Liyanage, The History of the Sri Lanka Post Office: 1815-1987, 2. 
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only influenced the island’s government to connect its lines to the subcontinent but also 
instigated the expansion of the network north of Colombo in general. Correspondence 
between the two governments from 1856 to 1857 supports this claim. According to letter 
no. 19 of 1856 from the Home Department to the Court of Directors of the British East 
India Company, the Home Department had informed the Court in a previous letter, no. 1 
of 1856, that it had “intimated to the Ceylon Government that if that Government would 
construct a line from Galle to the Straits, we should be prepared to bear half the expense 
of forming the communication between the Island of Ceylon and the mainland of India; 
and would connect that line with the general Indian line, at some convenient point in one 
of the southern districts of the Madras Presidency.”209 However, Ceylon’s government was 
reluctant and responded that “they were unable to close with [the] proposal” on the 
grounds that its interest in establishing telegraphic communication was limited to the 72 
miles between Galle and Colombo. It  
 
[…] would not be furthered by its extension to the mainland of India…There is no 
population north of Colombo to warrant the outlay, and no trade with India that 
calls for it, whereas the Indian government would seem to have some direct 
interest in the communication with Galle for the sake of the earlier information 
that might thus be obtained from China and the Eastward, as well as from the 
Australian colonies, when steam communication with them is reopened.210 
 
Although connecting Galle and Colombo was a priority for the colony, it is doubtful that 
Ceylon’s government had no interests “north of Colombo” given that the committee and 
subcommittee had verified that the network would greatly benefit from being connected 
to both Kandy and India. The Secretary to the Government of India, C. Beadon, 
expressed that the Secretary of State for the Colonies also disagreed with the validity of 
the Governor’s response: 
 
                                                            
209 Home Government to Court of Directors “Electric Telegraph,” no. 19 0f 1856 located in CO 54, 24 
October 1857 
210 Ibid., no. 14 0f 1856 located in CO 54, 24 October 1857 
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 His Lordship in Council is unable altogether to concur with the Governor 
General of Ceylon in conceiving that the interest of Ceylon in this line is limited to 
the 72 miles between Colombo and Galle and would not be furthered by its 
extension to the Mainland of India, but he is willing to admit that a greater 
measure of advantage may be expected to accrue to India from the connection 
than to the colony, and is disposed to accede to the proposal that the expense of 
constructing it as far as the western coast of the island of Manaar should be borne 
by the Government of India.211 
 
However doubtful, it was in response to the Secretary’s final remark, “that the expense of 
constructing it as far as the western coast of the island of Manaar should be borne by the 
Government of India” that India’s and Ceylon’s governments began negotiations to 
proceed with the construction of the network. In other words, because India’s 
government decided to pay for the entire cost of connecting the mainland to the island, 
Ceylon’s Governor agreed to extend its network north of Colombo.  
 
In letter no. 19 of 1856 the Home Government—in accordance to the Secretary of State’s 
decision—wrote that it understood Ceylon’s reluctance to attach its network to India and 
offered to bear the entire expense of constructing the line from India as far as the western 
coast of the island of Manaar. The Indian government also offered to provide at Ceylon’s 
expense officers to oversee the construction and materials at cost price. Ceylon’s 
government accepted the offer. On 3 October 1856 Colonial Secretary of Ceylon 
MacCarthy conveyed to the Governor General in Council that “Ceylon willingly accepts 
and are prepared to act on as soon as the requisite staff and materials which the Governor 
General has kindly consented to place at the disposal of this government are available for 
work.”212    
 
Governor Ward’s ultimate acceptance of India’s offer casts suspicion on his earlier 
reluctance. It seems very probable that Governor Ward had been negotiating with India 
                                                            
211 C. Beadon  Esquire, Secretary to the Government of India to the Honorable C.J. MacCarthy, 26 
August 1856, located in CO 54, 24 October 1857. 
212  MacCarthy to William, 3 October 1856, located in CO 54, 24 October 1857. 
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rather than inflexibly disapproving the initial prospect of connecting the telegraph to 
India. Nevertheless, it is likely that if India had not continued its negotiations with Ceylon 
and offered to pay, the island’s initial telegraph network would have connected only Galle 
and Colombo as stated by MacCarthy in letter no. 14 of 1856 and would not have 
connected to India—at least initially. That India paid for the construction of the Paumben 
submarine cable signaled the network’s construction north of Colombo and its link to the 
subcontinent. Thus, although it is possible that Governor Ward was only bluffing to 
provoke a favorable response from India and would have constructed the network 
beyond Colombo anyway, the records indicate that the outlay of the network north of 
Colombo was first and foremost directed by India’s government.  
 
The offer from India was subject to four conditions, however.  First, Ceylon’s telegraphs 
should be constructed on the same plan in all material respects as the Madras line. Second, 
employees would be required to conform to the instructions of the Superintendent of the 
Electric Telegraphs in India—subject to final orders of the Ceylon government. Third, all 
receipts from messages between Ceylon and India should be credited to the two 
governments respectively in proportion to the length of telegraph line. Fourth, Indian 
messages should have next preference after Ceylon and vice versa.  
 
Ceylon’s government also laid down some conditions. MacCarthy expressed that he 
expected the line between Colombo and Galle to be constructed first, and he made clear 
that the line would be carried in the following direction: “The network would extend 
from Galle to Colombo and Kandy, and thence by the Central Road to Manaar, as the 
communication by this Route is considered to be of more importance to the island and 
capable of easier construction than that by the Western Coast from Colombo to 
Manaar.”213 The expansion of the network north of Colombo into Kandy and Manaar was 
thus born in the negotiations between India’s and Ceylon’s governments in determining 
the connection of the network to the subcontinent. Manaar was chosen for its proximity 
to the mainland. But, we should pause here for a moment to reflect on the telegraphic 
significance of Kandy and what MacCarthy had in mind when suggesting that the network 
                                                            
213 MacCarthy to William, 3 October 1856, located in CO 54, 24 October 1857. 
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traverse it. At first glance, this might bear an easy answer. Kandy was located in the 
central highlands and was within reasonable distance of the majority of the island’s coffee 
plantations. It was furthermore the site of administrative control over the central regions. 
Therefore, it seemingly would have been useful to the local communities in commercial 
and political correspondence. However, according to related documents, there was very 
little local use of Kandy’s telegraph office. Rather, Kandy functioned as a switching or 
relay station between Galle, Colombo, and India.214 Therefore, it is likely that Kandy itself 
had little impact on the network’s initial outlay except for its central location and 
intermediary position between India and Colombo and Galle Therefore, to summarize the 
rationale behind the network’s initial outlay, I would suggest that there were two major 
influences: first, the relationship between Galle and Colombo and, second, India’s desire 
to connect its own network to Ceylon, coupled with its generous financial investments. 
And, Kandy and Manaar were byproducts that functioned as relay stations.  
 
The rationale behind the network’s expansion diverged from these initial factors. The 
importance of external communication affected telegraphic growth. According to the 
letters and statements to the Telegraph Superintendent in 1868 215 the quantity of local 
telegraphic communication was trumped substantially by the telegraphic traffic along the 
Indo-Ceylon and Indo-European lines. Between 1865 and 1867,216 tariffs collected from 
local telegrams accounted for only sixteen percent of total revenue. This meant that 
subsequent expansion was financed on revenue accumulated by external telegraphic 
communication, and the network was most likely to have expanded to connect locations 
in Ceylon to India, Europe, and other parts of the telegraphic world, not to each other. 
This differs remarkably from the idea behind the technology’s establishment in 1858 that 
was primarily driven by local demands to connect Galle and Colombo. It shows that the 
efficacy of the network, once in place, went beyond a mere servicing of local merchants. 
The network reached international importance.  
 
                                                            
214 SLNA 6/2463 1858 “Inspector of Telegraphs Report,” Bailey to O’Shaughnessy 8 November 1858 
215 Ibid. 
216 The line from India to England was opened in 1865. Before this date, it was not possible to telegraph 
directly between Ceylon and Europe. 
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Secondly, the expansion of the telegraph was highly influenced by the trajectory of the 
railway. As the railway expanded so too did railway telegraph lines—this, like in India as 
well, was contrary to the establishment of telegraphy in England, where telegraphy 
followed the development of the railway. Another factor behind the telegraph’s expansion 
was the growth of the island’s postal department. From 1869, as the next section will 
explain, post offices became responsible for conveying telegraphic messages—even a 
telegram could be sent from an office with no telegraph, the message was carried on by a 
messenger to a nearby telegraph office or to the recipient. Each new post office 
subsequently became part of the telegraph network.  
 
Institutionalization of Ceylon’s Telegraph Network 
 
Ceylon’s telegraph network was entirely the business of the colonial government. There 
were legal ordinances substantiating the colonial state’s power over the technology. By the 
authority of “The Electric Telegraph Ordinance of 1857,” Ceylon’s Governor was given 
control over all aspects of Ceylon’s telegraph network from its construction to its 
expansion and maintenance, the Ordinance gave him power to enter on lands to install 
the system and to punish those suspected of tampering with the network in any 
manner—pending, of course, the sanction of the Secretary of State for the colonies. The 
Ordinance was substantially amended and expanded in 1892 by “The Ceylon Postal and 
Telegraph Ordinance, 1892” and again by “The Ceylon Postal and Telegraph Amendment 
Ordinance, 1899.” However, the institutionalization of the network was not a 
straightforward affair and the Governor had very little hands-on involvement operating 
the network. Rather, government institutions such as the Electric Telegraph Department 
were responsible for the telegraph’s operation in the island. This too was not simple, 
however. From the telegraph’s introduction until the end of the century, the charge of the 
telegraph’s operation went through four phases of institutionalization.  
 
The first phase of the telegraph network’s institutionalization included the years of its 
construction (1857-1858) until the end of 1859. During this phase the network was in an 
unclear position. On the one hand, Ceylon’s government was paying for the construction 
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out of the island’s surplus funding, while, on the other hand, Bailey of the Indian 
Telegraph Department was in charge of constructing and operating the lines.217 There was 
no clear departmental framework established for running the telegraph and the majority 
of instructions continued to derive from O’Shaughnessy in India.                                                             
 
The second phase of institutionalization, which lasted from 1860-1869, witnessed a more 
organized approach to the island’s telegraph network. India’s involvement ended and 
Ceylon’s government gained autonomy over the network. During this phase, expenditure 
for the network was taken from Public funding, which made the source of its payment on 
par with the civil service and the Public Works Department. More importantly, however, 
the Electric Telegraph Department was established with Skinner as its superintendent. 
Ceylon’s government devised its own tariff charges, organized the office staff, and 
maintained the network in all it material and mechanical functions.    
    
The third phase of institutionalization lasted from 1869 until 1879. During this phase, 
control over the network, under mutually agreed upon terms, was taken from Ceylon’s 
government and given to the Indian Telegraph Department. The reason for this 
arrangement included the government of Ceylon’s inability to lower tariff charges on 
European telegraph messages to the rate of India’s.218  
 
The fourth phase of institutionalization was the one which endured longest, lasting from 
1880 into the twentieth century. This phase witnessed the return of Ceylon’s network to a 
department of Ceylon’s government. In 1880, the Postal and Telegraph Department of 
Ceylon was formed, combining the control and operation of the telegraph with that of the 
post into a single governmental body. According to the Administration Report for the 
1880, “economy” was the reason for the network’s return to Ceylon’s government:  
 
The Director of telegraphs in India required a payment of Rs. 70,000 to meet the 
loss on working the Ceylon Telegraphs, and this Government, not being prepared 
to agree to such terms, it was eventually decided to combine the Post and 
                                                            
217 SLNA 6/2463 “Inspector of Telegraphs Report,” 6 November 1858. 
218 SLNA 10/70 “Letters and Statements to the Telegraph Superintendent 1858-1872,” 2 March 1868.  
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Telegraphs in Ceylon in accordance with the example set by the United Kingdom, 
France, and other countries.219    
     
CONCLUSION 
 
I crafted this chapter for two reasons. Firstly, I wanted to write the telegraph in its global 
and local historical contexts and to create what can be considered as the first “history” of 
the island’s telegraph network—although much more work, of course, could have been 
done in this latter area; however, the topic of the dissertation is not concerned with an 
institutional history of the telegraph, per se, and my point here was to introduce rather 
than exhaust the subject. Secondly, I wrote it to indicate the extent to which Ceylon’s 
telegraph network was a technology of colonial government. Ceylon’s government 
introduced the network for commerce. This point will be important, particularly in 
chapter four, where I show that a large portion of the colonial administration was 
precluded from accessing the network, given its capital-centric design. But the colonial 
government, nevertheless, had its hands in all manners of the technology from its 
development to its operation, and would go on to make use of the technology directly. 
The disjunction between intention and application provides a wider picture of the colonial 
government’s relationship with the technology, enabling us to assess its utilization of the 
technology and the extent of its efficacy in administration. This dissertation turns now to 
refocus and commence its raison d’être, which will be delineated in the following two 
chapters and in the conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
219 SLNA Administration Reports for Ceylon, 1880.  
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CHAPTER THREE: TELEGRAMS AND OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As the previous chapter argued, the telegraph was introduced to serve the needs of 
commercial capitalism. The government installed the technology to provide local 
businesses and private persons with an ability, in their pursuit of market-gains, to 
communicate market prices, to trade, to announce the arrival and departure of shipments, 
etc. The telegraph facilitated lightning fast communication which could convey and tap 
into knowledge of world market prices, thereby transcending constraints of local space 
and time. While the technology was not intended to serve government directly, it was 
nevertheless part of governmental state building. It was a technology deployed by the 
government for the intention of giving businessmen and traders greater access to the free 
market economy—the technology was purported to connect the colony to a global 
dimension of commercial capitalism, thereby reflexively bringing nineteenth-century 
ideals of civilization and progress, that had originated in Europe, to the local populations 
in Ceylon. In this sense, the introduction of the telegraph network symbolically 
represented the organization, control, space, and “governmentality” 220  of nineteenth-
century colonial government; but, to repeat, it was not introduced as a direct tool of 
imperial communication. 
 
After a decade of its introduction, this focus changed and the technology became a direct 
component of Ceylon’s colonial government. In the mid 1860s, Ceylon’s colonial 
government began to use the telegraph to send and receive a broad range of its own 
communications, from shipping news, which would later be published in governmental 
gazettes, to official correspondence between Ceylon and London. This chapter analyzes 
the role that these government telegrams played and how they served the colonial 
government as a direct part of its administration. In it, I focus on the incorporation of 
the telegraph in the particular channel of colonial government called “official 
                                                            
220 Governmentality is taken up in chapter, 2 subchapter 2. For a discussion on governmentality, see 
Simon Gunn, “From Hegemony to Governmentality: Changing Conceptions of Power in Social History,” 
Journal of Social History 39, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 705–720. 
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correspondence”—that is, the communication between the Governor of Ceylon and the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. I seek to understand how the telegraph became 
incorporated in this official channel and what consequences it had on the imperial 
government. I go on to show that the telegraph added a number of new dimensions to 
the ways in which the Governor and the Secretary of State communicated; but it did not 
revolutionize the administration. Letters continued to mediate official correspondence, 
acting as the main medium used in official correspondence. Rather than replacing letters 
or transforming the system of communication, telegrams became part of the system, 
working alongside and in conjunction with letters and other forms of communication.  
   
There are three main reasons that justify the chapter’s focus on telegraphic 
communication and official correspondence. Firstly, as the exclusive chain of 
communication between the Secretary of State for the colonies and the Governor of 
Ceylon, official correspondence was the single most important channel of 
communication between the colony and the imperial center. Secondly, telegrams were 
used at a regular pace in official correspondence following the Governor of Ceylon’s first 
transmission of a telegram to the Secretary of State on 10 December 1865.221 From then, 
telegrams were a normal component of everyday exchanges between the two highest 
ranking officials responsible for governing the colony. Finally, telegrams enlarged the 
scope of official correspondence by enabling colonial government officials to 
communicate in hitherto unknown and unparallel ways. Their use thus marked a 
watershed in the history of official correspondence, as the new medium altered the 
capacity of, and the forms and symbols previously ascribed to, the official exchanges 
between the Secretary of State and the Governor in their pursuit of governing the island 
of Ceylon. A study of telegraphic communication thus offers fresh grounds for exploring 
and questioning the relationship between imperial communications, power, and 
technological change in the nineteenth-century.  
 
The analytical framework of this chapter is rather straightforward. I first explain the 
system of official correspondence that was in operation before the telegraph was 
                                                            
221 NA CO 54/406 10 December 1865. The telegram was about the colony’s surplus fund.  
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introduced and then gauge the ways that telegraphic communication became integrated 
into (and excluded from) it. I delineate the multitude uses and benefits of telegraphic 
communication in official correspondence as well as its limitations, explaining the extent 
of its utility. Before proceeding, however, I will briefly reintroduce Ceylon’s British 
political history and explain the basic operational structure of its colonial government. I 
will then define official correspondence and highlight its significance to the colony and its 
political history.   
 
Brief Overview of Ceylon’s Political History 
 
Until the island’s independence in 1948, Ceylon had been a target of colonial contact and 
imperial intrigue for over four hundred years. 222 This colonial legacy is typically divided 
between Portuguese rule (1505-1658), Dutch rule (1658-1796), and British rule (1796-
1948). Following what Nira Wickramasingha has stated, “for four hundred years the 
island of Sri Lanka was the prey of successive naval powers that controlled parts or the 
totality of its land…Colonial conquest was predicated on superior sea power and arms, 
military organization, political strength and economic wealth.”223 In the wake of these 
colonial encounters all aspects of life—including the relation between peoples and places, 
economies, local and global social ties, systems and rationalities of government—
underwent significant changes, transformations, fractures, and contestation. For, through 
all periods of the island’s encounter with colonialism, the methods for, the motivations 
behind, and the extent of territorial conquest differed, as well as the ways in which 
colonialism became negotiated into the everyday lives of the colonized people. “The ‘rule’ 
                                                            
222 For a more in-depth understanding of the British occuupation of Ceylon, espeically in regard to the 
early years of rule, see: K.M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (New York: Penguin Books, 2005); Lennox A. 
Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule 1795-1932: with an account of the East India Company's Embassies to Kandy 1762-
1795 (London: Oxford University Press, 1933); Garrett Champness Mendis, Ceylon under the British 
(Colombo Apothecaries' Co., 1948); Colvin R. de Silva, Ceylon under the British occupation 1795-1833, vol. 1 
(Blacksburg: Navrang, 1995); K.M. de Silva, “Chapter I - The Coming of the British to Ceylon,” University 
of Ceylon, History of Ceylon (from the beginning of the 19th century to 1948) 3 (1973): 1-11; Vernon L. B Mendis, 
The advent of the British to Ceylon, 1762-1803, 1st ed. (Tisara Prakasakayo, 1971). 
223 Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities (Sri Lanka: Vijitha 
Yapa Publications, 2006), 7. 
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of these three powers was,” finally, “sometimes nothing more than a presence that grew, 
spread or declined in space time.”224  
 
British rule differed markedly from that of the Portuguese and the Dutch in a number of 
notable ways. Firstly, Britain’s annexation of the Kandyan Kingdom, located in the 
central highlands of the island—which later became the site of coffee and then tea 
plantations—under the auspices of the Kandyan Convention in 1815, signaled the first 
time in which the entire island came under a European colonial authority. From the 
perspective of the British, the effects of this conquest included a reengagement with and 
reformation of the island’s political territory, to involve what had until then remained the 
island’s traditional “heartland”—a process which encompassed a significant 
reorganization of the colony’s administrative structures. 225  The fall of the Kandyan 
Kingdom also signaled a redefinition of British rule in Ceylon. No longer threatened by 
counter-presence on the island, the focus of expanding commercial capitalism began to 
trump the attention formally ascribed to military expenditure. This process culminated in 
the second important unique characteristic of British rule, which was the institution of 
liberal economic policies beginning in 1833. 
 
The popularly noted Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833 brought substantial changes 
to the island’s government and, consequently, the formal relationship between 
colonialism and the island’s people. It reconfigured and recast the structure of the island’s 
government, political machinery, and social economy in a multitude of ways. Most 
notably mercantilism, which had been the raison d’être of all three European colonial 
powers up to this point, was formally abolished. The cinnamon monopoly, which had 
dominated colonial revenue for centuries, was disbanded and replaced by commercial 
capitalism. The exportation of coffee, then tea, and rubber by entrepreneurs, with the aid 
of migrant labor mostly from Southern India, became the highlights of high-noon British 
imperialism in Ceylon.   
 
                                                            
224 Ibid., 8. 
225 K.M. de Silva, “The Development of the Administrative System, 1833 to c.1910”, 217  
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The advent of British rule is itself divisible by a few noteworthy circumstances. Firstly, 
the British originally encountered Ceylon as a profit seeking business venture under the 
guise of the English East India Company, which seized Jaffna and Colombo from the 
Dutch in 1796. It was not sought as a potential location for a colony. The British 
government, however, was also implicated in the capture. It had militarily backed up the 
East India Company in order to be able to use the island’s maritime regions, such as 
Trincomalee, as naval bases to secure ships against any possible future threat from the 
French in India. If the French attempted to siege India, the British would have at their 
dispose closely located military ships to counterattack.  
 
Secondly, it was not until a few years later that the formal British Crown became involved 
in ruling Ceylon.  In 1797, the failure of peace negotiations at Lille triggered the British 
government to place Ceylon more emphatically under the Crown than before. 226 
Responsibility of ruling Ceylon was then divided between the Company and the 
government—whilst the director of the Company was in charge of financial and 
commercial matters, the Governor General controlled issues of law and order. This dual 
rule quickly ended because of pressure from the central government and, on the 1st of 
January 1802, Ceylon was placed under the sole rule of the British Crown. It was formally 
ceded by the fifth article of the Peace of Amiens in March of the same year.227 The early 
history of the British in Ceylon was thus marked by significant changes in the structure of 
its power. But, from 1802 until its independence, Ceylon remained what historians have 
called a “Crown Colony.”  
The Colonial Office List (1878), 1878. The 1878 Colonial Office List provides us with the first 
formal definition of a British Crown Colony. In it, a Crown Colony is defined as a colony 
in which the crown held absolute control over legislation, whilst the administration was 
carried on by public officers under the control of the Home Government. The definition 
is only loosely defined, however. It did not take into account any of a colony’s unique 
                                                            
226Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age, 26. 
227 K.M. de Silva, “Chapter I - The Coming of the British to Ceylon,” 10; G.C. Mendis, The Colebrooke-
Cameron Papers: Documents on British Colonial Policy in Ceylon 1796-1833, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), 30; de Silva, Ceylon Under the British Occupation 1795-1833, 1:249; Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule 
1795-1932: With an Account of the East India Company’s Embassies to Kandy 1762-1795, 41; A.E. Buultjens, ed., 
“The Dutch East India Company and the Peace of Aimens, 1802,” in Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register, 
vol. I, pt IV, 1916, 237–242. 
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characteristics. For example, although Crown Colonies functioned within a constitutional 
framework laid down by acts of Parliament, constitutional uniformity was not ensured 
throughout the empire. Making light of the subject, but reflecting seriously on it, T.O. 
Lloyd wrote “Perhaps there really was a rule at the Colonial Office that no colony should 
have a constitution exactly like that of any other colony; if so, it was enforced with an 
entirely untypical uniformity.” 228 Also, the type of rule implicated in each territory varied 
at different points in the colony’s history. For example, India, which began as a venture 
of the English East India Company, became directly ruled by the Crown following the 
intense altercations between the British government and Sepoys in northern India in 
1857. As described above, British occupation in Ceylon followed a similar, albeit less 
bloody, trajectory, in which the island began as a British East India Company venture and 
later developed into a territory under the sole power of the British Crown. The category, 
Crown Colony, thus while useful in imagining the identity of a colony generally, does not 
account for a colony’s constitutional or historical details.  
The Crown only virtually controlled Ceylon, in any case. Real authority rested in the 
representative bodies of the Governor General appointed to the island and the Secretary 
of State for the colonies. Their individual duties and interactions constituted the 
foundation of Ceylon’s government. The Secretary of State was the representative of the 
Crown for the colonies. He was responsible to the British Government, and thence to 
Parliament, for the affairs of the colonies under his domain. All decisions regarding the 
ways in which colonies under his jurisdiction were run ultimately began and ended with 
him. All legislative, executive, and judicial decisions were under his authority and all 
individual Acts depended on his consent. An official was given title to represent him and 
enforce his decisions within the colonies.  
The Governor General represented the Secretary of State in Ceylon. The full extent of 
his authority was impressive. He had executive and legislative powers and responsibilities 
within the colony—and he exercised virtually all the constitutional functions of the 
Crown within his territory. The breadth and scope of his duties were officially declared in 
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the both Rules and Regulations for Her majesty’s Colonial Service,229 of 1843, and in the Colonial 
Office List under the “Rules and Regulations” chapter concerning the behavior of the 
Governor230 (figure 1). According to the texts, the Governor was in charge of everything 
that occurred in his colony, from the smallest of bureaucratic details such as granting 
leaves of absence to the institution of large scale public infrastructural projects, civil 
servant appointments, dealing with riots, and managing the colony’s finance; and, he was 
even the final verdict on criminal trials.231 While his powers were supreme in Ceylon, 
however, he was subject to the Secretary of State in London. As his subordinate, the 
Governor was expected to obey the Secretary of State’s instructions on matters of any 
importance; or, he was obliged to postpone action until he had obtained the higher 
official’s prior consent. 232  In cases of emergency like riots or famines, however, the 
Governor had discretionary authority to take immediate action and could disobey 
unnecessary directions. Still, the Governor had to inform the Secretary of State of any 
course of action which he took and all measures remained provisional, not official, until 
consented.233 So, while the Governor had the right and duty to rule Ceylon directly, the 
Secretary of State was wholly implicated in the process. Ceylon was thus ruled, on a 
fundamental level at least, by the hierarchically distinct officials of Governor and 
Secretary of State. Official correspondence was the formal medium of exchange between 
these two powers and therefore representative of the Crown itself. 
 
Official Correspondence 
 
Official correspondence, also known as official “despatches,” formed the core of 
Ceylon’s colonial government. 234  It was any and all communications between the 
                                                            
229  Great Britain. Colonial Office, Rules and Regulations for Her Majesty’s Colonial Service (Printed by W. 
Clowes and sons for H.M. Stationery off., 1843), 1–9. 
230 The Colonial Office List (1878), 1878; Arthur N. Birch and William Robinson, The Colonial Office List for 
1867, Comprising Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the Colonial Dependencies of Great Britain: With an 
Account of the Services of the Principal Officers of the Several Colonial Governments (Pall Mall: Harrison, 1867). 
231 Birch and Robinson, Colonial Office List for 1867, 136. 
232 Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule 1795-1932: With an Account of the East India Company’s Embassies to Kandy 
1762-1795, 101. 
233 Ibid., 101. 
234 R.B. Pugh, The Records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices (HMSO, 1964), 34. 
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Governor and the Secretary of State in administering the colony.235 While its primary 
purposes were to inform, instruct, and to inquire on various subject matters related to 
colonial government, it was, more importantly, the medium through which colonial 
government articulated itself; being both the practical and representational link between 
the Home government in London and the colony. Whether related to fiscal matters, 
legislative enactments, executive decisions, or even descriptions of cultural events and 
ideas, most aspects of Ceylon’s government was discursively bound in the form of official 
correspondence. 236  The majority of communicated topics dealt with everyday 
administrative business, including, but not limited to, descriptions of account balances, 
official appointments, public expenditure, and requests for leave of absence. 
Extraordinary events such as the outbreak of riots, famine, and disciplinary problems 
were also, but less frequently, communicated. Whatever the topic: official 
correspondence was the means by which the Governor and the Secretary of State 
communicated and managed the colony.237 
 
Official correspondence also articulated and represented the hierarchical relationship 
between the Governor and the Secretary of State. Take this event for example, in which 
the Governor made a decision knowing beforehand that the Secretary of State would not 
have approved. Lord Granville had appointed Sir William Gregory as Governor of 
Ceylon in 1871. The following year he set sail with his wife to uphold his position.238 As 
                                                            
235 Rules 153 and 154 of the "Rules and Regulations" section of the Colonial Office List expressly indicate 
this rule.Arthur N. Birch and William Robinson, The Colonial Office List for 1867, comprising Historical and 
Statistical Information respecting the Colonial Dependencies of Great Britain: With an account of the Services of the 
Principal Officers of the Several Colonial Governments (Pall Mall: Harrison, 1867), 146. 
236 It is useful to note that individual governors had considerable but varying authority to "run their 
territory as they saw fit," subject to instructions issued on the governor’s appointment, the agreement of 
legislature, and pressure from local interest. Thus the degree to which events were mentioned in 
despatches varied accordingly. See: Mandy Banton, Administering the Empire, 1801-1968: A Guide to the 
Records of the Colonial Office in the National Archives of the UK (Institute of Historical Research, 2008), 52-3. 
237 This is not to say that other types of correspondence were not important to decision-making. It is just 
to say that only correspondence between the governor and secretary of state  counted as official language 
in respect to colonial government. In fact, a great deal of correspondence which reached either London 
or Colombo derived from other people and places. There was a lot of correspondence, for example, 
between the governor’s secretariat and the Colonial Office's upper class staff. For example: NA CO 
54/292 29 August 1873. 
238 Governor Gregory writes in his autobiography that upon arriving in Ceylon he was struck by scenes of 
beauty—not uncommon to contemporary observers.He was in awe over the island’s pleasant natural 
landscape. ‘The morning was beautiful’, he wrote, "and the scenery absolutely enchanting…" Gregory, Sir. 
William Henry, Sir William Gregory, K. C. M. G., formerly member of Parliament and sometime governor of Ceylon. 
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other Governors before him, his first night’s stay in Ceylon was ceremoniously 
commemorated at the Queen’s House in Galle. He was met by the civil and military elite 
of the town and put up in the best of the building’s rooms, replete with privileged 
amenities. While he was struck pleasantly by the beauty of the “hibiscus flowers in the 
little garden attached”239 to it, he was at incommensurable odds with the enormous size of 
the estate bed that he was to sleep in, which was, in his words, “large enough to allow at 
least a half a dozen folks to sleep in comfort.”240 Not that he thought of himself too 
humbly to be met by such grand circumstances, but the fact that the greatness of the 
Queen’s House came at the expense of the colony was considered to be impractical and 
unnecessary, especially since there was already a most “admirable hotel in the town.”241 
Selling the Queen’s House at Galle for £1500 and buying another at Newara Eliya, “for 
about the same amount,”242 was one of his first actions as Governor. Whether the new 
house was less ostentatious than the one in Galle is irrespective. What is interesting here 
is the way in which Governor Gregory executed his decision. Warned by his Colonial 
Secretary Mr. Irving that the Secretary of State would not approve of the sale, Governor 
Gregory decided that the best course of action then was “to act first and inform the 
Secretary of State later.”243 That meant, he would sell the house and then declare in a 
“despatch” that he had done so. The despatch was sent as a telegram; it was handed to 
the Colonial Office on the 10th of November 1872 at 10pm. All it said was “Galle House 
sold last month.”244 “Great was his [the Secretary of State’s] wrath,” continued Gregory in 
his autobiography, “and an angry desptach was sent to me, stating that I was not 
warranted in disposing of a public building of that kind.”245 Governor Gregory said that 
he replied “in a penitent, but somewhat sarcastic missive” and he did not meet any 
further consequences.246 I use this example because it shows how official correspondence 
was used for purposes that transcended the practical. It was also representational. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
An autobiography: Gregory, William Henry, Sir, 1817-1892, ed. Lady Gregory (London: William Clowes and 
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Irrespective of the Governor’s non-compliant actions, sending official correspondence 
redressed his subversive actions by showing symbolically that hierarchy was respected. 
  
Governor Gregory’s course of action was not uncommon; in fact, it exemplified quite 
well the characteristic of his position. The relationship between the Governor and the 
Secretary of State functioned under, what early twentieth-century historian Henry L. Hall 
has called, an unspoken “policy of trust.”247 When the question of Governor Salaries was 
presented before the Parliamentary Committee of 1847-48, Earl Grey said it was “sound 
economy to pay them well” because the best men were needed: “To attempt to conduct 
the details of the administration from this country is absolutely impracticable.”248 At the 
end of the 1870s, Charles Adderly, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, remarked that “in 
distant Crown Colonies the Home Government can only supervise—they cannot judge 
except on the Governor’s information. Their original act is sending a good Governor, 
and their check is dismissing him. He may not initiate essential changes without 
consulting them and obtaining their sanction, but he may have to guide and influence 
local opinion and test and even agitate local feeling on questions of reform…”249 Selling a 
public building behind the Secretary of State’s back may have challenged to some extent 
the policy of trust inherent in their relationship, but it did not warrant the Secretary of 
State’s main method of checking his authority, which would have been the dismissal of 
the Governor from his position in office. While he was by description an appointee 
subordinate to the Secretary of State and was therefore required to follow his superior’s 
every command, the Governor in actuality held far yielding executive powers and 
exercised a significant amount of autonomy in the colony. It was a matter of expressing 
his behavior as a subordinate in official correspondence in a proper protocol which was 
most important for the retention of their relationship and the representation of hierarchy. 
Official correspondence was thus the channel of expression through which colonial rule 
and policy were maintained and shared; and, it was the plane on and through which the 
hierarchical distinctions between the Secretary of State and the Governor were practiced 
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and actualized. Ceylon’s colonial government was therefore dynamically fashioned 
together by the words contained in official correspondence.  
 
SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION 
 
By the time the telegraph arrived on the island, a system of communication designed to 
circulate official correspondence was already well established. This system had formed 
the basis of Ceylon’s colonial government, as it was the channel through which Ceylon 
and the Home government exercised Crown authority in the island, and the vehicle 
through which decisions about the colony were articulated, transferred, and executed.  
The official correspondence letter and its flow between and within the Colonial Office 
and Ceylon were the most important and noteworthy components of this system of 
communication; a system which I now attempt to explain.   
 
The Letter 
 
Before the advent of the telegraph, the system to communicate official correspondence 
communication was fundamentally dominated by letters.  Supplementary materials such 
as blue books of statistics and legislative and executive proceedings were also part of the 
parcel of official correspondence despatches. However, letters were the start and end of 
any and all conversations between the Governor and the Secretary of State in regard to 
government; all other materials played and ancillary role.  
 
There are a few main points consider about letters. Firstly, letters were not just 
manifestations of the Governor’s thoughts at random, an idea thought up in the middle 
of the night and written on personal stationery. Rather, official correspondence letters, 
and the kind of information they contained, were officially drafted, structured, ordered, 
and regulated. The appearance of official correspondence letters was standard and 
uniform. Their pages were made of parchment, slightly larger than today’s ‘A4’ size. They 
were often composed on multiple sheets of paper. And letters arrived as parts of a parcel 
of despatches.  
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Next, letters were uniform. Most official correspondence letters were almost always 
formatted in the following ways (figure 2). First, the name of the colony in concern 
appeared in dark black ink at the top of the first page. Second, below that the location 
from where and the date on which the letter was sent were described. Third, the body of 
the message began in the middle of the page, starting with a proper address to the 
Secretary of State or the Governor, referring to his official title. Their names, therefore, 
were preceded with indications to these respective titles, usually with Lord or Sir—a 
typical written address to the Secretary of State would commence with “Dear Sir or My 
Lord,” for example.250 Whichever title, the Governor and the Secretary of State most 
always indicated, following the address, “the Honor” with which the message was written 
to their superior or subordinate, or, in cases of tragedy, their deep felt “regret.” Fourth, 
the addressee’s name and title were repeated at the bottom left of the same page. Fifth, 
the message was divided into paragraphs, which were numbered if more than one was 
used. And, the message of the letter conveyed and articulated a specific topic of 
government, such as a request for opinion, affirmation, or advice, and/or a descriptive 
and qualitative report. Sixth, any information therein that the Governor or Secretary of 
State cited from other sources, including other despatches, was written into the margins 
of the letter next to the cited words. Seventh, the closing of the letter and the sender’s 
signature were given on the final page. Finally, the back side of the final page included a 
sentence describing the title of the letter and an abstract summary of its content. These 
eight characteristics were found on nearly every official correspondence letter sent 
between the Governor of Ceylon and the Secretary of State. 
 
Finally, a letter’s appearance, structure, and uniformity were regulated by the Colonial 
Office. Beginning in 1825, when the Colonial Office recognized the “want of some 
uniform mode in which all official communications should be addressed to this 
Department,” 251 the conduct of official correspondence became regulated by detailed 
instructions included in the “Rules and Regulations” of the Colonial Office List—first 
                                                            
250 Governors too held titles. General Henry Ward was Sir, for example. And, many secretaries of state 
carried titles such as Duke, Baron, Earl, Marquess, or Viscount as well.    
251 Banton, Administering the Empire, 1801-1968, 50-51. cites: CO 854/1, circular despatch of 26 July 1825. 
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compiled in 1837, and amended from time to time thereafter. 252  The instructions 
explained and set out the requirements for the layout of letters and their numbering.253 
For example, rule 155 stated that “The Governor’s despatches should be written in a 
large and distinct hand, with dark ink, on folio paper of uniform size; and an inner 
margin of about one-third of the paper should be left.” 254  The following few rules 
dictated how to docket and make notes in the margins.255 There were twenty-five rules 
related to the fashion and procedures of letter writing and sending between the Governor 
and the Secretary of State. Finished, submitted letters therefore resembled each other, 
albeit differing in subject matter and size (figure 3). Such regulations enforced a rationally 
uniform system of correspondence which instilled regularity in appearance, structure, and 
language in letter writing.   
 
Flow Between and Within the Colonial Office and Ceylon 
 
The monthly mail was a fundamental component of the movement of letters between 
Ceylon and London.256 Essentially, the official correspondence system was predicated 
upon on the regular and predictable intervals of mail delivered by way of sail and then 
steam ship. Letters were written, placed on a mail ship, and then sorted methodically and 
rationally each month, on a planned day, at the Colonial Office and in the Colony. Once 
a letter was signed by the proper authority, it was put into the post, shipped across 
thousands of miles of ocean and terrain, and then received at the other end. There it was 
circulated through bureaucratic channels. The information of the letter was examined and 
informed the necessary course of governmental action. Official correspondence letters, 
thus, followed a rational pattern of transmission and circulation. It flowed between two 
main sites: the Governor’s secretariat in Colombo257 and the Colonial Office in London. 
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For the purpose of analysis, however, I will restrict the scope of this chapter to the flow 
of correspondence in the Colonial Office and will exclude a detailed examination of the 
system of official correspondence from the perspective of the Governor’s secretariat. 258 
 
The Colonial Office located at thirteen and fourteen Downing Street, London, was 
created to deal specifically with the needs of the colonies and assigned to the Secretary of 
State for the colonies.259 The Colonial Office was in essence the Secretary of State’s 
secretariat, “the tool with which he does his work,”260 although in practice his subordinate 
staff was responsible for a great deal of the actual colonial administration. Under his 
authority there was an army of subordinate officials to aid in the duties of handling and 
administering official correspondence letters.261 These subordinates included the posts of 
three assistant undersecretaries, the permanent undersecretary, his assistants, senior and 
subordinate clerks, office keepers, and messengers.262 All official correspondence letters 
were written, read, and processed on premise by these official persons.  
 
Regularity of transmission and circulation was not always a characteristic of official 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
legislative council chambers near the Queen’s House in Fort, Colombo. It comprised the chief 
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261 “Following the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853, an additional post of Secretary of State was 
created, and the dual functions of the formerly united War and Colonial Department were split in 1854. It 
is only from this date that therefore that there can be said to be a Colonial Office proper.” In Ibid.  
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Duke UNiversity Press, 1969), 15. 
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correspondence letters, however. The sending and recording of letters in the 1820s and 
prior were unmistakably sloppy and irregular. Incoming letters were arranged haphazardly; 
drafts of replies were infrequently unavailable. And it was difficult to assess the course of 
action taken on any case presented in the letters, or by whom.263 By the early 1840s, 
though, the operations of the Colonial Office became rationalized under what has been 
termed “Stephen’s system,”264named after its progenitor Permanent Undersecretary James 
Stephen (4 February 1836—May 1848).265 Under this system, the errors of the previous 
decades were rectified. Stamps were introduced on all papers and contained the names of 
officials down to the rank of senior clerk, “to permit at a glance the determination of 
who has seen a given document and when.” Drafts of outgoing letters were retained. In 
general, the most notable effects of Stephen’s system were that whereas before channels 
of communication were uncertain, they were then made precise, knowable, and routine.266 
The system remained relatively unaltered until the early 1870s.  
 
Stephen’s system was applied more or less similarly to every letter. Typically, once a batch 
of official correspondence letters was received at the Colonial Office the following 
routine ensued. The first step was that a letter was sorted and registered.267 Normally, this 
involved entering specific details of it into the “register of correspondence,”268 which was 
in essence an official ruled entry book.  The letter was given a number, depending upon 
the date on which it was sent in relation to other despatches. These numbers started with 
1 for the first item opened and registered on the first working day of January each year. 
This number was stamped or written onto the despatch, normally in the header, and onto 
any accompanying minute sheet and often the enclosures too. The number was again 
marked in the register of correspondence. This number was important because it acted as 
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sender, and the type of information it contained. 
268  Colonial Office, “Colonial Office and Predecessor: Ceylon Register of Correspondence” (Kew, 
London), National Archives. (hereafter CO 337). This series contains registers of correspondence relating 
to Ceylon. 
 103 
 
a “unique identifier” for the item, making possible cross-references to it among other 
papers. The layout of the register of correspondence was divided into eight categories. 
One entry covered a double page spread. Columns from left to right provided the 
following information:  
 
1. Date of receipt in Colonial Office. 
2. Colonial Office registered number.       
3. Name of correspondent. 
4. Date on which the letter was written. 
5. Reference allocated by the Governor or other correspondent. 
6. Subject of correspondence. 
7. Cross-references to previous and subsequent papers on the same or 
a closely related subject. 
8. A note of the action taken.269 
 
After the letter was registered it was handled in turn by members of the upper level office 
staff. Although the Secretary of State had the final say on the content of a letter, each 
staff member was responsible to some extent to comment upon it beforehand.  
 
It was first and foremost read by the senior clerk of the department. His duty was to 
make the first evaluation of the despatch to determine its relevance, immediate 
importance and, in pen on the letter, express his opinion about its content. For example, 
he would give his judgment on situations such as: should an engineer be given an 
extended leave of absence? Should the Kandyan peasants be granted additional land for 
cultivation? (However, messages regarding greater importance such as the outbreak of a 
mutiny or famine crises went straight to the Secretary of State’s desk.) With the help of 
the junior clerks under his control, the senior clerk collected all the relevant information 
within the despatches—i.e., “those prominent points which his experience and constant 
reference to the general correspondence suggests, and proposes, in ordinary cases, the 
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form of the answer, or the practical course of dealing with the subject.” 270  If the 
correspondence required an explanation or analysis, he forwarded it along with 
statements, prepared either by himself or under his supervision, to the assistant 
undersecretary, or to the permanent undersecretary, according to the nature of the 
subject. Each of whom then passed the information to the parliamentary undersecretary 
with their respective observations jotted upon it. From him, the despatch reached the 
Secretary of State to consider all that had been submitted thus far, to request additional 
information, and to record his decision upon the letter.  
 
After, the papers returned through the same channel to the senior clerk, whose duty it 
was to examine the minutes and drafts, “in order to see whether any point in the 
instructions may be at variance with facts, regulations, or precedents not known to the 
Secretary of State or Under Secretaries; and to execute all the final instructions he may 
receive, by preparing the drafts, or causing them to be prepared by his assistants, and 
superintending the copying and despatch of the letters to be written from them.”271 All 
drafts finally received the sanction of the parliamentary undersecretary and the Secretary 
of State. While not all letters went through this rigmarole exactly, nearly every level of the 
colonial office staff was implicated in the process of reading a letter, administering its 
content—and, thus, taking part in colonial government administration. Almost every 
letter reached the Secretary of State’s desk, no matter how perfunctory the subject 
matter.272 
Bureaucratic Trail 
 
The flow of a letter through the office left behind a discernable bureaucratic trail. 
Decision making at the Colonial Office was generally by personal discussion until 1830, 
which left no paper trail. Over time, however, Stephen’s system of note taking, writing 
recommendations, and marking decisions in ink onto official correspondence letters in 
and around the margins became a standard administrative practice. Thus, the bureaucratic 
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process of official correspondence letters within the Colonial Office can be traced by 
examining these marks and initials on letters.273  
 
The notes in the margins of a letter written by Governor MacCarthy on 24 November 
1860 at the Queen’s House, Colombo, represent this process well.274 In the letter, the 
Governor announced the death of a Civil Servant of fairly high ranking and responsibility, 
who held simultaneously the offices of District Judge, Commissioner of Requests, and 
Police Magistrate of Chilaw; and he described the steps taken to replace the vacated 
positions. The Governor sent the letter to describe and make official the decisions he had 
made in replacing the deceased civil servant.  
 
An examination of the markings on the first page of the letter reveals a fair amount of 
detail about the reception and registration of the letter. For example, on figure 2, it is 
known that the letter was numbered twenty six, thus being the twenty-sixth letter 
received that year. The content of the letter concerned the “Civil” branch of government 
according to the bold letters on the left. The letter was received on the 1st of January 
1861 and was page 219 of the despatch documents. In the center, to the left of the 
message body, the letter was discernibly answered by the Colonial Office on the 15th of 
January.  
 
As we turn the pages, we can see how the letter traveled through the different staff hands 
at the office (figure 4). On the fourth page of the letter a staff member wrote a note in 
pencil in the right-hand margin of paragraph four. He remarked, “a very desirable thing,” 
indicating that he was in favor of the Governor’s appointment of Mr. Mooyaart as 
assistant agent and police magistrate of Kaigalle, as well as the Governor’s attitude that 
such an appointment was the best possible arrangement for the interests of public service. 
Hardly legible, however, were the initials of the person who wrote the note. Given that 
these notes were written alongside the letter’s message, it is very likely that the notes 
belonged to the senior clerk, since his were the first pair of eyes to read official 
correspondence letters. As far as I can tell, the initials confirm this, and belonged to 
                                                            
273 Knowing who, exactly, can be quite difficult because of illegible handwriting. 
274 CO 54/355, 24 November 1860 
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Senior Clerk, Cox, C., appointed 1 January 1860.275 On page six of the letter, as indicated 
by the same initials, Senior Clerk C. Cox’s notes again appeared (figure 5). Here, in the 
margins of the sixth paragraph, he wrote “In April, I think,” thus giving his opinion 
about, as pondered by the Governor in the text, “the return of Mr. Cairns now in 
England on leave of absence.”  
 
The backside of the last page is covered in many notes (figure 6). Although it is difficult 
to decipher when or by whom each individual note was made, since they appear together, 
these notes represent the final process of a letter’s trail through bureaucracy. The initials 
here were made by high ranking office staff officials, such as the undersecretary and his 
assistants. Some information is plainly legible. The text on the top left of the page was 
written by Mr. Ellis, who had been assistant undersecretary from 20 November 1847 
until 3 December 1868. The note was: “I conclude the Duke of Newcastle [the Secretary 
of State for Colonies] will confirm these appointments, in which case a writership will be 
at his disposal.” Below this note again appear Senior Clerk C. Cox’s initials with an 
illegible note. Below that, the word “confirm” is written, and to the right are a signature 
and two sets of initials. The Secretary of State’s initials are not represented on the letter, 
however, which is normal given that all notes on the letter were written specifically for 
him to read. His executive decision was based on these notes.  
  
Although a bit shaky, it is possible to construct a narrative of the letter as it made its way 
through the various hands of the Colonial Office’s staff, from its registration to the 
Senior Clerk’s first responses and notes, as well as the final marks made by the 
undersecretary and his assistants. Letters flowed continuously in such a fashion, through 
the staff’s hands until they reached the Secretary of State, who then either put by the 
letters or drafted a response. As indicated by the markings, the Governor’s appointments 
were positively received at the Colonial Office. Referencing the Secretary of State’s 
personal response to the Governor’s letter is the only way to truly affirm this assessment, 
however. Most, if not all, letters between the Governor and the Secretary of State were 
                                                            
275 J.C. Sainty, Office-Holders in Modern Britain VI Colonial Office Officials: Officials of the Secretary of State for War 
1794-1802, of the Secretary of State for War and Colonies 1801-54 and of the Secretary of State for Colonies 1854-70, 
15. 
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placed through similar bureaucratic procedures. From the 1860s, however, such marks 
were written onto an attached minute sheet (figure 7). However, notes and initials still 
appeared in the margins of letters.  
 
Official correspondence, which was based on the circulation and flow of letters, was 
subsequently challenged to incorporate the telegraphically technology. To what extent 
were telegrams used? Did they replace letters? Did they improve official correspondence 
communications? I turn now to these questions and analyze the uses and limitations of 
telegrams as official correspondence in the context of this system.  
 
USES AND LIMITATIONS OF TELEGRAMS AS OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE 
 
At first glance, telegrams seem to have made great improvements to official 
correspondence. The Governor was able to communicate quickly with the Secretary of 
State, information was shared rapidly, and the Secretary of State was given greater 
opportunity to control the Governor’s decisions and actions on a day-to-day basis. There 
is plenty of evidence to support these benefits as well, many of which I will represent 
below. Telegrams were indeed dynamic instruments of communication and were adopted 
and used in a variety of creative ways. One way of showing how useful telegrams were is 
by making a comparison of them to letters. The slow speed of writing and sending using 
letters brings the many benefits of telegrams into sharp relief.  
 
 
Limitations of Letters 
 
Except for several telegrams sent before 1870, letters had constituted official 
correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Governor of Ceylon.276 Although 
                                                            
276 Although there were a few official correspondence telegrams sent over the Karachi to London over 
ground line between 1865 and 1870, the submission of these telegrams took just as long as letters, 
approximately one month. It is for this reason that I focus on the telegrams sent from 1870 as these were 
stable and sent within a few hours. The following are the telegrams used as official correspondence 
between 1865 and 1870: CO 54/406, 7 December 1865; CO 54/ 412, 28 May 1866; CO 54/ 414, 15 
September 1866; CO 54/417, 26 December 1866; CO 54/424, 14 January 1867; CO 54/427, 31 August 
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letters were the primary form of communication, they were incessantly slow and tended 
to drag on the process of official correspondence. Drafting a letter not only took time 
but a letter traveling by ship and mail carriers took approximately one month to across 
the thousands of miles of ocean and terrain in between Ceylon to London. A response at 
minimum, therefore, took two months. For the function of Ceylon’s colonial 
administration this was at times problematic. The Secretary of State did not know 
immediately what was occurring in Ceylon at any given moment, which left little 
possibility for him to interject in decisions made by the Governor, if needed. The 
Governor, in turn, could not ask the Secretary of State for advice or gain reference to 
matters which may have required immediate action and assistance. 
 
At the apex of the so-called Indian Mutiny, on 6 June 1857, Governor General Henry 
Ward submitted a letter to Secretary of State for the Colonies Henry Labouchere.277 
Governor Ward wrote in the letter that he had received a letter on 29 May from the 
Governor General of India, requesting urgently “that a portion of the European 
Regiment station in Ceylon might be shared, temporarily, for the purpose of restoring 
safety to our Indian possessions.”278 According Governor general, the supply of available 
British troops in northern India was severely limited and would not suffice to hold back 
the riotous groups against which the British were then at arms. The Governor General of 
India was in dire need of assistance from Ceylon as the deployment of troops from the 
island to the mainland could be assured with relative haste, given the geographic 
proximity of the two colonies. In addition to describing the Governor General of India’s 
request for Ceylon’s troops, the letter continued for twenty three more pages and 
included details of Governor Ward’s response to the Governor General’s letter as well as 
his reaction to the situation in India more generally. To summarize: Governor Ward 
amassed and deployed 500 troops to India by way of steamer; because of the anxiety 
caused by thinking that the disorder occurring in India would soon spread to Ceylon he 
also gave “considerable sanction to the police force, both at Colombo and Kandy” for 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1867; CO 54/428, 14 December 1867; CO 54/433, 12 March 1868; CO 54/435, 11 June 1868; CO 
54/433, 14 May 1868; CO 54/436, 8 July 1868; CO 54/445, 11 July 1869; CO 54/448, 25 November 
1869; CO 54/448, 29 November 1869. 
277 CO 54/329, 6 June 1857. 
278 Ibid. 
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the ostensible protection of the island; and, he described conversations contained in 
letters he had had with other but relevant individuals, such as General Bailey, in the 
course of framing his response and actions.279  
 
According to the registration stamp on the letter, Henry Labouchere did not receive 
Governor Ward’s letter until 15 July.280 This was more than one month since Ceylon’s 
Governor had written it and nearly two months after the Governor General of India’s 
urgent letter had reached Ceylon’s Governor. A consideration of such disconnected dates 
is of importance as it indicates that all actions taken by the Governor in respect to 
Ceylon’s assistance to India, as well as the measures taken to serve the safety of the 
colony itself, were not known by the Secretary of State until after they were executed by 
the Governor. Henry Labouchere’s thoughts on, and immediate reactions to, such 
decisions were therefore rendered irrelevant. By this point in time Governor General 
Ward’s mind and his decisions had been made, the troops had been sent, and the island’s 
administrative centers were teeming with a new police force armed and geared to 
preserve and protect the peace. This delayed absence of the letter, therefore, fixed the 
Secretary of State and the Governor of Ceylon at a muted divide. Not only was the 
Secretary of State at the receiving end of information about events occurring in Ceylon, 
but the Governor, too, was isolated from the opinions, expressions, or concerns that the 
Secretary of State may have had. Although the situation was handled without impunity, 
the slow transmission of the letter nonetheless removed the Secretary of State from 
interjecting and placed limitations on how he may have reacted.  
 
It was not only during times of crises that the slow speed of letters posed problems. Even 
in everyday administrative practices, such as the sending and receiving of expenditure 
reports, the slow pace of the letter limited the Governor’s and the Secretary of State’s 
ability to communicate. A rather lengthy and complex letter regarding the administration 
of the colony’s surplus funds, sent to the Secretary of State by the Governor of Ceylon 
on 5 December 1865, illustrates this point well. 281  To begin with, the letter represented 
                                                            
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 CO 54/406, 5 December 1865. 
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the Governor of Ceylon’s recognition of the changes to an expenditure policy which the 
Secretary of State had supposedly mandated in a previous letter, dated a year earlier, on 
the 31 October 1864. Until the reception of this letter, the Governor had written, it had 
been the normal practice of Ceylon’s administration “for the appropriation of [each year’s 
budget] to be expended within the year.”282 This had meant that all sums unexpended on 
public works at the termination of each year were added to the surplus balance and thus 
became unavailable except under the expressed sanction of the Secretary of State. It also 
entailed that “the completion of all works unfinished on the 31st December in each year 
had therefore to be provided for out of the revenue of the following year.” 283  The 
Governor wrote that this had caused many difficulties. It not only made finding and 
paying for labor challenging, but it also complicated the engineers’ ability to estimate the 
costs of upcoming, or in progress, projects, as they “would have to arrange for funds for 
the following year in the middle of the current year.”284  
 
According to the Governor, the Secretary of State in the letter dated 31 October 1864 
had, presumably, changed this policy. The Governor remarked that he had taken this 
letter as an indication by the Secretary of State to “place a relaxation of this [previous 
expenditure] practice,” thus allowing “sums voted in the annual Appropriation Ordinance 
for any work to be expended upon if it were commenced or contracted for within two 
years from the date of the ordinance.”285 If this were true, he conjectured, projects remain 
funded, without interval, for up to two years at a time; and that, as a result, the older, 
abovementioned practice would be altered. The Governor continued to write that the 
prospect of changing the expenditure policy along such lines was received well in Ceylon. 
An announcement of it was made and it was “held as a boon” among members of the 
“legislative Council, the local press, and all intelligent members of the community.”286  
 
However, the Governor’s reason for writing the letter, dated the 5 December 1865, was 
not to share this satisfaction with the Secretary of State. Rather, he wrote it because he 
                                                            
282 Ibid.  
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid.  
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid. 
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had “just received” another letter bearing the stamp of the 14 October 1865, which 
presented information that contradicted the letter of the 31 October in the previous 
year.287 The Governor wrote: “It now seems questionable whether it was ever your [the 
Secretary of State’s] intention that unexpended balances on unfinished works should be 
brought forward at all against surplus funds, and whether, if brought forward, they 
should not have been re-appropriated?”288 The information in the previous letter, dated 
31 October 1864, which had been well received, was suddenly thwarted by the 
information found in the letter dated 14 October 1865. Because of this, the Governor, 
and his plans to change the expenditure policy, became perplexed. The letter, according 
to the Governor, was received just two days before the Session of the Legislation was at 
its close and that “the Supply Bill has already been passed through Committee.”289 Unable 
to communicate straightaway with the Secretary of State and ask what he should do on 
the matter, the Governor was thus left to act alone. In the December 5th letter, the 
Governor expressed the frustration this had caused him: “Your Letter [dated 14 October 
1865] has been received too late to admit any change being made in the form of next 
year’s Estimates and Appropriations, even if I were sure of your wishes, which I am not, 
[your last letters] being apparently contradictory…”290 However, continued the Governor: 
 
given that this [subject of expenditure] has formed the subject of correspondence 
between the Colony and Her Majesty’s Government for the last sixteen months, 
but through doubts, misapprehensions, and delays no definite instructions have yet 
been received, that if [unambiguous instructions] should not now reach me within 
the next two days, another twelve months must elapse before the amount can be 
released, and submitted to the legislation for appropriation…. I will have therefore 
no choice but to follow the course adopted last year in the respect which has at all 
events been formally approved by you, and to ask that if Her Majesty’s 
Government desire the adoption of any other course I may be apprised of it 
before the commencement of another session.291  
                                                            
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. 
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No such instructions, by the Governor’s lettered request, arrived on time in Ceylon, 
however, and, whether or not the Secretary of State had wished it, the Governor went 
through with the policy change. Without knowing the Governor’s confusion during this 
time the Secretary of State was enlightened when, finally, on 19 January 1866, he received 
the letter dated 5th December in which the Governor’s dissatisfaction and confusions 
were expressed and realized; albeit over a month too late.292 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
292 Ibid. 
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Figure 5. Arthur N. Birch and William Robinson, The Colonial Office List for 1867, 
Comprising Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the Colonial Dependencies of Great 
Britain: With an Account of the Services of the Principal Officers of the Several Colonial Governments 
(Pall Mall: Harrison, 1867), 136. 
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Figure 6. First page of despatch. CO 54/357, no. 26., 24 November 1860. 
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Figure 7. This shows the first page of two separate despatches. Notice how they look 
almost identical. CO 54/406, 4 December 1865; CO 54/406, 5 December 1865. 
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Figure 8. Fourth page of letter. CO 54/357, no. 26., 24 November 1860. 
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Figure 9. Sixth page of letter. Co 54/357, no. 26., 24 November 1860. 
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Figure 10. This is the backside of the last page of the letter. Notice on the left: the title 
and content summary of the letter. On the reverse side are the minuted notes and initials. 
CO 54/357, no. 26., 24 November 1860. 
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Figure 11. Example of a Minute Sheet. Minute Sheets preceded a letter, which would 
commence on the next page. CO 54/496, 22 January 1875. 
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Figure 12. An example of a Telegram. CO 54/426, 12 June 1867. 
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Figure 13. An example of another telegram sent by a different telegraph company. CO 
54/427, 2 September 1867. 
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Figure 14. This is how telegrams began, as notes on official stationery paper. CO 54
 123
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Example of a telegram receipt. CO 54/434, 11 May 1868. 
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Use of Telegrams 
 
The use of telegrams in official correspondence was regularly incorporated into official 
correspondence from 1870, and, to some extent, redressed the problems aforementioned 
by providing both the Governor and the Secretary of State with an ability to 
communicate within a single day. Given the telegram’s speed of transmission, the 
possibility of exchange between them was broadened in impressive ways.293 Firstly, news 
of events could be shared by the Governor with the Secretary of State on, or in 
approximation to, the day of their occurrence. For example, on 25 October 1900, for 
instance, the Secretary of State received the following telegram from the Governor: “L. 
White, engineer, Jaffna, died. Snakebite: arrange for successor.”294  This telegram informed the 
Secretary of State of the engineer’s unfortunate death on the day of its occurrence, and 
enabled him to nominate a successor shortly after. The posted letter, in contrast, would 
have extended the process of delay on this issue by over a month.  
 
Telegrams could also be used by the Secretary of State to share current events in London 
with the Governor. For example, on 2 March 1872 the Governor received the following 
telegram from the Secretary of State: “yesterday a youth presented a pistol at the Queen when 
about to leave her carriage at Buckingham palace on returning from her drive. He was immediately seized 
and found pistol not loaded. Her majesty behaved with greatest courage and composure and is in good 
health and spirits. This is sent to prevent exaggerated reports…” 295  From this telegram the 
Governor became aware of the Queen’s attack the day after it occurred and the Secretary 
of State was able to mediate the potential outbreak of exaggerated news reports in Ceylon. 
In this way too, the telegram offered possibilities that the letter could not—that is, as a 
form of exchange which could be used to mediate experiences of moments, current in 
both London and Ceylon. 
 
Official correspondence telegrams could not only be used to inform but also to 
communicate details, thus providing the Secretary of State with a more present voice in 
                                                            
293 Mandy Banton has made note of this as well, in Banton, Administering the Empire, 1801-1968, 53. 
294 CO 54/665, 25 October 1900. 
295 CO 54/475, 2 March 1872. 
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the daily affairs of Ceylon’s colonial administration. In the autumn of 1871 the Secretary 
of State requested by telegram that the Governor should participate in the scientific 
observations of the upcoming total eclipse, to which the Governor replied, after viewing 
the cosmic phenomenon, that it had been a great success;296 on 24 January 1872, the 
Secretary of State demanded that the Governor “send immediately a copy of that year’s Blue 
book of Statistics;”297 and, on 19 July 1875, the Secretary of State urged that the Governor 
must not make judicial appointments “till heard from by next mail.”298 Such flexibility, as 
exemplified by these few telegrams, gave the Secretary of State an ability to direct the 
Governor on very minute details, such as scientific observations, the necessity to have a 
certain colonial document, and to request that he wait for further news, thus allowing the 
Secretary of State to send quick, concerted information which was valuable to him, and 
of which the Governor was pressed to address.  
 
Telegrams also provided the Governor with the capacity to enquire and question the 
Secretary of State. In preparation for the Princess of Saxony’s visit to Ceylon in 1875, for 
example, the Governor wanted to know if “special leave duties is necessary for officials and others 
at levee and other public entertainments during the princesses’ visit, or will simple evening cheers suffice in 
cases where there is no recognized official uniform.”299 While ambiguous to us, this telegram was, 
nonetheless, a request to the Secretary of State for advice on a subject which the 
Governor was at a loss by himself to know. With the princess’ nearing arrival, a lettered 
response would have never reached either the Governor or the Secretary of State in time 
for such a consideration. Similarly, the Governor was able to express any concerns that 
he may have had, such as that, for example, he had experienced during the preliminary 
construction of the breakwater in Colombo’s harbor. On 14 March 1873 he telegraphed 
to the Secretary of State: “has the engineer for the Breakwater been decided on are anxious to begin 
in preliminary work.”300 In this way, too, the Governor was able to get advice from, or 
express concerns to, the Secretary of State regarding situations that he would have 
normally dealt with alone. The telegram thus enabled expressions, commands, and 
                                                            
296 CO 54/467, 17 Sept 1871, 18 September 1871; CO 54/469, 12 December 1871. 
297 CO 54/473, 24 January 1872. 
298 CO 54/497, 19 July 1875. 
299 CO 54/498, 20 September 1875. 
300 CO 54/484, 14 March 1873. 
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questions to be made with the understanding that they would be received and then dealt 
with promptly.  
 
The capacity of telegrams in official correspondence was not restricted to these few cases, 
however. As the hundreds of telegrams in Ceylon’s colonial records attest, there were 
nearly as many telegrams as there were possibilities of communication itself. Telegrams 
were used to express thanks for appointments immediately following the given 
appointment, 301  to describe the current financial status of the island’s revenue, 302  to 
disambiguate information in a letter on the same day the letter was received,303 to send 
word ahead of vessels to quarantine them in light of epidemic outbreaks,304 to track the 
travels of widows returning home to England,305 to report on someone’s health,306 and to 
request a leave of absence or an extended leave of absence,307 even a week or a day before 
the leave’s expiration. In many ways, therefore, the telegram created new techniques in 
which Ceylon’s Governor and the Secretary of State could communicate, in ways that the 
slower system of letter writing and the post could not.  
 
Given the benefits of telegraphic speed, we might assume that the use of the letter in 
official correspondence would have gradually diminished during the period under 
consideration; that the technology had, in some way, determined the course of official 
correspondence for the rest of the century. However, the letter, and not the telegram, 
continued to serve as the main form of official correspondence. Not only were there 
thousands more letters than telegrams used; but, as the organization of the colonial 
records indicate, telegrams were treated as secondary or supplementary forms of 
communication in respect to the letter.308  It was letters which substantiated the final 
word on any given situation. Why, then, in light of the telegram’s dynamic capabilities, 
                                                            
301 CO 54/603, 4 October 1892. 
302 CO 54/524, 4 January 1880; CO 54/621, 6 March 1895; CO 54/629, 16 January 1896; CO 54/644, 7 
February 1898; CO 54/664, 17 July 1900. 
303 CO 54/466, 6 July 1871. 
304 CO 54/507, 23 March 1877; CO 54/586, 28 February 1890. 
305 CO 54/587, 2 May 1890. 
306 CO 54/497, 23 August 1875; CO 54/604, 30 November 1892; CO 54/665, 17August 1900; CO 
54/666, 29   November 1900. 
307 CO 54/458, 15 November 1870; CO 54/586, 1 January 1889; CO 54/625, 10 September 1895. 
308 CO 337/3-19. 
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did the letter, rather than becoming eclipsed by the telegram, continue, and to such a 
large extent, as the main form of official correspondence?  
 
Limitations of the Telegram 
 
Price may have been a great disadvantage to telegraphic communication during the 
nineteenth century. Though, for Ceylon’s government this is only accurate to a small 
extent, if at all. The price of a telegram was significantly higher than penny-postage letters. 
The telegrams sent by the Governor of Ceylon on 15 February and 4 June 1868 cost, 
respectively, £10.12.8 and £21.4.0. Nevertheless, the costs of both telegrams were 
eventually refunded by government subsidies and debited directly to Ceylon’s treasury 
account on 10 June 1869.309 So, cost may not have prevented officials from sending 
telegrams if refunding the price of telegrams remained a standard practice. Regardless, 
cost was only a minor reason telegrams remained subordinate to letters. There were 
greater issues at stake located in the medium itself as well as a strong resistance to adopt 
the technology by the Colonial Office.  
 
First of all, the language found in telegrams presented real limitations to its use. The 
standard 20-words-or-less telegraph format, established in Ceylon in 1862,310 ensured that 
fewer words could be written in a standard telegram than the unlimited amount of words 
allotted in letters. This is not to say that there were no successful attempts to exceed the 
20 word limit. The very first telegram that the Governor of Ceylon sent to the Secretary 
of State makes a case in point.  Submitted on 10 December 1865 and received on the 16th 
of the same month, this telegram is one of the few telegrams comparably as lengthy as a 
letter. It read: 
  
The Despatch number two hundred and thirty nine of fourteenth October about… [illegible] surplus 
balance has been read there is no doubt whatever as to the existence on the first January last of the net 
cost surplus [illegible] namely one hundred & fifty four thousand pounds it is composed of the 
                                                            
309 CO 54/444, 10 June 1869. 
310 CO 54/369, 14 May 1862.  
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accumulated during eighteen sixty three & previous years there was no real surplus in eighteen sixty 
four under the terms of the despatch now acknowledged no part of this balance can be appropriated the 
season will shortly close there is therefore no time to wait & it will be most disastrous to the colony if 
this large sum so urgently needed be locked up unproductive in the vault for another year your 
instructions are requested by telegraph and authority is asked to bring forward a surplus funds bills for 
at least one thousand pounds the one hundred thousand pounds now asked for is not in addition to the 
fifty thousand pounds for by general O’brien which has been asked.311     
 
This was not just a matter of novelty. Ten years later in 1870 on 7 March a telegram was 
sent comprising well over 20 words was sent to the Governor: “R. Bersce accepts the Colonial 
Secretaryship of the Straits settlement but I beg he may be allowed to remain here until after the Duke of 
Edinburgh visit it is desirable that he should go round all the irrigation works in the Eastern province 
with Mr. Birsch before he leaves for Singapore which he will be able to do towards the end of May.”312 
These two cases were not the only examples, but exceeding 20 words was exceptional. 
The Governor and the Secretary of State typically wrote telegrams within or near the 
confines of the 20 word limit. Telegraphic messages were more often curt and succinct, 
such as: “arrangements being made for summons embarking for Sydney in a fortnight,” as on 19 July 
1899.313  
 
Thus, while telegrams were useful in breaching some of the problems inherent in the 
speed of letters, they were not useful to expand upon a subject matter. Therefore, it was 
often the case that a letter rather than a telegram was used to communicate. Telegrams, 
often but not always, preceded a letter—encompassing a coherent and rounded 
description of the same topic. For instance, the Governor transferred a telegram on 28 
March 1883 to the Secretary of State, informing him of the chaos engulfing Kotahena,314 
in Colombo, during the Buddhist and Catholic riots: “Serious riot here on Sunday between 
Roman Catholics and Buddhists…outnumbered by thousands and were overpowered, military called in 
when mob dispersed. Mob again attempted on Monday and suppressed by….town now quiet. 50 rioters 
                                                            
311 CO 54/406, 10 December 1865  
312 CO 54/454, 7 March 1870. 
313 CO 54/656, 19 July 1899. 
314 Kotahena is a town on the outskirts of Colombo. For more information, see Tessa Bartholomeusz, 
“Catholics, Buddhists, and the Church of England: The 1883 Sri Lankan Riots,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 
15 (1995): 89-103. 
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apprehended waiting trial, 20 rioters injured taken to hospital…Riot caused by false stories that insults 
were offered by Buddhists to Christian symbols. Merchants took no part in mob.”315 Additionally, two 
other telegrams were used to communicate the circumstances of the riot succeeding this 
telegram. 316  They, too, pronounced the beginning stages and anxieties of the riot. 
However, in addition to these telegrams, the Governor later mailed a letter to make sense 
and extrapolate upon the subject of the riot in all its facets—to provide explanations, 
specific details, and consequential deliberations—something, which the short blurbs of 
language used in telegrams, did not equal.317 More will be said on the communication of 
this riot in the following chapter. But I discuss it here because it was exemplary of how 
telegrams and letters worked together: Telegrams were sent to inform of situations 
quickly. Letters expanded on the facts. Although long, I think that it is important for the 
sake of understanding the elucidated language common among these colonial letters to 
represent at least part of the letter here. The full document can be found in Appendix 1: 
 
My Lord, With reference to my telegram of the 28th March reporting the riot of 
the 25th 
I have the honour to state that legal proceedings are being taken against some of 
the rioters the results of which shall be reported when they are concluded….. 
2—. I visited the Colombo Hospital last Wednesday and saw the men who had 
been admitted after the Riot, and I learnt from Dr. Kynsey that there had been 
no more deaths among them, but all were in a fair way to recovery.  
3—. The proximate cause which led to the riot was the jealousy of the Roman 
Catholics, fanned into a flame by rumours spread (whether designedly or not 
ascertained) that the Buddhists were carrying in a procession images or pictures 
in ridicule of Christianity.  The Buddhists of Colombo have just completed the 
building of a new temple which is said to have been begun fifty years ago. Like all 
Buddhist temples this contains a statue of the Buddha, and the closing ceremony 
of the construction was to be celebrated in the Buddhist manner of painting the 
eyes of the statue. This ceremony which may be compared in some respects to 
                                                            
315 CO 54/545, 28 March 1883. 
316 Unfortunately, these other telegrams were “destroyed under statute” of the Public Office Act of 1877. 
Banton, Administering the Empire, 1801-1968, 99. 
317 CO 54/546, 2 April 1883. 
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the consecration of a church in Europe is usually accompanied by Persheras or 
processions from the country round varying according to the sanctity or 
otherwise of the new Temple. In the present case the new temple was widely 
known, and many Buddhists were prepared to go there in procession offering 
gifts. The ceremony of opening the eyes (as it is called) is usually performed on 
the day of the full moon, and the High Priests fixed on the full moon which, 
according to the Sinhalese reckoning, fell on the 23rd of march for their 
ceremony[…]318 
 
It was quite unusual for any telegram to be as long and detailed as even the shortest of 
letters. But, there is one particular exception that I have located. It is a telegram from 
John Pender, the telegraph chairman of the Eastern Telegraph Company, London. “At 
the request of the Prince of Wales,” he had sent the Governor of Ceylon a telegram of 
the minutes of the Colonial Exhibition Address given by the Prince, His Royal Highness 
the Executive President of the Exhibition, to Her Majesty the Queen at the opening of 
the 1878 Exhibition in Paris. It is an extraordinarily sized telegram comprising 1,317 
words and was composed on a series of twenty-nine telegrams. (The message is included 
in the appendix, and I encourage the reader to consider it).319 The beginning reads like a 
formal letter, “May it please your majesty,” and the language is so fluent and eloquent that it 
could easily be mistaken for a letter. This telegram, however, was an absolute exception 
to the typical size and detail of telegraphic messages during the period. As Chairman of 
the Eastern Telegraph Department his ability to send the telegram was easily facilitated. 
The telegram does show, though, that telegraphic messages had the capacity to replicate 
letters—that essentially they could be used to write as much as letters.  
 
But they were not used as such. I suspect that the amount of effort to dictate a telegram, 
even a quarter the size of the Prince’s, would have taken enormous effort and time. 
According to Superintendent of telegraphs B.C. Bailey’s letter to the Colonial Secretary 
                                                            
318 CO 54/546, 2 April 1883. 
319 Sri Lanka National Archives, Colombo, Sri Lanka. Series: Lot 6, (hereafter SLNA 6); SLNA 6/8127  
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on 3 April 1858, it would have undermined the intrinsic value of telegraphic 
communication which, according to him, was its speed:  
 
Sir,  
I have the honor respectfully to call attention to the Bulletin of mail received 
from Galle yesterday, and to point out the great difference between the number 
of words therein contained and the number (viz 250) named by me in a former 
communication as the utmost limit for the short lines [telegraph lines] of this 
island.  
 The Bulletin of yesterday as received in this office contains 623 words 
which is only 17 less than the utmost limit allowed for telegraphing from 
Bombay to Calcutta, a distance of 1600 miles, along which an Express Post 
cannot be conveyed in less than eight days, while the postal difference between 
Galle and Colombo is only nine hours.    
 The message under notice could not have been prepared in less than two 
hours after the anchoring of the steamer, two hours were occupied in signaling it, 
and a further delay of two hours in making the copies required for the Colonial 
Secretary and the News Papers. Thus it will be seen that the message was not 
clear of this office till about six hours after the arrival of the steamer, and if the 
time occupied by the Printing Offices in “Setting up” and distributing the News 
is taken into consideration and idea may be formed of the inconvenience and 
little worth of a dispatch issued only an hour before the arrival of the coach with 
the papers and letters from which it was compiled.  
 And, in such cases as this, not only is the dispatch itself made useless but 
also the private paying messages brought by steamer, or rendered necessary by 
her arrival, whilst those received at this office for transmission to Galle, are in 
danger of reaching there too late to serve the purposes for which they are 
intended.  
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 In conclusion I would beg that the Compiling Officer may be instructed to 
report facts only, and not opinions or rumours, which in my poor judgment may 
be well left for the Newspaper Extras.320   
 
Although Bailey wrote the letter specifically about news telegrams between Galle and 
Colombo, his message reveals a few fundamental principles about telegrams that may 
answer why lengthy telegrams, although possible, were not the norm.  
 
As Bailey suggested, a telegram must reach its destination much earlier than the more 
detailed letters and papers from which it derived. He did not have to explain the reasons 
behind this concern. To both him and his contemporaries it would have been obvious 
that the telegram’s value was its inherent ability to communicate information quickly, that 
to send a telegram slowly was a superfluous investment in colonial state time and money. 
His complaint raises issues beyond the mere practicality of an unnecessary telegram, 
however. He hints at an important functional distinction between letters and telegrams, a 
distinction that structured British colonial incorporation of the technology more generally. 
According to Bailey’s logic, the two mediums (letters and telegrams) communicated 
different sets of things, sometimes to distinct audiences. Bailey wrote that the telegram 
should contain “facts only, and not opinions or rumours, which in [his] poor judgment 
may be well left for the Newspaper Extras.” Telegrammed news, according to Bailey, 
should contain only “facts” because it was directed toward government readership, while 
written materials, with their “rumours” and “opinions,” would more appropriately find 
their way into newspaper extras. Thus telegrams were distinct from hand-written 
materials and did not just present a shorter version of the same story. Reading a telegram, 
as Bailey suggested, was not equivalent to reading a diminutive letter. It was reading a 
message intrinsic to the medium of telegraphy itself: telegrams were short, concise, and 
factual and, one could say, less burdened by the time-consuming strictures of grammar 
and analysis; letters, on the other hand, were the platform for longer, clearer exposition. 
According to Bailey, then, telegrams in nineteenth-century Ceylon were meant not to 
replace, but to coexist with letters, to function in combination, not separately. Thus, 
although telegraphy was the super-highway of the age, it provided just one facet of the 
                                                            
320 SLNA 6/2463: 1858 Inspector of the Electric Telegraph Reports. 
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colonial government’s communication arsenal. Telegrams had their role. And, letters, 
albeit slow and tedious, had theirs as well. This distinction, according to Bailey, structured 
a telegram’s length and general purpose.  
 
TELEGRAMS AND THE SYSTEM 
 
We can go much deeper into an analysis of telegrams, by considering them in relation to 
the system of communication above described. The Colonial Office system, as explained, 
was based on the principles of rational order, regularity, and consistency. Letters that 
were structured according to Colonial Office rules and regulations constituted the 
fundamental basis of this system. They were uniform. They represented hierarchy. They 
were well written. Information was configured on them in similar patterns. They arrived 
at regular and predictable intervals at the Colonial Office, in bulk. Colonial Office 
bureaucracy was embedded into and based on these characteristics and patterns. 
Telegrams, on the other hand, were not only inconsistent with but also contradictory to 
these fundamental tenets of the Colonial Office system. What they provided in speed, 
they lacked in structure, uniformity, order, hierarchy. The incorporation and limited use 
of telegrams as official correspondence can be explained to a large extent by bringing into 
focus these incongruities. 
 
Unlike letters, telegrams were not standardized. Even a cursory examination of telegrams 
during the period reveals heterogeneity rather than uniformity. If we turn to the image of 
the following telegram, see figure 8, we will notice that it includes the name of the 
telegraph department which sent the message, the office from and to which it was sent, 
and the sender’s and the recipient’s names. The amount of words which the message 
contained is also given—in this case there are sixty words. At the bottom of the telegram 
the name of the telegraph clerk, the time at and date on which it was sent, and the other 
offices through which it traveled were described. The middle of the telegram contained 
the message, the time of its reception, and additional notes. However, a telegram from 
September of the same year, 1867, was structured differently (see figure 9). It contained 
the name of the station to which it was sent in London, Circus, on top. The other did not. 
 134 
 
Although it contained the recipient’s and sender’s names, in a location similar to that of 
the other, it did not contain the telegraph clerks’ names, or the telegraph offices, as had 
appeared at the bottom of the former telegram. Furthermore, the telegram was sent by a 
different company, British and Irish magnetic Telegraph Company, Limited, not the 
Ceylon Telegraph Department. The letter font was set in a different color and in a 
different format. 321 And, these only explain superficial characteristics. 
 
Also, compared to any letter of the period, the language used in the telegram was 
disorderly. Letters were well written, grammatically and stylistically mastered. They gave 
details about events and elaborated on ideas in well-structured, numbered, and 
paragraphed compositions. Telegrams, on the other hand, were short, sometimes 
unintelligible, and they did not usually describe or deliberate on an event in any successful 
detail. Telegrams were often sloppily transcribed and misspelled, like this one from the 
Secretary of State to the Governor on 2 March 1875 (as it appears): “London de Colombo 
1310 20 19 3 SR=Lord CARNORVOR LNDN= MARCH NINETEENTH NO SUV 
EYORS AVAILABLE FROM SURVEY FOR DEPETREMENT RALWAY 
SURVEYS SENDS OUT MORE RAILWAY SURVEYORS= GOUVERNOR.” 322  I 
replicate here a few more representative telegrams to give a sense of the language 
typically found in telegrams. On 4 January 1880, the Governor telegraphed: “extraordinary 
local expenditure probably two millions rupees of… [illegible] not drawing one million can be paid from 
revenue leaving one million uncovered.”323 This sentence was the extent of the message, and it 
noticeably lacked sound syntax, correct spelling, and proper capitalization and 
punctuation, which more than likely would have appeared in a letter on the same topic.324 
Similarly, a telegram from four years later: “Your tel 23 sept pray do not make arrangements with 
Mercantile bank involving conditions as to giving circulation to govt notes. There will be no occasion for 
conditions as they will come at once into circulation without any difficulty. Madras Bank will at once 
purchase Rs. 2,000,000 worth without any conditions. Pray wait for dispatch before concluding any 
                                                            
321 Unfortunately, original telegrams disappeared from the colonial archives beginning in the 1880s due to 
reasons which will be explained below, so a complete study of telegram heterogeneity is not possible. 
322 CO 54/496, 2 March 1875. 
323 CO 337/13, 4 January 1880. 
324 CO 337/3, 24 October 1857. 
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arrangement which would impose any fresh obligations on us.”325 How was the Colonial Office able 
to incorporate telegrams in its system of communication if they were not only 
heterogeneous but also, at times, illegible? 
 
An even greater disjuncture between the two mediums lay within the hierarchical 
representation of official correspondence. Official correspondence was the medium 
through which the Secretary of State and the Governor communicated. It was therefore a 
hierarchical and formal exchange as it represented the two seats of government and thus 
Crown government itself, in all its representations and physical manifestations—and was 
not merely a practical means of conveying communication. This was not just a matter of 
cordiality, as I have described above, as there were strict instructions concerning official 
correspondence laid out in detail in the Rules and Regulations for the Information and Guidance 
of the Principal Officers and Others in His majesty’s Colonial Possessions.326  
 
Letters, and not telegrams, embodied such rules of hierarchy. In fact, the entire first page 
of most letters was used to describe only the honor of receiving and writing the letter, 
before the main issue of the letter even began. The closing was then again formal as it 
indicated the humbleness with which the letter had been written; and it was signed, 
certifying officially the identity of the person by whom the letter was written. Also, the 
colonial government hired professional letter writers to compose its correspondence, to 
ensure perfect grammar and handwriting. In contrast, telegrams did not respect hierarchy 
and did not make a formal entreaty of address, save the completion of the mandatory to-
and-from categories found on the face of the telegram. The writers of telegrams used 
short phrases, poor punctuation, crass grammar and sometimes mysterious language 
when addressing each other. Telegrams, therefore, did not exemplify a respect for the 
chain of command inherent in official correspondence, whereas letters wholly 
represented them.  
 
Also, the material composition of telegrams made it difficult for the Colonial Office to 
incorporate them into its system. A telegram embodied a number of forms during the 
                                                            
325 CO 337/14, 28 September 1884. 
326 The Colonial Office List (1878). 
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duration of its existence. For example, telegrams sent from the Governor began in noted 
form, see figure 10, written onto secretarial stationery, which was then transported by a 
messenger to a telegraph clerk for electric transmission. The message was translated into 
code and sent electronically over telegraph wires, before arriving at a telegraph office in 
London. The message was once again transferred onto a sheet of paper and delivered to 
the Secretary of State. The process occurred in reverse if the Secretary of State responded 
telegraphically. Telegraphic communication thus arrived as an abstraction upon an 
abstraction, upon an abstraction. Telegraphic messages were filtered through various 
processes that could potentially alter the meaning of the message itself. The Colonial 
Office was therefore responsible for transferring a telegraphic message onto a sustainable 
material that it could read and circulate through the echelons of bureaucratic 
administration.  
 
For this reason, lettered telegram receipts became used (see figure 11). In most but not all 
cases, following the Governor’s submission of a telegram, a letter concerning the 
telegram was sent either on the same day or a few days after.327 In the letter the Governor 
pointed the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that a telegram had previously 
been sent. Included was a direct quotation of the message found in the telegram; and, at 
times, any additional information that the Governor felt necessary was also added. 
Likewise, when the Secretary of State sent a telegram to the Governor, the Governor in 
return sent a letter to the Secretary of State to acknowledge the receipt of his received 
telegram. In it, he too pointed attention to the fact that he had received a telegram. He 
included a direct quote of the telegram’s message as well as additional information, such 
as how he responded to the telegram. The important thing to consider is that the letter, 
and not the telegram, was entered into the correspondence register list. Even in cases in 
which the practice of writing a follow-up letter was not made, a telegram still did not 
become a separate, numbered despatch but remained solely described as a telegram. 
Telegrams were recognized as a form of correspondence only through the process of 
writing a supplementary letter in conjunction with it.  Without the additional letter there 
would have been, partly, no respect paid to the formal and regulated structures of official 
                                                            
327 CO 337/3-19. 
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correspondence as embodied in the form and content of the letter, and no sustainable 
record to circulate through the bureaucratic channels. During the 1880s, this practice was 
altered and, to some extent, exacerbated. From this period onward, there are rarely 
original telegrams in the colonial records. What remain, instead, are minute sheets of the 
telegrams—just like those attached to official correspondence letters.  
 
A final point to consider is that the methodology of the Colonial Office system was very 
much based on the mode of the communication in use during Stephen’s tenure.  It was 
structured on the fact that mail ships took approximately one month to travel between 
the colony and London and that they arrived at known dates and times. The system, 
which was formed on the predictability and regular arrival and departure of letters, 
remained the basis of the Colonial Office throughout the century, all the way up to the 
introduction of telegraphy. As far as historian John W. Cell has argued, even “The advent 
of the oceangoing steamship caused little strain in the system: in the twenty years after it 
was introduced in the 1840s the routine of the office altered hardly at all. The exchange 
of abstractions from reality became somewhat more frequent and somewhat more 
predictable, but they continued to arrive in interrelated bunches.”328 The watershed point 
was the telegraph. Telegraphic communications arrived quickly, irregularly, and 
unpredictably; responses, too, had to be made hurriedly.329 Staff members had to stay 
later than usual and other methods were applied to adapt to the new communication. The 
amount of effort in employing new, or retraining old, office staff to adapt to telegraphic 
communication, and to reconstitute Colonial Office bureaucracy to incorporate the 
unpredictable arrival of telegrams, placed significant barriers on utilizing the new medium 
in any comprehensible way. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
328 Cell, British Colonial Administration, 41–3. 
329 Ibid., 43. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Colonial Office was notorious for its “antiquated” character. In a testimony given 
before the 1849 Committee of Inquiry into the Public Offices, the buildings located at 
thirteen and fourteen Downing Street, occupied by the Colonial Office, were described as 
‘inadequate to the present extent of public business, in parts unsafe and generally in [sic] 
a state of dilapidation’. The Colonial Office’s means of arranging and preserving records 
were considered deficient also. The accommodation for the clerks was remarked upon as 
both inconvenient and unsuitable, that “copyists and their Superintendent carry on their 
occupation in cellars the dampness, closeness, and darkness of which must be very 
injurious to their health.” Contemporary staff members too generally observed that the 
structure of the building was unsuitable. The ground floor librarian in the early 1850s, 
complaining of the smells and draughts which filled his room, noted that “scarcely a Day 
passes, in which Persons do not express their astonishment that anyone can inhabit it.”330 
Within this unsuitable structure, the office staff operated with a minimum amount of 
equipment. Lord Carnarvon, Parliamentary Undersecretary (1858-59) complained, “We 
have no maps that are fit to be consulted—none of the mechanical apparatus for carrying 
on the Govt. of fifty Colonies in various stages of civilization and in different parts of the 
world. We have no furniture—carpets, chairs, tables are all decrepit.”331 The Colonial 
Office operated throughout the nineteenth century without typists, telephones, or 
dictaphones.332 Rather, the chief clerk only had to provide a few essential materials such 
as paper, pens, ink, coal, oil for the lamps (until the introduction of electric lamps toward 
the end of the century), and the “proverbial red tape”.333 Despite these qualities, it was in 
this environment that official correspondence circulated, and the place where, ironically, 
one of the most advanced communication technologies of the nineteenth century, 
telegraphy, made its way into colonial government. Such descriptions may provoke an 
understanding of telegraphy’s minimal and precarious role.  
 
                                                            
 
331 Cell, British Colonial Administration, 4. Taken from: Minutes on Office of Works to C.O., 25 Oct. 1858, 
CO 323/252. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid., 5. 
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But, let us not become over skeptical and observe the Colonial Office as its staff may 
have viewed the people, cultures, and places under its authority: as backward, traditional, 
anti-modern. The Colonial Office did eventually adapt itself to the telegraph. As early as 
1870, in fact, it began to make notable adjustments to its system of administration. Not 
surprisingly, it did so gradually—by incrementally hiring staff members and allotting 
more responsibility to lower level members over the years. This removed a great amount 
of pressure and responsibility on the secretaries who had before handled nearly all 
communication, including the arrival and departure of telegrams. This is not to say that 
the telegraph “impacted” on the Colonial Office system, forcing it, as it were, to change. 
There were many far more important factors involved than technological determinism in 
the Colonial Office reforms, such as the Treasury’s role and reform-minded secretaries.334 
Rather, the introduction of official correspondence telegrams became embedded within a 
reformative Colonial Office, itself getting swept into the incremental changes. By the turn 
of the century, the amount of telegrams used as official correspondence between Ceylon 
and London more than trebled,335 indicating that the Colonial Office eventually became 
adept at using and incorporating telegrams in its system of communication, which had 
not been the case during most of the period under analysis. By the beginning of the First 
World War, the telegraph, as far as my research can tell, was incorporated in the system 
even more so. The adoption of the telegraph was, needless to say, slow and precarious 
throughout the course of the century. But throughout the process, the letter remained. 
Telegrams added something new, unprecedented communication.  
 
Telegrams made possible what letters could not. They allowed for immediate reactions to 
immediate subjects; they gave the Secretary of State the ability to enlighten the Governor 
of Ceylon on events of immediate importance occurring in London, as well as faster 
command over the Governor. Moreover, they provided the Governor with the ability to 
make specific, last minute requests. Despite these qualities, however, letters were not 
displaced. As I showed, this was because there were limitations to the medium of 
telegrams itself, and the Colonial Office had difficulties in incorporating telegrams into its 
                                                            
334 Blakeley, The Colonial Office: 1868-1892, 20–60. 
335 CO 337/662-666, 1900; CO 337/10, 1873. In 1873, there were approximately twenty telegrams in the 
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established system of official correspondence communication. Telegrams were irregular, 
not uniform, materially inadequate, did not represent hierarchy, and they were generally 
short and poorly written. These reasons delineated the colonial government’s persistent 
use of letters in official correspondence—and ultimately, too, what shaped the uses and 
limitations of telegrams in Ceylon’s colonial government.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: TELEGRAPHY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
INTRODUCTION 
 
As shown in chapter two, the telegraph’s utility as a tool for danger apprehension did not 
factor into the Council’s 1852 decision to implement it in Ceylon. The reason for this, 
they wrote, was because Ceylon’s state of affairs was not as tumultuous as it was in India, 
where the ever presence of danger rendered telegraphy a technology of necessity: 
 
In India, properly so called, instant communications of political events is of the 
utmost importance to the supreme government. Indeed its value cannot be 
calculated in a country almost always at war, or liable to be so, and that within its 
own territory! Ceylon has no such danger to apprehend, nor is there any Imperial 
political events, that I can conceive probable, which could be damaged in the least 
degree by the usual delay in communicating the intelligence from Point de Galle.336   
 
The members, who were contentedly writing in the prosperous wake of the island’s 
coffee resurgence, were not aware though that in just a few years thousands of refugees, 
fleeing a famine in south India, would spread cholera throughout the island; that a violent 
religiously motivated clash would break out in the streets of Kotahena, Colombo, leaving 
many wounded and two dead; or that the Oriental Bank Corporation would close and 
temporarily destabilize the colony’s finances and crash the island’s market economy. 
Perhaps the island colony did not experience uprisings and disasters at the same rate or to 
the same extent as in India, but Ceylon did have its fair share of problems to contend 
with, and its government, like India’s, had to find ways to cope with and manage them 
when they arose. And, Ceylon’s telegraph network—which encompassed a large portion 
of the island by the mid 1870s and had become part of the colonial government’s official 
                                                            
336  SLNA 10/166 “Correspondence Regarding the Introduction of the Telegraph,” James Stuart, 10 
November 1852.  
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system of communication—was very likely to have been implicated in apprehending 
these dangerous situations, therefore, challenging the Council’s foresight.   
 
Until now, the only studies on the role of technology in danger apprehension have been 
made in the context of India. Most have paid particular attention to the role of telegraphy 
in the 1857 Mutiny,337 purporting that the East India Company’s use of the technology in 
the uprisings saved India and led to the hanging of the anonymous Sepoy.338 Recently, 
Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury has argued against these claims by stating that the 
telegraph did not save India but rather “India saved the telegraph,”339 demonstrating both 
the perfunctory role of telegraphy in managing the mutiny and the Indian government’s 
resolve to resurrect the technology from its dismal state. 340  As revealing and well 
researched as his study may be in demystifying the value of the telegraph in the 1857 
mutiny, it does not take into consideration the use of telegraphy during other moments 
of crises in India or in other colonies. Thus, repeating the Council’s foresight, modern 
historians have focused on the interplay between telegraphy and danger apprehension in 
India alone, but neglected to consider Ceylon as anything other than a tranquil location. 
The purpose of this chapter is to address this neglect by analyzing three cases of 
emergencies that occurred in Ceylon during the second half of the nineteenth century: 
namely, the cholera outbreak of 1877, the Kotahena Riot of 1883, and the collapse of the 
Oriental Bank Corporation in 1884. It seeks to understand if and how telegraphy was 
used by the colonial administration in dealing with these emergencies in their attempt to 
bring forth stability and peace. Did the colonial government use the telegraph to 
communicate these events? Did the telegraph facilitate faster resolutions to these 
                                                            
337See, for example: Mel Gorman, “Sir William O’Shaughnessy, Lord Dalhousie, and the Establishment of 
the Telegraph System in India,” Technology and Culture 12, no. 4 (October 1971): 581-601; Saroj Ghose, 
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Technology and Technical Transfers to India, 1700-1947, ed. Deepak Kumar and Professor Roy M MacLeod, 
illustrated edition. (London: Sage Publications, 1995); Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology 
and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford University Press, 1981); Daniel R. Headrick, The 
Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 (Oxford University Press, USA, 
1988). 
338 P.V. Luke, “How the Electric Telegraph Saves India,” Macmillan’s Magazine, 1897, 401-06. 
339 Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism: Crisis and Panic in the Indian Empire, c.1830-1920 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 49. 
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problems? Did it arm the colonial state with a formidable tool of authority to quell them?  
What role did telegraphy play in general during moments of critical importance? 
Answering these questions, the chapter will present each case in turn, chronologically. It 
begins with the cholera epidemic of 1877 and follows with the Kotahena Riot and the 
Oriental Bank Corporation’s failure. Each case will provide a brief account of the most 
salient points regarding the event and continue with a quantitative and a qualitative 
analysis of the use and role of telegrams. A conclusion with a brief discussion will follow.  
 
CASE ONE: CHOLERA 
 
If we view the progress of this terrific malady, as it tends to disorganise 
society wherever it shows itself, as it causes the destruction of human life 
on an extensive scale, or as it cramps commerce, and causes vast expense 
in the maintenance of quarantine and cordon establishments, no subject 
can surely be, at this moment, of deeper interest.341  
 
Cholera was one of the most dreadful diseases of nineteenth-century Ceylon. Between 
1841 and 1900, it caused nearly 80,000 deaths out of a reported 129,755 cases, and had an 
average fatality rate of 61.5%.342 The disease broke out at various times in different parts 
of the colony and was contended to be the main cause of depopulation in certain 
districts.343 The trajectory of its infection was unpredictable and was said to spread like 
fire “from hamlet to hamlet and station to station,” or it would attack, lay dormant, and 
then attack again, the same village repeatedly. 344 It struck its victims unexpectedly. A 
person healthy in one instance could suddenly become seized by an acute onset of watery 
diarrhea and intensive vomiting and die hours later by severe dehydration; and it 
simultaneously produced gut wrenching cramps in the bowels, cold and clammy skin, and 
                                                            
341 James Gilcrest and Sir William Fergusson, Letters on the cholera morbus, containing ample evidence that this 
disease, under whatever name known, cannot be transmitted from the persons of those labouring under it to other individuals, 
by contact (London, 1831), 3.. 
342 S. A. Meegama, “Cholera Epidemics and their Control in Ceylon,” Population Studies 33, no. 1 (March 1, 
1979): 143. 
343 Ibid. 
344 W Fernando, Kataragama and its festivals, 1819-1939 (Colombo, 1985), v. 
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a “deathly pallor” on the victim’s face.345  It could kill a person within 10 to 24 hours 
from the commencement of the attack.346 The pattern of cholera outbreaks in Ceylon was 
therefore characteristically sudden and explosive. And, during most of the nineteenth 
century there was no certainty about when it would attack or why it spread or how to 
contain it, which also made it one of the most frightening diseases to contend with. 
 
It is the purpose of this case study to determine how telegraphy was used in combating 
the threat of cholera. While it considers the island’s relationship with cholera throughout 
the century, it focuses primarily on the cholera epidemic of 1877 that coincided with the 
Great Famine of Madras, India in the same year—during which time more people died 
from cholera in Ceylon than any other year before or after. Before attempting to answer 
how telegraphy was used to combat cholera in 1877, the case study will begin by 
analyzing how cholera was comprehended in the nineteenth century Ceylon; and it will 
examine the role and function of quarantine in cholera eradication.   
 
Comprehending Cholera in Nineteenth-Century Ceylon 
 
Ceylon’s administration had a number of hypotheses regarding the disease’s transmission. 
The most prominent was that cholera was not endemic to the island but an exotic import 
from India.347 Reasons that India in particular was pinned as the origin of cholera in 
Ceylon included, firstly, the unprecedented levels of cholera-related mortalities found 
there, numbering around 15 million between 1817 and 1865, and 23 million between 
1865 and 1947;348secondly, the earliest recorded outbreaks of cholera in Ceylon coincided 
with the arrival of Indian laborers to the newly emerging plantation centers from the 
1830s; and, thirdly, that the largest pockets of cholera outbreaks were found in places 
temporarily occupied by Indian laborers, such as in Jaffna and along the Great Northern 
                                                            
345 David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-century India (Univ of 
California Pr, 1993), 160. 
346 Arnold quotes the Secretary of the Madras Medical Board in August 1818Ibid., 161. 
347 “Administration Report for Ceylon, 1878: Report of the principal Civil Medical Officer and Inspector 
General of Hospitals for the year 1877”, 1878, 213c-214c, SLNA. 
348 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 161; David Arnold, The New Cambridge History of India, Volume 3, Part 5: 
Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81. 
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Road,349 indicating that newly arrived Indians were sources of the infection.350 It would 
not be until the mid 1890s, after Robert Koch’s discovery of comma bacillus in a water 
tank in Calcutta in 1884, that there would be any consensus among the medical 
community in British south Asia that the disease was a microbiological agent. Until then, 
Ceylon’s government took a hard contagonist stance that the disease emanated from 
people of the subcontinent. 351  
 
Indians, specifically south Indian Malabar “coolies,”352 were held responsible as the main 
transmitters of cholera within Ceylon.  The knowledge that we have today—that cholera 
is spread via fecal to oral transmission primarily through contaminated water supplies, 
and that “catching” the disease from a person through the air is not possible—was not 
known in the nineteenth century.353 Rather, cholera was likened to a seed which, once 
planted into a person, could be “communicated” to others by virtue of close proximity.354 
The disease was more likely to spread, however, if there were certain conditions for the 
disease to grow. Ceylon’s jungle-like environment and its native-social landscape were 
considered as the perfect conduits for cholera transmission.355 Heavy rains, the monsoon 
season, stagnant water, heat, large crowds of people, dirt heaps, seasonal droughts, 
decaying matter, and uncovered latrines were considered by the British in Ceylon to 
provide the necessary conditions for the disease to run its course.356  
 
Partly, this idea was a continued manifestation of Orientalist discourse, but the idea was, 
nevertheless, influenced by inductive observations of the Indian migrant communities 
who flocked to the island at the same time as cholera epidemics flared. For example, the 
famines in Madras in 1877, coupled with the severe and simultaneous cholera epidemics 
in the same region, influenced the movement of tens of thousands of south Indians to 
                                                            
349 The famed road that migrant workers walked on for approximately 750 miles over a course of 20 days 
to reach the plantations.  
350 Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, 81. 
351 Even today, India is regarded as the historical source of cholera around world. This is a point taken up 
in: Christopher Hamlin, Cholera: The Biography (Oxford, 2009), 38-46. 
352 Unskilled labor. 
353 “WHO | Cholera”, n.d., http://www.who.int/topics/cholera/en/. 
354 “Medical Report of Ceylon, 1878,” 213c-214c. 
355 See the “introduction” to Fernando, Kataragama and its festivals, 1819-1939. 
356 “Medical Report of Ceylon, 1878,” 213c.  
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Ceylon seeking refuge and work.357 That year coincided with the largest cholera epidemic 
in Ceylon during the entire century, with 11,963 reported deaths.358 While it is likely that 
some Indians were in fact infected with the disease before arrival, given the short 
incubation time of the disease, of only a few days,359 it is perhaps more likely that most 
cholera victims contracted cholera once inside Ceylon. This is evidenced by the 1867 
observation that most Indians did not appear sick upon entering Ceylon, but did so “very 
much on the road, as soon as they commenced their journey.”360 From this vantage, the 
majority of infections was born in Ceylon and then spread amongst and between other 
Indians and to neighboring villages along the journey.361 Altered patterns of diet and 
behavior brought on by the conditions met in Ceylon, specifically those encountered on 
the “160 mile tramp”362 along the Great North Road from Mannaar to the interior,363 
were perhaps significant factors in exposing individuals to infection, but it was 
nevertheless Indians, not environmental and social circumstances that the administration 
targeted as the source and the agents of cholera transmission.  
Because south Indians, who constituted the bulk of the island’s “unskilled” workers, were 
targeted as the source and agents of cholera transmission, the disease was understood, 
not as an unwarranted affront but as an unfortunate byproduct of cheap labor. The 
exceptional amount of immigration from south India to Ceylon in 1877, and the colonial 
government’s reaction to it, makes a case in point.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
357 CO 54/507, 18 May 1877 “State of the labour market in connection with distress prevailing in India.”  
358 Meegama, “Cholera Epidemics and their Control in Ceylon,” 144 who quotes the Administrative  
Reports of the Medical Department. 
359 “WHO | Cholera.” 
360  From Cholera Commission, Sessional Paper 2 of 1867Meegama, “Cholera Epidemics and their 
Control in Ceylon,” 145. 
361 There, the death toll raged highest. Ibid., 150. 
362 CO 54/507, 15 March 1877 “Anticipated Excessive Immigration from India and Difficulties Likely to 
Arise Therefrom.” 
363 For a history of the perilous journey, see: I.H.Van den Drisen, The Long Walk: Indian Plantation Labour 
in Sri Lanka in the 19th Century, 1st ed. (Sydney: Prestige Books, 1998). 
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The Famine of South India and the Cholera Outbreak of 1877 
 
Between the second half of 1876 and early 1878, Madras was the site of one of the most 
disastrous famines and cholera epidemics to ever hit British-ruled India.364 Consequently, 
between January and April of 1877, the largest wave of south Indian immigrants fled to 
Ceylon by way of ship in a “miserable wretched state,” seeking refuge and employment.365 
According to the Governor of Ceylon, in an official correspondence letter dated 15 
March 1877, between January and April alone 60,000 immigrants arrived in Ceylon, 
placing a significant strain on the “island’s resources,” which, fortunately, were for the 
time being sufficient, given the proprietors’ “heavy crops” for the year.366 But, as soon as 
slack season began in May, he continued, there would not be enough jobs for the usual 
amount of seasonal Indian laborers (who were set to remain in Ceylon until the famine in 
Madras was rectified), the 60,000 refugees who had arrived since the first of the year, and 
the tens of thousands of immigrants who were still anticipated to appear.367  
 
The Governor emphasized these points repeatedly to the Secretary of State to stress the 
gravity of the situation and to explain the strain of immigration on Ceylon’s resources; 
however, he did so not to demand that the island should protect itself from such an 
incursion by stopping or limiting immigration, or that the colonial government should 
take extra steps to appease the suffering that south Indians incurred from the perils of 
immigration. Rather, the Governor argued that excessive immigration, which would have 
nothing better to do come “slack season,” signaled an opportune moment to build a new 
railroad extension to Matale. “Please sanction the railway,” the Governor begged 
repeatedly, “which will gain largely by the cheapness of the superabundant labour in the 
colony.” 368 Although the Secretary of State sanctioned the railway extension on 23 April 
                                                            
364 For a history of the Great Famine, refer to: Arnold, David, “The ‘discovery’ of malnutrition and diet in 
colonial India,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 31, no. 1 (1994): 1-26; David Washbrook, “The 
Commercialization of Agriculture in Colonial India: Production, Subsistence and Reproduction in 
the"Dry South," c. 1870-1930,” Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 1 (1994): 129-164. 
365 CO 54/507, 15 March 1877, “Anticipated Excessive Immigration from India and Difficulties Likely to 
Arise therefrom.” 
366 Ibid. 
367 Ibid. 
368 CO 54/507, 15 March 1877 
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in a telegram,369 the Governor’s plans were, nevertheless, challenged because along with 
“superabundant labour” came the scourge of the worst cholera epidemic to ever hit the 
island colony.   
 
The Governor’s insistence to construct the Matale line was not marked without an at 
least shallow imprint of human sympathy toward cholera victims. But “apart from the 
question of humanity” wrote the Governor, “it would be unwise to do anything which 
might seriously threaten the supply of labor on which the cultivation of our main staple 
depends… I am clearly of opinion that it is in our first duty to see the resident population 
is made as secure as may be practicable from the ravages of cholera, which the gangs of 
famished and sickly coolies are importing in their pain.”370 The colony may benefit from 
immigration, in other words, but it should not enjoy it irresponsibly, at the expense of 
individuals living on the island. To counter the threat of cholera—under the authority of 
Ordinance No. 8 1866—the Governor took a strong contagonist stance and 
implemented a special system of quarantine that targeted newly arriving south Indian 
immigrants,371 whereby healthy south Indians and other “classes” such as merchants were 
permitted entrance and separated from the sick laborers, who were locked in hospitals 
until proven healthy or pronounced dead.372 The idea was simple. Remove the sick and let 
the healthy through, thereby protecting everyone else and ensuring that the 
“superabundance of cheap labour” gets to work. The method, according to the Governor, 
was a middle course that “[refused] on the one hand to put a stop to immigration, and on 
the other hand to facilitate the indiscriminate admission of Indian refugees and the 
consequent importation of cholera into our populous centres.”373  
 
The system of quarantine summarily functioned in the following ways. Firstly, all sailing 
vessels carrying “coolies” from the ports in southern India to the ports of Kalpitiya, 
Colombo, or any Ceylon port south of Colombo, were subject to fourteen days 
                                                            
369 CO 54/507, 23 April 1877 
370 CO 54/507, 15 March 1877 
371 Quarantine imposed by the Government Gazette notification of the 10th February 1877. CO 54/508, 5 
July 1877 
372 This measure was not well taken by the Chamber of Commerce, however, which was adamant against 
any form of immigration control, in the face of cholera or not, thus emphasizing the Governor’s 
divergent opinion about the fate of his colony and economic ideology 
373 CO 54/508, 5 July 1877  
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quarantine. 374  They were scrubbed and fumigated before returning. Port duties were 
entrusted to health officers to inspect all south Indian “coolies” on vessels arriving from 
sites of cholera infection for disease and privation.375 The healthy among them were taken 
to depots for the reception of passengers, where they were provided with temporary 
accommodation and employment.376 Those found to exhibit cholera-like symptoms were 
conveyed to an infectious hospital, where they were detained, quarantined, and treated, 
like the “insane” at lunatic asylums, with such things as milk, fresh air, and, heat belts.377 
Anyone else onboard the vessel, of “higher social status” such as Indian merchants or 
travelers, was not checked. On 5 July, however, quarantine restrictions were loosened and 
ships were only quarantined for periods of five to eight days rather than fourteen, if they 
carried mostly healthy bodied immigrants. The idea, which was strongly put forward by 
the Chamber of Commerce, gave incentive to ships to discriminate against who they 
allowed onboard, 378 thus ensuring that planters and relief works received a healthier stock 
of labor. The sick, however, continued to be belted off and quarantined.  The result of 
quarantine restrictions was characterized by a series of nasty side effects. The survival rate 
at an infectious hospital was less than 50% and there is a strong possibility that many 
people actually contracted cholera once inside them.379 Sometimes, to avoid quarantine, 
passengers or staff members threw cholera victims “overboard from native crafts during 
the voyage.”380 Finally, for all the efforts of quarantine, cholera continued to ravage the 
island at an alarming rate until the early 1880s.381  
 
The most salient points to consider regarding quarantine was that it was a system that 
targeted only south Indian laborers and was exercised only at the site of the island’s 
borders. It was thus a system that sought to filter and isolate suspected cholera agents 
from entering the island, thereby attempting to stop transmission with very little 
emphasis on treatment or therapy. How telegraphy was used in the system of quarantine 
is a subject to which I now turn.  
                                                            
374 Government Gazette 10 February 1877 
375 Administrative Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer, 1877, 218c 
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379 Meegama, “Cholera Epidemics and their Control in Ceylon,” 149. 
380 Administrative Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer, 1876 (Colombo, 1877), p. 124. 
381 Meegama, “Cholera Epidemics and their Control in Ceylon,” 143. 
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Telegraphing Cholera in 1877 
 
How do we gauge telegraphy’s function? We can surmise that the telegraph could have 
been used by port officials to announce known or suspected cases of cholera to the 
central government. Perhaps, also, it could have been deployed to track the travels of the 
sick to the infectious hospitals located along the Great North Road. However, none of 
these possibilities constituted the role of telegraphy in cholera eradication in 1877. 
Quantitatively, telegraphy does not have a strong presence in this case. There were only 
seven telegrams used by the colonial government in discussing the 1877 cholera outbreak, 
including local telegrams and those of official correspondence. Nevertheless, I would 
argue that telegraphy was an absolutely critical component in relation to the 1877 cholera 
epidemic, if we take the interest of the colonial government and not the disease itself into 
account. I would also suggest that an examination of telegraphic communication in 
relation to cholera indicates that the colonial state was not primarily concerned with 
immigration or cholera but what immigration and the disease could do for the colonial 
state. Before pursuing these ideas, let us first examine the telegrams themselves.  
There was only one telegram about cholera that was utilized by government agents locally. 
The single telegram was sent on 5 March 1877 to Colonial Secretary O’Brien in Colombo 
from the Lt. Governor in Batticaloa. It was sent  just ten days prior to the Governor’s 
letter, mentioned above, regarding excess immigration, the threat of cholera, and his 
desire for the Matale line extension. In the telegram, O’Brien wrote:  
Saunders writes that matters worse on Puttalam Road and requires authority to feed 
coolies…full authority to act as he considers best until my return. It would be well if Campbell 
would proceed at once to Kalpitiya and render such assistance with police as advisable. 
Quarantine of vessels should be strictly adhered to. Harbour master Tuticorin should warn 
shippers that Cholera at Kalypitiya. 382 
There are a number of interesting points about this particular telegram. Firstly, the 
information was instigated by Tudor Saunders, the prominent coffee-planter in the 
                                                            
382 SLNA 6/6545, 5 March 1877, “To Colombo, O’Brien, from Batticaloa, Lt. Governor” 
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Morawak Korale in the Matale District, seeking permission to feed a group of hungry 
workers, possibly battling cholera, somewhere along Puttalam Road—the route leading 
from the port at Kalpitiya to the interior coffee estates. This meant that rather than 
coming from the colonial state, knowledge of the epidemic derived from a private source 
that was, we can assume, motivated primarily by an interest in commerce. That no local 
telegrams were sent directly by the colonial state shows that the government was perhaps 
not concerned with transferring knowledge via telegram, and that private persons and 
that nongovernmental persons were concerned with the epidemic inside the colony.  
Secondly, Batticaloa, where O’Brien was located, is an eastern city. Kalpitiya is in the west 
and was not connected to the telegraph network in 1877.383 Therefore, the message was 
most likely conveyed from Morawak Korale in the center of the island to Batticaloa, 
thence to Colombo. Therefore, the message was not sent from the site of the problem 
but from an area approximately 200 km away. How the message made it to Batticaloa is 
not known exactly, but it is quite telling that it took a private message from a coffee 
planter to convey governmental troubles occurring at the western border to a 
government agent in the east. That no other telegraphic messages followed reveals the 
lack of consistency in using the technology to inform the colonial government about 
cholera epidemics. This telegram was, therefore, an anomaly in 1877 cholera 
communication.  
General ignorance about cholera outbreaks was prevalent, irrespective of relatively muted 
telegraphic communication. Writing to the Governor on 19 June 1877, G.J.M O’Brien of 
the Chamber of Commerce stated that: 
I am further with reference to an allegation that was brought to His Excellency’s 
notice by the deputation that 31 coolies out of a gang of 40 had recently died on 
their journey along the North Road, to request you to be so good as to furnish me 
with the name of the person responsible for the allegation, the name of the ship in 
which the coolies arrived, the date of their arrival, the pass on which they travelled, 
                                                            
383 Blue Book of Statistics, Ceylon, 1880.  
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if this can be procured, the name of their Kangany and the name of the estate on 
which the Kangany and the survivors of his gang are at present employed.384   
In other words, there was little if no knowledge about the present state of immigration 
and cholera within the island’s borders; and the Governor, like O’Brien, received his 
information by deputation rather than direct sources. It is suggestive that the colonial 
government was not well informed about other similar cholera-related cases.  
 
Even in letters to the Secretary of State, Ceylon’s Governor was regarded as not being 
well informed about the state of events. The Governor had sent an extensive letter, 
including dispatches from Paumben and Madras, to the Colonial Office on 15 May 
regarding the threat of excessive immigration and the problem of cholera.385 It reached 
there on 9 April. Upon reading it, Permanent Undersecretary Meade noted on the minute 
sheet that the information in the letter did not “appear satisfactory”; it provided 
insufficient information about food supplies, could not ascertain the number of coolies 
immigrating to the island, did not provide ideas for possible public and relief works, and 
the amount of immigrants yet to be expected was not predicted. But he noted that the 
Governor wrote amply about wanting to use the coolies to extend the Matale Railway.386  
The telegrams that passed between the colony and the Home government were slightly 
more numerous, there were four. All of which were sent before the 9 April letter. 
Reading them exposes a number of notable features. First of all, the official 
correspondence telegrams were not about conveying a pressing matter. That the 
telegrams and the letter were sent in March, and the waves of immigrants had been 
coming since the beginning of 1877, indicates that if the problem had actually been 
immediate the government would have communicated earlier. Also, the colonial office 
was well aware that telegraphic communication was an indication of emergency; that a 
telegram was sent rather than a letter meant that whatever was being sent was urgent and 
required a speedy response—especially if a reply by telegram was insisted. The Governor 
did not order telegraphic replies on any of his telegrams, and the Colonial Office found 
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this to be informative itself of the situation. On an incoming telegram on 2 March, 
regarding the cholera outbreak, Meade noted that because the Governor “did not order a 
reply by telegram, [and] the fact that Mr. Birch replied by despatch [instead], which will 
be here about 8th April, shows that the danger apprehended was not so much present as 
anticipated.”387 Thus, the telegrams that the Governor sent were intended as one way 
communication. They were meant to communicate something; not to seek help, 
insistence, or, as noted above, to provide the colonial office with sufficient 
information—even the Permanent Undersecretary knew this was the case.  
Secondly, the telegrams reinforced what would be said again in the letter. The two 
telegrams sent on 23 March, eight days after the letter was sent, included the following 
information: “Stoppage of immigration from India owing to outbreak of cholera on 
board a native vessel, by last mail you will be furnished with all information….” and “it is 
anticipated that relief works may be necessary in consequence of the famine in India and 
the large increasing supply of labour consequently seeking employment here, it would 
therefore be advantageous that the railway …to Matale should be sanctioned as early as 
possible.”388 Then on 16 April, eight days after the letter was received, a telegram titled 
“Telegram regarding railway to matale…” was sent. Not surprisingly there were no other 
telegrams sent after this one because on 23 April, the Matale line was formally sanctioned 
by the Secretary of State, and the Governor had no more need in deliberating on the 
subject via telegraph. The only telegram which did not recall the Matale line was the 
following telegram “deeply regret to report sudden death of sir M. Hackett this morning 
from cholera pray inform friends.”389 The announcement of a death by telegram was 
common practice. But, it was timely, nevertheless, since it was sent on 17 March just days 
before the letter would arrive; a dead Justice of the Peace was a good indication of the 
severity of cholera and would fit well in the narrative about immigration, cholera, and the 
need to contain the problem, via employment on the Matale line. Thus, by the time the 
colonial office received the letter, it was already informed that there was excessive 
immigration, that cholera was killing high-ranking Europeans, and that the Matale line 
extension was critically required. 
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To conclude, I suggest that the telegraphic communication about cholera in 1877 sent by 
the Governor was used to influence the metropolitan government to sanction the Matale 
railway. The logic was: there was an excess of labor and an epidemic of cholera; rather 
than stop immigration, open the borders and institute a system of quarantine that only 
marginally sufficed; then, rather than worry further, the excess labor ought to be taken 
advantage of and put to use building the railway. The one local telegram that actually 
considered cholera inside the island was sent by a private planter most likely because he 
was concerned for the coolies that were supposed to work on his estate. The telegrams to 
London were not used to negotiate the problem of cholera in any comprehensive or 
intelligent way; nor were they even about cholera eradication, but as the best way to 
utilize the immigrants supposedly carrying it. The quarantine system, which was the 
colonial state’s only form of cholera eradication, did not use telegraphic communication. 
Inside the island, the colonial government was ignorant of cholera outbreaks regardless 
of access to telegraphy.        
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CASE TWO: KOTAHENA RIOT, 1883 
 
The Kotahena Riot390 began when 2,000 to 4,000 Catholics  armed with bludgeons and 
swords of sword-fish,391  attacked a procession of 2,000 to 4,000 Buddhists, 392  whose 
perahera393 was meant to celebrate the completion of the decorations of and the setting of 
the “eyes of Buddha” at the Dipaduttama vihara.394 It occurred in Kotahena, Colombo, on 
Easter Sunday, 25 March 1883 around one o’clock p.m. and lasted until the evening. It 
culminated in numerous injuries and two deaths, one Catholic and one Buddhist.  
The factors which precipitated the violence were numerous. The first was based on 
demographic reasons. Kotahena395 had been primarily a Catholic dominated subsection of 
Colombo since the rule of the Portuguese, and the Buddhists, who had only since the 
authority of British colonial rule been granted permission to build religious edifices in 
Colombo, were a religious minority in the area.396 The Catholics desired to retain their 
majority status. Secondly, there had been a long standing oratory and pamphlet war 
between the two religions for decades, which created deep seeded animosity between the 
two groups.397 Third, the Buddhists were purported by witnesses to have offended the 
Catholics publicly, therefore provoking violence. For example, it was widely rumored that 
a dead monkey was nailed to a cross and displayed during the perahera;398  that some 
Buddhists carried images insulting to the Virgin;399 and, M. Don John a Catholic and 
                                                            
390  A great deal of debt is owed to G.P.V. Somaratna for transcribing and publishing all official 
correspondence records, news papers, found at both the SLNA and the NA in Kew, related to the 
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1991). 
391 Ibid., 95. 
392 Numbers were enumerated officially. Therefore, there are many different estimates. John D. Rogers, 
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assistant notary clerk, who, upon examination by the court, remembered that Gunananda, 
a prominent and often despised Buddhist orator, “held up a book (in red binding) and 
said this is the book of the Christians. Then he put it on the ground and put his foot on it. 
He then began to abuse and blaspheme the Lord Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary.”400 
Fourth, it was also an issue of sacred space since the procession was planned to move in 
front of the church on Easter Sunday, using tom-tom drums—which may have also been 
offensive to the austerity of the Catholics.401 The police were also to blame since they 
were in charge of permitting collective processions; the documentary evidence shows the 
incompetence of the police in granting organizing the event, losing applications, 
forgetting that applications were processed, and scheduling the Buddhist and Catholic 
processions on the same dates and times. A number of times, the police had to cancel 
permission. 402  Finally, the collective violence which ensued was most likely not 
premeditated by all people from the groups, but violence was provoked as individual 
religious peers came under attack.  
The Kotahena Riot was significant because it was the first large-scale act of religious 
violence that occurred in Ceylon during the second half of the nineteenth century, at a 
time which is characterized by economic and political stability.403 Also, the riot coincided 
with the rise of Buddhist nationalism.404 The Buddhist Defense Committee began in 
reaction to the riot, represented by H.S. Olcott;405 the Buddhist flag was created in the 
aftermath of the violence. 406  It was, therefore, a symbolically critical moment in the 
island’s Buddhist and British history. It was, furthermore, a test of the British authorities’ 
                                                            
400 Taken from SLNA Lot 33/991, 28 April 1883, in Ibid., 272. 
401 See especially Young and Somaratna, Vain Debates, 189-194. 
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1920,” Modern Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (2002): 937-967; See also, L. A. Wickremeratne, “Religion, 
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capacity to contain intense violence,407 and it provides fresh ground for examining the 
relationship between the telegraph and colonial power. 
This Case study sets out with this in mind. It is divided into three parts. The first part will 
explain the riot in narrative form. The second part will analyze the ways in which the 
police stopped the riot and the telegraph’s role in this process. The third part will 
examine the single telegram that the Governor used to communicate the event to 
London and its significance and purpose.   
 
Narrative of the Kotahena Riot 
 
The first report of violence, delivered by an unnamed messenger, reached the police 
accompanying the Buddhist procession at canal-bridge on Skinner’s Road, less than half a 
mile from where the catholic mob had assembled, at St. Lucia’s cathedral.408 They were 
told that a Buddhist priest had been assaulted up ahead. In reaction to the news, the 
Buddhists became excited and men from the group furiously rushed to a nearby timber 
yard and took possession of “any stick or weapon they could find.”409 The Buddhists 
henceforth continued on with fervid speed to retaliate.  
Outnumbered, the 20 to 90 police410 who were responsible for securing the perahera were 
not able to prevent the fighting or stop it once it had commenced. To no avail, Major 
Tranchell, an accompanying officer, ordered both the Buddhists and Catholics to disband 
and turn back.411 But, it was too late. As soon as the Buddhists arrived at St. Lucia’s 
corner, fighting had begun. They threw sticks at one another, stabbed one another with 
knives; the Catholics sliced bullocks’ throats, overturned and burned carts carrying 
                                                            
407 For a history of Ceylon’s police department during this period, see: A.C. Dep, A History of the Ceylon 
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religious ornaments.412 The Buddhists hit back with their fists or whatever material they 
could use as a weapon. 413 In the inquest report into the cause of death of Juan Naide, the 
Buddhist who was killed during the riot, published by the Examiner on the 30th of March 
1883, Major Tranchell testified that: 
 
As the carts neared the Catholics a body of the latter ran down, seized the 
bullocks, belaboured and killed five of them, and the carts were drawn up in a 
heap and set on fire…the police could not cope with the two parties, who were 
determined to fight, the Buddhist having declared they would kill the others or die 
themselves…During the conflict, I saw very heavy blows given on both sides and 
many men lying on the ground, who I thought would never recover. I never 
before thought that it took so much to kill a man. I ordered the wounded to be 
taken to hospital, but nothing could be done till late at night. I afterwards 
ascertained that there were 20 of the contending parties, and 11 police officers 
seriously hurt.414   
Major Tranchell was right to ascertain the fragility of the human condition. The blows 
were in fact strong enough to kill a man: two people died during the encounter. Only the 
death of the Buddhist, Juan Naide, was officially declared or examined by police, 
however.415 A reported one-eyed Malabar man hit Juan Naide on the head with a club and 
knocked him to the ground.416 When Juan attempted to get up, “a dark man with a beard, 
dressed in a cloth with crosses painted on his forehead and shoulder, and a red 
handkerchief round his head,” stabbed him in the stomach with a Kris (an asymmetrical 
dagger from south-east Asian origins).417 Then another person came and began to kick 
him repeatedly in the ribs, saying “this man is still alive.”418 None of the police witnessed 
the murder and nobody is reported to have intervened to stop the attackers.419 The three 
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attackers left Juan in the street to die alone. But, the sister of his wife, who reported to be 
present and witness the attack, summoned a couple bystanders to remove her brother-in-
law from the road and move him to the side, into a field.420 The victim’s wife, who was 
informed of her husband’s demise by her startled child, later arrived to the scene, and 
accompanied her husband to the hospital, where he died soon after from 
hemorrhaging.421 The men responsible for his death were never caught or sentenced.  
There is very little reference of the murdered Catholic man, Kutch Appu, or Cutch Appu 
as he is also named.422 His name is completely absent from the Commission Report and 
the Administration Report of Police. His name and death are only mentioned during a 
bribery charge against Inspector Gunaratna and are scantily reported in a few 
newspapers.423 The Ceylon Observer reported on 29 March that Kutch Appu died from 
complications due to puncture wounds “on his right side, about an inch in length and 
three inches in depth, penetrating the right lobe of his liver, and also a simple fracture of 
the right temporal bone.”424 It suggested, too, that Inspector Gunaratna was responsible 
for the man’s death, that he stabbed him in the lung.425 But, the Inspector was never 
brought to trial for it.  
 
How the Police Stopped the Riot  
   
The police were not able to stop the violence themselves. They were even at some points 
cornered and unable to contain the bedlam around them. Sticks, fists, and clubs were 
often aimed at them too.426 The police had to retreat, even, and if not “they would not be 
here to the story.”427 It is precisely for these reasons, we would assume, that the police 
would have hurried to telegraph to ask for help. But, this is not at all what happened.  
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The police were, nevertheless, able to stop the riot. Firstly, during a short lull in the fight, 
Assistant Superintendent Holland succeeded in persuading a body of the Catholics to 
follow him to the cathedral, where a Roman Catholic priest addressed them and asked 
them to cease.428 Major Tranchell then sent a mounted despatch to call in the military, the 
Royal Dublin Fusilier’s 1st Battalion, the infamous Irish infantry of the British Army.429 
The presence of the military was reported to have stopped the fighting and the injured 
were carried to hospital in the late evening.430 It was reported to have rained heavily that 
afternoon too, scattering the remaining people, and washing the debris and human 
effluvia into the soil.431 Thus, the 20 to 90 police who had endured the length of the 
violence, who were unable to defend themselves or protect the parties from injury and 
death, finally gained some peace when a Catholic priest, the military, and rain came to 
their rescue. 432 But, why did not other police come to help the defeated men caught in 
the violence? Why was the telegraph not used?  
In 1883, the population of the Western Province was 897,329 and had a police force of 
797 men, of which 756 were located in Colombo alone. Colombo was, in fact, the most 
heavily policed part of the island considering that there were only 1,579 police on the 
whole island.433 This meant that there were, at least statistically, over 700 police located in 
Colombo who could have helped the police in the riot.  
There is no direct evidence explaining why other police were not called, but there are at 
least two likely explanations. Firstly, the police were not the appropriate group to turn to 
in the face of such violence, since they were—as described by G.W.R. Campbell, 
Inspector General of Police, in the 1883 Administration Report for the Police—a poorly 
trained and meagerly armed band of men that would have been unsuitable, or unavailable, 
to assist the riot:  
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It is a civil police with a semi-military training. It is armed with sniper rifles and 
swords, and drilled, but the men carry only batons when on any ordinary duty 
other than treasure or convict escort or jail guard… But even of the small force of 
1,580 police, in Ceylon, from one-quarter to one-third are employed on duties 
which are not strictly police—the guarding of treasure and jails, for instance, and 
of convict gangs on such public works as the saltpans at Hambantota, the Mahara 
quarries, and the Breakwater. They are, further, the only relieving officers of the 
vagrant portion of the helpless poor, and they are now the jailers of several of the 
minor jails.434 
 Secondly, the Colombo police were as dislocated from each other as the city was spread 
wide and had no quick means of communicating. In Kotahena there were four police 
stations in various locations.435 One of which was immediately near the site of the riot on 
Skinner’s Road, directly around the corner from St. Lucia.436 It is not known, however, 
which station assisted the police at the riot or which ones were equipped to do so. The 
other police stations in Colombo, which contained the majority of the 82 police stations 
on the island, were located in other parts of the city, which were far from the scene.437 
Calling to arms the police scattered throughout the city was not a viable option for the 
men locked in the riot. The city’s network of communications, which was based primarily 
on the spread of rumors438 and foot and mounted messengers, exacerbated the reality of 
this dislocation.439 Despite the colony’s advances in telecommunications—the telegraph 
network and the telephone system from 1880—there was no network coverage in 
Colombo, or any other city on the island.440 Until the next century, only inter-regional 
telegraph lines, between the most important centers of commerce, constituted the 
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island’s network. The trajectory of the telegraph did not, therefore, follow the pattern of 
the island’s population, which was quickly urbanizing, especially in Colombo. Therefore, 
communication was restricted to space and human agency, which in Colombo was wide 
and slow, respectively. Thus, the police did not use the telegraph because there was no 
network coverage in Colombo.  
The riot accentuated the reality of this disconnection and signaled its address. According 
to G.W.R. Campbell: 
One great advantage the Colombo Police have derived from the Kotahena riots is 
that I got government to connect by telephone all my town stations and jail guards 
with each other and with the principal public institutions. This was most necessary, 
as we have never had even telegraphic communication, though Colombo is, by 
reason of its seaside position, and its spreading lake and cocoanut groves, one of 
the most widely scattered cities in the world in proportion to its population. 
Indeed the police is rather starved in every way, to justify which statement I would 
add to what I have stated before, that we have not one mounted constable in the 
Colony, and not a vestige of harbor police anywhere.441  
Whether or not telecommunication would have helped the police, its absence in the 
Kotahena Riot nevertheless inspired it to become part of policing in Ceylon’s cities.442 
According to sources of the 1915 Riot,443 the police used telegraphy to organize their 
movements; and telegrams, alongside letters and telephone tapping, were used as 
evidence by the police to locate and ascertain the origins and instigators of the riot.444 
However, even by then police only had access to telegraphy in major metropolitan areas. 
According to L.M. Samarasinghe—who in 1945 was Divisional Regional Officer at 
Anamadua—despite having a high crime rate, there was no telegraphy or telephone in his 
district.445 However, because of the high crime rate, he was necessarily in contact with the 
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courts, the police, and the kachcheri at Puttalama which was seventeen miles away.446 He 
had no telephone or telegraph, so what he did was he sent a foot messenger and wait for 
him to return, usually taking an entire day.447 To counter this, he devised the use of 
pigeons to contact the authorities in the other district, which took a total of seven to 
eight minutes. The full case of his story can be read in his autobiography.448 The district 
did not receive the telephone until 1957.449 
Telegraphing the Kotahena Riot 
 
While the police did not use telegraphy to contain the Kotahena Riot, the colonial 
government made use of one telegram to announce the Riot to the metropolitan 
government. It was sent by the Governor on 28 March, three days after the riot: 
Serious riot here on Sunday between Roman Catholics and Buddhists. Police 
outnumbered by thousands and overpowered. Military called in when mob 
dispersed. Riot again attempted on Monday and suppressed without violence. 
Town now quiet. Fifty rioters apprehended awaiting trial. Twenty rioters injured 
taken to hospital one had since died. Neither police nor military fired. Riot caused 
by false stories that insults were offered by Buddhists to Christian symbols. 
Mohammedans took no part in riots.450    
There are a number of significant points to make about this telegram. Firstly, the 
Governor had been on leave during the riot and returned only after the military had 
already quelled the violence, which could explain the three day delay. It was, furthermore, 
the first piece of information about the riot to reach London.451 The transmission of the 
telegram was, therefore, not an invitation for help or a means of managing the crisis as 
much as it was a statement of resolution. It declared the success of the military and 
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government and the ineptitude of the police in stopping the riot. And, it blamed the 
Catholics for the violence.  
Secondly, the information contained in the telegram appears to have been biased and 
incomplete. The Riots Commission Report of June 1883 consisted of Mr. Saunders, the 
government Agent of the Western Provence, Colonel Duncan, a senior military officer of 
the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and one Eurasian, Mr. de Saram, the District Judge of 
Kurunegala.452 It was their primary duty to determine the cause and to investigate the 
ways in which the government handled the crisis. Mr. Saunders, who was absent during 
the riot, never mentioned his absence in the report. 453Colonel Duncan, the Governor’s 
purported friend, was in the military that presided during the riots, a fact which would 
not cause suspicion if most of the final section of the report was not dedicated to the 
bravery and success of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers.454 All three men were Protestants. The 
absence of Roman Catholic and Buddhist representatives indicates that the Commission 
was impartial to the views of either party.455 
Another curious deception was the complete lack of recognition that Buddhists and 
Catholics had mutually strong grievances against one another, and had for decades 
engaged in a number of heated public debates. Both Buddhists and Catholics had been 
for years in a pamphlet and oratory war, in which both sides defamed the verity of the 
other. The report, instead, made the Buddhists into innocent victims of an enraged and 
jealous Catholic population that was being squeezed out of its majority position in 
Kotahena. While the report does consider that the Buddhists provoked the Catholics to 
battle, it sided with the Buddhists rather than taking into account that the riot was an 
almost inevitable consequence of years of embittered and bifurcated religious squabbles. 
Although there were eyewitnesses who later reported that they saw Buddhists carrying 
monkeys on a cross that supposedly angered the Catholics, this claim is denied by the 
Commission. Also missing from the report was the mention of the Catholic man, Kutch 
Appu, who was murdered during the riot. The omission of these details suggests that the 
Commission may have used the Catholics as scapegoats to explain the violence.  Also the 
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Commission heavily criticized the police for granting the Buddhists permission to have a 
procession on Easter Sunday, of all the days when a disturbance was predictable.456 They 
were blamed for granting the permission to Gunananda, a Buddhist monk who they 
claimed was famous for his verbal and written attacks against Christianity. By this reason 
alone, the report hinted, it was enough to incriminate the Catholics because of their 
hatred for this man. However, the testimony of witnesses subpoenaed by the 
Commission, who claimed that Gunananda’s language did not seem inappropriate, was 
totally ignored.457 Finally, the Governor’s letter of 2 April 1883, sent months before, and 
the Riot Commission Report of 26 June 1883, contained near identical information.458 To 
this end, an unswerving narrative, found in the letter and continued in the report, had 
been constructed which supported the government and condemned the Catholics. Thus, 
the seemingly biased judgments and details remained consistent in all manners of opinion. 
The government’s certainty is curious given that no person was ever condemned for the 
riot, despite the government’s consistent knowledge of culprits and “facts” from the end 
of March until June.   
All of this goes on to suggest that the colonial government perhaps tailored the telegram, 
the letter, and the report to show the Home government that it had remained consistent 
throughout the ordeal, a value which was essential in maintaining the bond of trust 
between the imperial center and the colony. Consistency bespoke confidence, intelligence, 
and resolve—all such characteristics were positive attributes of a government in the face 
of emergency. The telegram began this process of consistency by quickly indicating to the 
Home authorities that measures were verified, contained, and controlled, thus creating a 
space in which the government could further cover-up the realities on the ground, to 
render a positive image of a government challenged by its own subjects. Telegraphy as a 
tool of emergency management in relation to the Kotahena Riot ends on somewhat 
dubious grounds, therefore. Telegraphy was not used during the riot. The police did not 
have access to it. And, when the Governor did deploy it, he did so as a tool of declaring a 
resolution to find time to construct a positive image of the government at Home. But, it 
                                                            
456 Young and Somaratna, Vain Debates, 192. 
457 Ibid., 193. 
458 CO 54 2 April 1883 
 166 
 
did not offer real-time benefits to the colony, its authority, or its ability to control 
violence in Colombo.           
 
CASE THREE: COLLAPSE OF THE ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION 
  
The Oriental Bank Corporation collapsed on 3 May 1884. The significance of this event 
was manifold for Ceylon and its government. Firstly, the island’s currency had been 
based on Oriental Bank Corporation notes, which became valueless immediately 
following the bank’s failure; a problem that was not resolved until the end of the year. 
Traders and merchants in Ceylon, consequently, lost confidence in paper currency and 
demanded the value of their notes in silver. Many traders would, in fact, only trade in the 
currency of silver or other precious metals. Secondly, Ceylon’s government held a large 
portion of its revenue balance in the bank, which it subsequently lost in the crash.  These 
consequences of the bank’s collapse had substantial effects on the island’s economy as a 
whole. For example, trade was slowed down. The price of rice and other subsistence 
foodstuffs became inflated. But, most importantly, it signaled the colonial government’s 
intervention in banking, which had hitherto remained a private enterprise. How the 
colonial government utilized telegraphic communication to mediate and regulate the 
collapse is the focus of this case study. Before analyzing the use of telegraphy, the case 
study will briefly describe the origins and role of banks in Ceylon, the events that led to 
the Oriental Bank Corporation’s collapse, and the effects of the collapse on the colony, 
respectively.  
Origin and Role of Banks in Ceylon 
 
Until the introduction of the plantation system in the mid to late 1830s, Ceylon’s 
economy was mercantile in character, dealing in the export of a few natural products. It 
had some activity of shipping and trading, with a very small agricultural sector, and 
meager manufactures. 459  Both foreign trading companies and the administration 
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continued to operate monopolies that had existed since the pre-colonial era, such as the 
cinnamon trade. There were no major innovations in the economy or society during this 
pre-capitalist phase of British occupation. Rather, European merchants adapted to 
existing structures of trade and capital accumulation. This included the accumulation of 
capital based on local currency and loaning agencies. 460 Banks did not exist during this 
period. However, “Chettiars” or “Chetties” from south India provided the majority of 
exchange services necessary for the island’s balance of trade and money lending.461 And, 
merchant houses sold sterling bills with a six month sight. While these services suited the 
demands of the pre-capitalist economy, the Chettiars and the merchant houses could not 
sufficiently service the island’s economy in the wake of the plantation era.  
From the mid to late 1830s Ceylon’s economy experienced a significant acceleration of its 
import-export trade with the rise and expansion of plantations.462 According to Ferguson’s 
Ceylon Directory for the year 1880, there was a sharp distinction between the value of 
exports in the pre- and plantation years. The value of exports rose from £224,000 in 1825 
to £1.2 million in 1850 and £4.7 million in 1880.463 The value of exports was composed 
primarily of unprocessed commodities, of which coffee constituted the bulk. Between 
1850 and 1880, coffee accounted for 75% of total exports. 464  The value of imports 
increased alongside, and at times ahead of, the rise in exports, indicating a direct relation 
of imports to the expansion of the plantation sector. Imports mostly included foodstuffs 
for the growing number of plantation workers, luxury goods for the British, 
administrators, and planters, and the food and textile requirements of the population in 
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general.465 The sharp increase in export and import values created a high demand for 
capital which the monetary system of exchange and money lending under the Chettiars 
and merchant houses, which had serviced the colony since the start of the century, were 
not able to meet. As a result, banks were instituted to meet the planters’ and the 
attendant industries’ increased demand for capital.  
The Bank of Ceylon was the island’s first bank. It commenced operations on 1 June 1841 
by Royal Charter. It remained the only bank on the island until the commercial crisis of 
1845 to 1847, when the price of coffee fell from 68s per cwt in 1844 to 43s per cwt in 
1847.466 During this time, the Western Bank of India, established in 1843, moved its head 
office from Bombay to London and changed its name to the Oriental Bank. Two years 
later it established a branch office in Colombo. Having survived the crisis, in 1847 it took 
over the Bank of Ceylon and in 1851 they merged to form the Oriental Bank 
Corporation. By 1878, the bank grew and had branches and agencies in Kandy, Jaffna, 
Galle, Badulla, Nuwara Eliya, Dambulla and Haldummulla. 467  It also had agencies 
throughout southern and eastern Asia, including India, China, Mauritius, Hong Kong, 
and the Straits Settlements.468 In 1854, the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London, 
and China established a branch in Colombo. The Oriental Bank Corporation was the 
larger of the two, however, with dividends that remained steadily above the Chartered 
Mercantile Bank’s, ranging respectively from 16 to 10 in 1860 and 12 to 6 in 1870.469 In 
1884 it had 7 branches, 5 agencies, and 25 sub-agencies, including its head office in 
London.470 Therefore, until the bank crash in 1884, there were two banks in operation in 
Ceylon, the Oriental Bank Corporation and the Chartered Mercantile Bank, of which the 
former was the largest.  
These banks functioned in three primary ways. Firstly, they provided credit to planters 
for the rent of land and the cost of its cultivation, and they gave credit to the ancillary 
industries which developed alongside the plantation sector. The loans were somewhat 
problematic since they had a six-month turnover which placed the planting community in 
                                                            
465Value of imports was £296,000 in 1825 and £5 million in 1880. Jayawardena, Nobodies to Somebodies, 131. 
466 Andree, “The Progress of Banking in Ceylon,” 81-82. 
467 Gunasekera, From Dependent Currency to Central Banking in Ceylon, 56. 
468 Ibid., 48. 
469 Ibid., 57. 
470 Ibid., 60. 
 169 
 
a position sensitive to the short-term fluctuations of the market, making foreclosures and 
defaults an easy reality—although the majority of the period experienced sober expansion. 
The British, foreign businesses, and the Chettiars were the main customers of bank 
loans.471  
Secondly, banks were agencies of currency exchange. According to Arnold Wright in 
Twentieth Century Impressions of Ceylon:  
The chief business of an ‘exchange bank’, as the name denotes, is the purchase 
and sale of bills of exchange. Had the merchant who ships his produce to Europe, 
Australia, America, or whatever country it may be, to wait until such shipments 
were realised and the proceeds remitted back to him, trade would be hampered to 
such an extent as to become well-nigh impossible, but here the exchange bank 
steps in and purchases the bills of exchange drawn against such shipments, so that 
the merchant has not to remain without his money. 472 
As exchange banks, they made possible the sale of commodities in foreign markets on an 
everyday basis.473    
Finally, in addition to providing credit for the expansion of the economy, and facilitating 
currency exchange, banks also supplied the colony with its currency. Prior to 1856, the 
money supply consisted of Treasury notes, bank notes, Indian rupees, and its subsidiary 
coinage. In 1855, Governor Henry Ward announced the withdrawal of Treasury notes 
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from circulation, leaving bank notes and rupees as the sole forms of monetary exchange 
in the island.474  
 
The Events that Led to the Oriental Bank Corporation’s Collapse 
 
The events that led to the crash of the Oriental Bank Corporation on 3 May 1884 can be 
summarily described by the following narrative. Around the turn of the 1880s, a leaf 
fungus termed Hemileia vastatrix began to infect the island’s coffee plants, causing 
unmitigated decay of the majority of them and the wholesale abandonment of coffee 
estates. As a result, the drop in the supply of coffee increased its price.475 This would not 
have been so immediately serious, if there had not been a depression in the site of the 
industry’s biggest market, the U.K., at the same time, which caused a sharp decline in the 
demand for the product simultaneous to the rise in prices. The decline of sales led to a 
large slump in Ceylon’s government revenues, affecting every other branch of trade and 
industry connected to the coffee industry. Ceylon’s banks suffered as a consequence, 
especially the Oriental Bank Corporation which showed a 50% decrease in its deposits 
between 1876 and 1883 and a fall in its holdings of bills of exchange from £5.6 to £1.7 
million.476   
Still, the Oriental Bank Corporation may have survived and improved once the colony 
had transitioned to tea production in the mid 1880s. 477  But there were other 
circumstances outside the colony that caused even more problems for the bank. Its 
Chilean bonds fell in value. Its South African business was transferred to the Bank of 
Africa. There was a sharp decline in the global price of silver and rupee paper.478 And, a 
                                                            
474 Gunasekera, From Dependent Currency to Central Banking in Ceylon, 37. 
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number of natural calamities such as cyclones, droughts, and bad harvests in Mauritius 
afflicted its branches there.479 The simultaneous occurrence of all of these factors led to 
the fall of its shares to less than £7 in 1883, from £43 a share in 1877. News of this drop 
caused a lack of confidence among its customers and there was a rush both in Ceylon and 
abroad to withdraw deposits.480 Unable to return the deposits, the directors of the bank 
suspended payment on 3 May 1884, 481  signaling the immediate end of the bank’s 
operations in all of its branches—482  including other British possessions such as the 
Straits Settlements, Mauritius, and Hong Kong. Because the stability of the island’s 
economy was tied to the stability of the bank, Ceylon’s economy was immediately 
devastated.483       
The Effects of the Collapse on the Colony 
 
The effects of the bank’s closure were felt immediately in Ceylon. On the day of the 
suspension, the colony lost the sum of its balances in the different branches of the 
Oriental Bank Corporation, valued at Rs. 626,369.68. 484  And, more significantly, the 
value of all Oriental Bank Corporation notes in circulation—valued at Rs. 3,200,000 at 
the time of the suspension—was rendered worthless.485 As a result of the valueless notes, 
popular confidence was lost in all paper currency on the island. Even the notes of the 
Chartered Mercantile Bank (the only other bank of issue in the Colony) became as 
difficult to negotiate as those of the Oriental Bank Corporation. This entailed the entire 
cessation of trade throughout the island, and intense local pressure was put on the 
Chartered Mercantile Bank for the immediate conversion of its notes into silver. 486 
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Consequently, “supplies of rice for the maintenance of coolies on estates—or indeed for 
any purpose—were almost unattainable from native traders, specie being very scarce, and 
the dealers refusing to sell except for silver.”487 The amount of silver in the hands, or at 
the disposal of the government, was so little that even the Postmaster General had to 
issue orders to his branch offices to refuse to cash Post Office Orders, on account of the 
small amount of money at his disposal.488 Gripped with an economy in crisis, Ceylon’s 
colonial government quickly began to search for ways towards stabilization. The 
telegraph’s function in this process is the focus of the following section.  
 
How the Colonial Government Utilized Telegraphic Communication to Mediate and 
Regulate the Collapse 
 
Unlike the previous two cases, telegraphic communication had a significant presence and 
played a vital role in Ceylon’s recovery from the effects caused by the Oriental Bank 
Corporation’s closure. This can be proven by two facts. Firstly, there is quantitative 
evidence that shows that the colonial government sent many telegrams directly related to 
the bank’s collapse. Three of the seven despatches sent between the Governor of Ceylon 
and the Colonial Office within the first week of the bank’s closure were telegraphic.489  
On 5 May, two days after the crash, the government sent numerous telegrams to 
determine its balances held in the different branches of the Oriental Bank Corporation 
and the value of the Oriental Bank Corporation notes held in the colony’s district 
kachcheries. 490In addition to communicating to London and within Ceylon, Ceylon’s 
government extensively utilized the global capacity of its telegraph network to contact the 
governments of the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, Melbourne, and Mauritius, which 
had all been former locations of the Oriental Bank Corporation.491  
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A minute sheet addressed to the Crown Agents for the Colonies, dated 10 May 1884, 
included a list of the telegraphic correspondence that had passed between the Governors 
of these colonies. Notes on the minute sheet indicated that in the seven days between 3 
and 10 May, there had been seventeen individual telegraphic messages sent between these 
governments.492 The information contained in the telegrams included the value of the 
Oriental Bank Corporation’s note issue in the Straits Settlement that had amounted to 
$345,000; the aggregate amount of the bank’s notes in circulation in Hong Kong which 
was approximately $860,000; and enquiries into the legal proceedings that had been 
advised or commenced in the colonies—thus revealing the collective enumerative losses 
incurred by the colonies’ governments, the interest in pursuing the cases legally, as well as 
indicating the global reach of the bank’s failure.493 Finally, between 3 and 16 May 1884, 30 
telegrams were exchanged between the Treasury and the Governors of Ceylon, the Straits 
Settlement, and Hong Kong “to assess and limit the impact of the collapse to the 
Oriental Bank Corporation on their respective colonies.”494  
Secondly, telegraphy was used to circumvent the spread of panic in Mauritius, which was 
essential to protect Ceylon from incurring greater economic hardship. As a consequence 
of the Oriental Bank Corporation’s failure, Mauritius’ government had lost the total of its 
balances valued at Rs. 1,000,000.495 Comparatively, this was less than one-third of the 
losses incurred by Ceylon’s government in the crash. But, relatively, this loss was 
significant given that the colony’s economy had just been wrecked by a series of natural 
calamities causing across-the-board damages to its plantations. To address this situation, 
Ceylon’s government proposed to pay Mauritius’ government Rs. 250,000 in silver 
coin.496  
Aiding Mauritius served the interest of Ceylon’s government. The Rs. 250,000 that 
Ceylon’s government offered to Mauritius was not meant to replenish the colony’s lost 
balances per se, but rather to provide the colony with a reserve of coin to protect the value 
of its own paper currency. There were two reasons for this. First, the Governor of 
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Ceylon was fearful that people in Mauritius would make a run on the banks there, 
believing that the Chartered Mercantile Bank notes, the only remaining currency in 
Mauritius and Ceylon, had become valueless like Oriental Bank Corporation notes.497 The 
Governor believed this would crash the banks in Mauritius and destroy the already 
waning confidence that people had in paper currency in Ceylon. Secondly, the Chartered 
Mercantile Bank notes would lose value without public confidence, a run would be made 
on the bank’s branches in Ceylon, and the island’s entire cash-based economy would 
collapse. 498  It was thus the perceived threat of an information panic that prompted 
Ceylon’s government to intervene in Mauritius.  
Paradoxically, though, it was the perceived spread of information panics by telegraph that 
required Ceylon’s government to use the same technology in circumventing it—for news 
of a bank run in Mauritius, Ceylon’s government believed, would have arrived to Ceylon 
by way of telegram to the local newspapers, just as telegraphy had spread the news about 
the sharp drop in the Oriental Bank Corporation shares.499 And, the telegraph’s speed was 
used to sidestep the spread of information panic. 500  On 5 May, Ceylon’s Governor 
telegraphed the Colonial Office to order the Crown Agents for the Colonies to arrange 
by “telegraphic transfer” to Governor Hennessey “for the convergence of two and a half 
lakh of rupees in silver from Bombay to Mauritius, for the use of [his] government…”501 
Thus, because of telegraphy, the situation in Mauritius was handled within the first two 
days after the bank’s failure, thereby skirting potential information panics and securing 
public confidence in paper currency.   
However, I suggest though that as present and essential as telegraphy was in managing 
the aftermath of the bank’s failure, it would not be correct to assume that the telegraph 
saved the colony from the bank’s failure directly. While a great deal of communication 
was circulated via telegraph, there were far more significant matters handled without the 
technology. Indeed, the single most important decision that Ceylon’s government 
                                                            
497 CO 54/553, 5 May 1884, no. 734, “Failure of the Oriental Bank.” 
498 Ibid. 
499 Ibid. 
500 McGuire, “The Rise and Fall of the Oriental Bank in the Nineteenth Century: A Product of the 
Transformations That Occurred in the World Economy or the Result of Its Own Mismanagement,” 12. 
501 CO 54/553, 5 May 1884, no. 7341, “Colonial Office to The Crown Agents” 
 175 
 
ordered was made intentionally without telegraphic communication. Following the 
Governor’s immediate reactions to the bank’s failure gives evidence of this.   
 
The Governor’s Tale502 
On 3 May the Governor, who was in Newara Eliya, received a telegraphic message from 
the Acting Colonial Secretary, informing him that the Oriental bank Corporation had 
suspended payments. He left at once for Colombo and arrived early on 5 May. Upon 
arrival, he learned that shortly after the bank’s failure the managers of both the Bank of 
Madras and the Chartered Mercantile Bank had proposed to the Acting Colonial 
Secretary a solution to the problem afflicting their banks. They suggested that the 
government of Ceylon should quarantine the Oriental Bank Corporation notes in 
circulation in Ceylon, amounting to Rs. 3,200,000.503 They proceeded to insist that if 
Ceylon’s government gave the desired quarantine, the Madras and Chartered Mercantile 
Banks would receive Oriental Bank Corporation notes at the full nominal value “they had 
hitherto borne,” an example which it was hoped would be followed by the general 
restoration of public confidence in the notes. The essential idea was that the government 
would match the notes with an equal value of silver, thereby giving real value to the notes, 
which would in turn instill confidence in paper currency and restore the economy. The 
Governor, however, hesitated to agree with the managers and consulted the Colonial 
Secretary.  
If he agreed to quarantine the notes, he thought, dangers of an immediate run on the 
banks would be avoided, public confidence would be restored, and trade could run its 
free course,504 but the local government would most likely have to pay some “amount to 
supplement the dividend paid by the bank on its winding up, and a chance of its being 
called on to pay a large amount for that purpose.”505If he refused it, the government 
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would escape the danger of losing the difference between their nominal value and the rise 
in value if the Oriental bank Corporation were to return to business, but the government 
would have to protect itself from further entanglements in the affairs of the Oriental 
Bank Corporation, and he would run the risk of a continued lack of confidence in the 
island’s currency, causing a subsequent run on the banks. After deliberating with the 
Colonial Secretary, he opted to approve of the quarantine since it included more 
perceived benefits than the course of refusing it. He sent an unofficial notification of his 
decision, and a letter from the Acting Secretary, declaring his order to the Chamber of 
Commerce and to the Banks. Confidence was restored in bank notes and trade resumed 
under nearly normal operations within five days of his decision. 
Whether or not success was related to the Governor’s judgment or merely coincidental, 
the Governor’s decision to quarantine the bank notes was probably the most important 
action undertaken by the colonial government regarding the bank’s failure. First of all, it 
signaled the government’s interference in banking, thereby challenging the essential 
liberal concern of separating government from the world of free trade. Secondly, the 
Governor approached his decision seriously; as though it could result in only the success 
or the utter failure of the island’s economy. Finally, it was the decision that inspired 
intervention in the affairs of Mauritius and private banking in general.  Therefore, while 
the decisions involved in Mauritius and the communications with Hong Kong were 
significant, the governor’s decision to quarantine the Oriental Bank Corporation bank 
notes was singularly more important given that it potentially saved the colony’s economy 
and gave the government the right to help Mauritius and intervene in other areas of 
business if necessary—which culminated into the wholesale replacement of private bank 
notes with Ceylon government bank notes.506  
Nevertheless, as serious as his decision was, the Governor did not inform the Secretary 
of State about it until 10 May, five days after he executed it. To justify his silence on the 
matter, the Governor declared in a letter that any extra delay in rendering a decision 
about the quarantine: 
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would have practically been to refuse it, and on Tuesday morning the effects of 
that impression would have been felt from one end of the island to the other. 
Under other circumstance, I should have sought, (for I need hardly say I was 
desirous to obtain in a matter of such importance) the preliminary sanction of Her 
Majesty’s Government to the course contemplated before adopting it, but (to say 
nothing of the difficulties of conveying by telegraph anything like a full or just idea 
of the nature or perils of the position), an immediate decision was absolutely 
requisite. A few hours delay would have involved consequences which no later 
effort, no amount of subsequent unavailing regret that the moment for action had 
been allowed to pass unheeded, would have sufficed in the least degree to repair.507     
The Governor considered any delay, including telegraphing his ideas to the Secretary of 
State, an impediment to decision-making. Therefore, while the telegraph was extensively 
used as a tool of communication in the aftermath of the bank’s failure in general, it was 
intentionally avoided in formulating and executing the most critical decision that the 
Governor made. Thus, the telegraph was perhaps not the tool which singularly “fixed” 
the economy since avoiding it may have been the reason that success occurred at all—if 
we take the Governor’s words at face value.       
However, the difference between the Governor’s words and deeds were contentious. On 
the same day, 5 May, he had sent a telegraphic message to the Secretary of State 
informing him about the bank’s failure and the government’s lost balances. He could 
have, therefore, informed the Colonial Office about his decision to quarantine the bank 
notes in the same telegram. The Colonial Office also noticed and questioned this neglect. 
In the margin next to the Governor’s message, the Colonial Office wrote: “Why did he 
conceal what he contemplated [to the] Men sending his [telegram] No. 7?” Although his 
intentions cannot be known with certainty, it is clear that the Governor did not confer 
with the Colonial Office on the matter telegraphically. The Governor avoided using 
telegraphy while addressing one of the most pressing issues that the colony faced in the 
aftermath of the bank’s failure—the quarantine of the Oriental Bank Corporation notes 
circulating in the colony—on the basis that the technology could not be used to 
communicate efficiently the gravity of the circumstances to the Home government.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
These three cases all shared in the fact that they were extraordinary events that required 
immediate action by the colonial state to stop and/or mediate them. All three would have 
implicitly benefited from telegraphic technology to some extent. Telegraphy could have 
been implemented in mediating quarantine measures in cholera eradication; it could have 
been used to call in reinforcements at the time of the Kotahena Riot; and it could have 
been used to level the complications associated with the Oriental Bank Corporation’s 
failure. As I showed, these implications were not equally shared or reflected in practice. 
Telegraphy was hardly used in any measure to deal with the cholera epidemic; nor was it a 
key form of communication in response to the Kotahena Riot. But, it played a significant 
role in dealing with the banking crisis. What, then, explains these differences and what do 
they mean for this thesis?  
In part, these differences in use patterns had to do with practicality. This included 
structural limitations. Telegraphy was not part of the urban communication system, as 
telephony had become in later years. The network had been structured along commercial 
lines and was therefore limited to intra-urban and rural communications.  The police and 
other urban state powers did not have access to it at the time of the revolt because it was 
simply not available in the city at the time. Yet, structural limitations do not explain the 
meager performance of the telegraph in the cholera epidemic. There were telegraph-hubs 
located in all major ports of entrance along the coast, which the powers in Colombo had 
access to. Telegraphy could have been used by the government in monitoring outbreaks 
as they arose and to communicate executive orders about quarantine, measures which 
necessarily required immediate responses that telegraphy could have facilitated. Structural 
limitations, thus, only partly explain why some cases were handled with telegraphic 
communication and others were not.  
One way to gauge the differences of use patterns between these three cases is to examine 
the nature of communication involved in the cases themselves. For where telegrams were 
used least was in relation to communication on the island. Almost all telegrams examined 
above were related to international or long-range communication; this is highlighted by 
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the comparatively numerous telegrams deployed in regard to the banking crisis and the 
limited utility of telegrams sent in regard to the other two cases. Unlike the other cases, 
the banking crisis was of global proportion and required the mediation of multiple global 
actors and institutions; mediation that had to be handled decisively and quickly. While the 
Kotahena Riot and the cholera outbreak were insular events, the banking crisis in Ceylon 
was one part of a financial drama that performed throughout the Indian Ocean region. 
And, the telegraph was the ideal communication medium in maintaining a dialogue 
between the international banking institutions. This was a matter of practicality as well as 
circumstance, however. As I stated above, the need to telegraph arose because of the 
telegraph. The only way to counter the spreading news of the crisis and to curtail 
increased complications and prevent a further breakdown in confidence, was to 
communicate via telegraph—for, the news of the crisis that was deteriorating confidence 
was spreading via telegraphy and communication to restore confidence had to be made 
just as quickly. Thus telegraphy begot the need for more telegraphy. The single telegram 
used in respect to the Kotahena Riot was also international, being sent from Colombo to 
London. And, the telegrams used in reference to the cholera outbreak, minus the single 
local telegram which was sent by a local planter, were all international telegrams.  
But why were the majority of telegrams international? Perhaps the telegraph may have 
been considered as only an international communication tool; that only long distance 
necessitated telegraphic mediation. But, this does not add up. As I have stated, the 
administration sent hundreds of telegrams locally. Alongside these crises the 
administration continued to implement telegraphy in its local correspondence activities. 
Far beyond intentionality, I think subjectivity and the dynamics of colonial administrative 
power and the meaning of communication itself had more to do with the neglect of 
sending telegrams locally than any preconceived notions. The purpose of telegrams in the 
Kotahena Riot and the cholera epidemic was not meant to address the crises themselves 
but to satisfy some subjective requirement of the colonial administration. When the 
telegram was used in the cholera epidemic and the Kotahena Riot, it was used to either 
persuade the home government to act in the local administration’s favor or to instill a 
sense of authority. Thus telegrams served a purpose that had less to do with practically 
serving the crisis at hand than with strategy; that is, using communication to perform an 
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act of power, an act that did not directly impact on the severity of the event but that 
worked to achieve some other end. The telegram deployed in the Kotahena riot made the 
statement that the situation was under control. But it did not help stop the riot or work in 
any practical way. It was about performing colonial government power, showing the 
Home government that the administration was fast and responsive. The telegrams 
deployed in the cholera epidemic worked similarly. They did not refer to any practical 
concern regarding the disease. They did not request help or back up. Instead, they 
functioned on a representative level, to stress the danger of having excessive amounts of 
immigrants. The significance of cholera was downplayed to rationalize a continued 
allowance of labor. The speed and repetition of sending telegrams represented to the 
Home government that it was an escalating problem—that only the permission of 
railroad development seemed to quiet. All of this goes on to suggest that the colonial 
administration was highly aware of the significance and symbolic meaning of telegraphy. 
Sending telegrams symbolized speed, urgency; they were a coded way of saying that 
everything “in this moment” was relevant. The Governor sent a handful of telegrams to 
the Secretary of State to stress the importance of the situation of excess labor. Each new 
telegram reinforced the urgency of the one prior. Likewise the telegram sent after the 
Kotahena Riot was coded language stating that the moment of emergency was silenced 
and that all dangers were apprehended and handled. Telegraphy represented timeliness. 
Depending on what was written and how many were sent, they could stress danger or 
security. The reason that international telegrams were sent more often than local ones 
was, I believe, because telegrams functioned primarily along these lines, as a symbolic, 
rather than a practical, form of communication. This point is hammered in by the fact 
that a practical response by the Home Government’s to the crises would have been 
minimal. What was the Secretary of State to do thousands of miles from the spot of 
trouble? It was furthermore the governor’s duty to contain local problems. That local 
telegrams were not used also hammers in the idea that telegrams were more symbolic 
than practical. If they were practical, then they would have been deployed in the location 
where they would have served best, not 5,500 miles away.    
The findings of this chapter are significant for thesis, particularly in relation to its concern 
with the relationship between telegraphy and power. This chapter gave evidence to the 
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fact that colonial authority is a rather hard to pin down concept; it was most elusive in 
the case of the Kotahena Riot. There was no telegraph network in Colombo, the largest 
city on the island, nor was it in any other city on the island. The police, which were 
fundamentally an urban form of colonial authority, therefore, had no access to it; the 
military did not either and was, in fact, called in to help the Kotahena police by way of 
horseback messenger. Thus, telegraphy was disconnected from the island’s sources of 
main power. If the technology was not used by the military or the police, then what kind 
of authority did telegraphy possess? I showed that the single telegram that was used in 
reference to the Kotahena Riot was used to communicate to the metropolitan 
government that the situation was immediately under control. It was used to begin a story 
that was repeated in the subsequent letter and made official in the Commission report. 
This story, however, came back to hurt the island’s government in the long run, when 
Buddhist nationalists came back to grieve for the state’s incapacity to bring to justice 
those it blamed for the violence.  Although the Catholics were identified as the sole 
enemies and instigators of the riot, no Catholic was ever tried or brought to justice—
because the colonial government actually did not have evidence to prosecute them, 
evidence which would not also have incriminated a number of Buddhists. The Buddhists 
understood the colonial government’s inability to bring the Catholics to justice as a 
deliberate neglect against their case. Consequently, the Buddhist Defense Committee, 
which was represented by General Henry Olcott in London, was started. The Buddhist 
flag found its origins after the riot. And, Buddhist nationalism, in its anti-British form, to 
a large extent grew out of the injustice incurred by the Buddhists during the riot. In such 
a situation, it is tough to locate any authority in telegraphic communication. The same 
perplexed relationship between the technology and authority is found in the Oriental 
Bank Corporation’s collapse and the 1877 cholera outbreak. The former case was 
handled without telegraphic communication, except as a device of long range, global 
communication to collect data and information on the market and the bank’s affairs in 
other colonies. But, again, the Governor made his decision without telegraphy. It seems 
as though the Governor did not use the technology purposefully to retain his autonomy 
and his right to independent decision-making. During the cholera outbreak the telegraph 
enabled the colonial authority to persuade the metropolitan government into sanctioning 
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the Matale railroad line; but it was useless in gathering information about cholera or for 
quarantining ships carrying cholera.   
I would argue that given the above analyses, telegraphy was more important in serving 
the interests of the colonial government than it was in actually resolving emergencies. 
The telegraph was used by the Governor to make the colonial government appear that it 
had the Kotahena Riot under control; it was used to negotiate deals globally during the 
bank failure, but when it came time to make a concrete decision about the colony, the 
Governor deliberately excluded the Secretary of State from the situation by not 
telegraphing him. It would be interesting to know what the Secretary of State might have 
replied on the issue of quarantined bank notes and whose interest the Governor was 
actually protecting. Finally, the cholera case describes how telegrams were used to create 
a narrative of distress to serve the colony’s interest of railroad production. Perhaps, we 
might want to rethink what an emergency meant in nineteenth century Ceylon if the 
interest of the government, not health, life, property or environment seemed to matter 
most. 
I conclude with an example, highlighting the precarious relationship between the colonial 
government and its capacity to utilize the telegraph as a means of management and crisis 
suppression. Although the British had a highly sophisticated system of telegraphy, they 
were not the only ones to share its power; as I will show, the telegraph was a public tool 
that was not the sole possession of the colonial government. Indeed, it in many ways 
dissolved the critical fortress of communication power that had been built by letters 
between the natives and the Governor. While it enabled the colonial government to 
conduct its affairs with faster ease, it also provided itself as a divergent mechanism to be 
used by natives as a tool of resistance and negotiation. 
Over the course of three days, from 2l until 23 March 1886, Ceylon’s Post and Telegraph 
Department delivered several urgent telegrams to Governor Hamilton-Gordon at his 
repose in the Queen’s Cottage in Newara Eliya. 508  The telegrams were sent from 
Trincomalee, about 250 kilometers away, by two individuals—a Muslim shop keeper 
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named Mohamed Husain and Akilasapillai, a local Tamil merchant.509 The purpose of 
their messages was twofold. They wrote that they wanted the Governor to protect them 
and the town from the Government Agent of Trincomalee Mr. Reid’s unnecessarily 
violent enforcement of a local municipal ordinance that forbade the use of tats (shop 
awnings). The transmitted telegrams reported Mr. Reid throwing shop produce into the 
streets and brutally assaulting people with horsewhips to enforce the ordinance. The two 
men also sent the telegrams to inform the Governor that “to escape further oppression,” 
all the shop keepers had closed their doors and would not open them until the Governor 
ordered immediate relief. The Governor forwarded the messages with instructions to the 
Colonial Secretary in Colombo: 
Col. Sec: The enclosed telegrams reached me yesterday and today- I am afraid Mr. Reid is not 
unlikely to exercise petty authority vexatiously: the tats, I presume, are the sort of awning which 
native ships usually put up as shelter from sun, but which are, I suppose, in contravention of 
some municipal direction. I think you might telegraph to him. “Complaints made by telegraph of 
some action in cutting down tats of boutiques. Shops said to be closed in consequence. What are 
the facts? Remember forcible action unless absolutely necessary—or something of that sort.510 
The messages, including the one represented here, are evidence that telegraphy provided 
a number of benefits to the Governor in administering his authority and power in the 
colony. Suppose the two men had sent letters instead of telegrams. The distance between 
the two locations, Trincomalee and Newara Eliya, would have made sending timely 
messages about the situation impossible. Perhaps a week would have passed before the 
Governor would become informed of what was happening. Because telegrams were used 
rather than letters, the Governor was able to handle the case in a timely fashion and 
perhaps prevent the situation from worsening. The messages show, then, that the 
Governor possessed a tool that allowed him to communicate his commands quickly, 
even from inside his Newara Eliya mansion; it indicated the implicit power of telegraphy 
as a means of quickly resolving situations and its ostensible utility as a method of control 
and discipline. The present case shows this only at first sight, however. If pursued further, 
the situation becomes more complex. 
                                                            
509 Both men had transmitted two telegrams each, respectively on the 21st and 22nd and on the 21st and 23rd. 
510 Throughout the dissertation, I italicize all telegraphic messages to differentiate them visually from letters.   
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Firstly, let us return to the imagined scenario in which the two men had sent letters, not 
telegrams, to the Governor. To whom would they have addressed their problems? It 
would not have been possible for the two men to address the Governor, the highest 
ranking official on the island, directly by letter. Sending a letter to the Governor would 
have required hierarchical distinction, neither of which the two men had. At best, they 
would have been able to send a letter to the Colonial Secretary who would have 
forwarded the information to the Governor or settled the problem himself. As we have 
seen, though, the opposite occurred; the men telegraphed the Governor directly, who 
then messaged his Secretary, thereby subverting standard formalities of 
communication.511 
Secondly, the messages were not just pleas for help. The merchants’ closure of the shops 
posed a real threat to the welfare of Trincomalee’s European community, whose access 
to provisions was potentially prevented. The two men were, therefore, not merely 
expressing their discontent but also announcing their and their constituents’ resistance to 
the Government Agent’s brutal mistreatment: either as a form of negotiation or, in its 
most radical interpretation, as blackmail. The stores would reopen when Reid was taken 
control of, they commanded. Thus telegraphy had the capacity to empower multiple 
actors, not only the colonial government administration.512 
 
What this example shows us is that while telegraphy could support the colonial 
government in handling potential crises, it could also challenge traditional hierarchical 
practices and even be used by local populations against the colonial state. The 
relationship between telegraphy and colonial government administration was therefore 
                                                            
511  This example was exceptional, however, and does not represent governmental telegraphic communications 
as a whole. It is probable too that the two men personally knew the Governor. Trincomalee was the site of very 
wealthy merchants and businessmen in the nineteenth century, and these men may have had ties to the government; 
their employment of English may also indicate a high social status.  
512   As far as I can tell, this case does not appear in any other records. There are no indications of it in local or 
European newspapers, no mention of it by the Governor in official correspondence with the Secretary of State, and 
the SLNA does not include it in its index. Therefore, its resolution is unknown. The only indication of the 
Governor’s intervention was Mr. Reid’s subsequent promotion and relocation to the south coast. According to the 
Ceylon Civil List of 1887, in January 1887 Mr. Reid became Assistant at Hambantota to the Government Agent for 
the Southern Province, and Commissioner of Requests and Police Magistrate, Hambantota. 512 However, it cannot 
be proven that his move was linked to his behavior in Trincomalee.  George J.A. Skeen, The Ceylon Civil List, corrected 
to January 1, 1887: Showing the Names and Designations of the Civil, Military, and Other Servants of Government (Colombo: 
Government Printer, 1887), 31–32. 
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ordered by a series of issues ranging from access to the medium to the practical and 
symbolic meanings and values of telegrams. Telegraphy helped and hindered; was used 
and avoided; and was a weapon of the state and the population. But it did not always 
follow this dichotomy. Telegraphy complicated power and it did not signal a completely 
faster approach to communication on the island, rendering the colonial government 
faster, stronger, and more likely to endure hardship. As this final example emphasizes, it 
also disempowered colonial government and empowered those under its command.  
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CONCLUSION TO DISSERTATION 
 
In this dissertation, I analyzed the role of telegrams in Ceylon’s nineteenth-century 
colonial government administration and assessed their impact on the relationship of 
power between and within the central government and the colony. In chapter two, I 
examined the material history of the telegraph in Ceylon to determine its intellectual and 
political roots, and in the following two chapters I assessed the role of telegraphy in 
administrative practices by comparing its function to that of letters and other postal 
materials. In chapter three, I looked at the function of telegrams as a medium of 
communication between the Governor and the Secretary of State. In chapter four, I 
evaluated the role of telegrams in three cases of crises that took place in Ceylon during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. The main question which I asked my sources 
as I worked through these chapters and cases was not only in what ways but also to 
which extent the introduction and adaptation of the telegraph in Ceylon’s colonial 
government impacted on or changed established modes of communication. This 
question was founded on the fact that the telegraph could communicate between the 
colony and London in as little as four hours, while the letter took approximately one 
month to traverse the same distance; faster communication via telegraphy implied faster 
government administration, greater authoritative oversight given to the Secretary of State 
for the Colony, and less autonomous powers exercised by the rank of the Governor 
General and his subordinates. Hitherto mediated primarily by postal letters, the uncanny 
speed of telegraphy signaled a break from traditional communication practices which 
would bring deep changes within the structure of colonial government power.  
 
This view, which has been the dominant one among historians of telegraphy, implied that 
revolutions in communication technology, rendered revolutions in cultural and 
institutional practices and realities. I wanted to determine if this was plausible in light of 
scientific evidence.  
 
According to my work in chapters two, three, and four, I found that the telegraph indeed 
played a significant role in colonial government communication, offering the colonial 
government dynamic and unprecedented ways to communicate and share information. In 
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chapter three in particular, I outlined multiple examples of telegraphy’s exceptional utility, 
including its capacity to embed the colonial government structure of power into a shared 
sense of time. In chapter four, I showed the ways in which telegrams were used to 
mediate and relieve the problems associated with crises.  
 
But, the conclusions I reached in asking the abovementioned question were negative. 
Despite telegraphy’s benefits and impressive speediness, the technology did not alter the 
practices of colonial government administration, as indicated by conventional thought 
among historians; nor did it transform government principles, at least not to the extent 
that had been expected. Changes in the structures of government power were nuanced, 
and the telegram’s role was limited. Despite its faster speed and implicit benefits, 
telegraphic communication did not enact widespread changes and did not become the 
key form of correspondence in Ceylon’s nineteenth-century colonial administration. Even 
in the case of crisis management, where one might expect that faster communication 
would be important to the imperial regime, the telegram was rarely incorporated except 
when the interests of the Governor or financial institutions were at risk.  
 
As I showed in chapters two through four, there were several forces which limited the 
capacity of telegraphic communication. Firstly, telegrams could not provide the same 
level of informational quality as letters. Letters were broad and analytical compositions, 
written with in-depth information and insight. Telegrams gave a fraction of what a letter 
could in terms of words and roundness of argumentation. Secondly, the technology’s 
language was not especially appropriate for official contexts. Telegrams were typically 
written without proper addresses and closings, and they tended to be short and 
grammatically incorrect. As such, telegrams insufficiently mediated the exchange between 
hierarchically distinct Agents of the Crown, of which official language and titles were 
crucial components. In contrast, letter writers went to great lengths to ensure a letter was 
grammatically error-free and formally addressed hierarchical ranks. Thirdly, telegrams 
were difficult to integrate into the Colonial Office’s system of administration because of 
practical concerns. For instance, their material composition, telegram paper, was not 
suitable for the Office’s particular practices of bureaucracy and documentation standards. 
One could argue that letters were, in fact, intrinsic to the Colonial Office system, a 
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bureaucracy that was based on elaborate referencing, commentary, and record keeping, 
which their sturdy and well-margined parchment enabled, leaving little room for the 
divergent materiality of telegrams.  
 
Non-discursive factors also limited telegraphic communication in colonial government. 
Ceylon’s nineteenth-century telegraph network was not located in cities, a factor which 
precluded its adoption by police and military forces in a rapidly urbanizing colony. Its 
connection to colonial power was thus limited by virtue of its limited connectivity to the 
colony’s armed forces. This problem was clearly realized during the 1883 Kotahena Riot, 
where the police had no access to telegraphy and a horse messenger had to be deployed 
to call for backup. Furthermore, as revealed in chapter two, the network was installed for 
commercial purposes; its adaptation into colonial government administration was 
therefore a byproduct of capitalist expansion, not a predetermination to improve 
government communications; its use in colonial government was therefore determined 
by its primary role in commerce. The network was shaped to benefit commerce, not 
government. It was such functional differences between letters and telegrams as well as 
the socio-economic circumstances described that structured the colonial government’s 
incorporation of the technology and ultimately defined its role in the British Empire.  
 
However, underlying these limitations I believe there remains one more significant factor. 
Namely, the telegram mediated choices and practices, it did not enforce them. The option to 
use the telegram was determined by rational individuals making rational decisions. Thus, 
behind every choice to use or not to use the telegraph was a reason that ultimately began 
and ended with an individual. This was clearly shown in chapter four. Despite the 
urgency of the crises, the majority of communication was made via letter, except in the 
case of the banking crisis. As analyzed, there were specific strategic reasons for using 
telegraphy and letters that went beyond mere technological capacity, or even the situation 
itself, but were determined by the desires and rationale of the individual users and their 
personal objectives. The Governor’s clearly intentional avoidance of telegraphy during 
the banking crisis of 1884 is a prime example.        
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So what does this all say about telegrams in Ceylon’s colonial government administration? 
In the introduction, I postulated that we must assume that telegraphy’s function was not 
only revolutionary; that we should test to see if it had other functions as well. I delineated 
three: that it had no effect, supplemented, or paralleled letters. My concluding response 
to this assumption is affirmative. It is definitely the case that in order to understand 
telegraphy in colonial government administration, one must realize that its consequences 
were not total, but more nuanced, that it did not merely replace current systems and 
revolutionize internal constructs of power. Rather, it became part of them. Its formations 
and utility was both predetermined and over-determined; it was affected by the system in 
which it was embedded, and once installed it interacted with letters and joined them to 
produce a novel system. Once integrated into the bureaucracy, the telegram operated in 
tandem with the letter, forming a collective enterprise within a web of technologies and 
practices. In other words, the telegram did not replace the letter but became one part of a 
network of forces, creating their own self-perpetuating dynamic. Furthermore, the very 
system which we are assuming telegraphy to have changed was itself not absolute. It 
included the Colonial Office, numerous technologies such as steam ships and canals, and 
a very complex governmental structures and hierarchy. So, when we ask whether the 
telegraph transformed the system, we must also ask “what system?” and examine 
carefully the many parts within it. Its impact on “the system” was thus inherently diffuse 
and varied accordingly. It had multiple consequences, but none of which were permanent 
or revolutionary.  
 
All three possibilities I underlined had some critical bearing, but the second one—that 
the telegraph supplemented letters—was most plausible and apparent. There is evidence 
to suggest that the telegraph had no affect on colonial government administration.  
 
Less than one eighth of official correspondence was mediated by telegrams, and if one 
takes into consideration the fact of telegram receipts, described in chapter three, the 
extent of telegraphy’s impact and role becomes eclipsed almost totally by letters. There 
were also some but very few cases that showed the telegraph to parallel letters, that is, 
work in separate, non-corresponding domains. I assume that one area in particular had 
become a critical territory of the telegram, possibly its sole territory—and that was 
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requests for leave of absence. I have ascertained this observation based on contemporary 
and current evidence. The majority of the requests for leaves of absence were made by 
telegram, particularly toward the end of the century. And, the practice of requesting a 
leave of absence is still done mandatorily by telegram in Sri Lanka today. However, I have 
not been able to deduce any other field of correspondence that was totally communicated 
via telegram. The majority of telegrams, in fact, shared purposes and topics with letters, 
bringing me to my main idea: telegraphy primarily functioned as a supplement to letters. 
The majority of telegrams functioned on a meta-level, including organizing the relay of 
mail and pointing out errors located in lettered correspondence. They were also about 
remedying the shortcomings of letters. When information needed to be sent quickly; 
when time was of the essence; when a Governor had to highlight the symbolic 
significance of situations; where the possibilities and strengths of the letter ended—so 
began the telegram. At the same time, the letter supplemented the telegram. When speed 
was not enough, when hesitation and deliberation and hierarchy were the necessary steps, 
then the letter reigned. The telegram provided the colonial administration with a way to 
communicate that was not possible via letter, just as the letter provided a way to 
communicate that was not possible with telegrams. The telegram was thus a purposeful 
medium of correspondence whose chances of success in the colonial administration were 
buoyed by its partnership with the letter. It supplemented the letter, in a conjoined effort, 
as a powerful mutual enterprise.  
 
Thus, to reiterate my hypothesis and what I have deduced in my assessment of the 
sources, the telegraph was not a revolutionary instrument, but its effects and roles were 
nuanced and diverse. The telegraph did not transform the system but become part of it, 
providing new and alternative measures to communication that supplemented and, to a 
lesser extent, paralleled the letter.  
 
The notion shared by many historians that the telegraph revolutionized posteriori systems 
of control is, therefore, unjustifiable. It neither turned the Secretary of State into a 
panoptical power, nor did it transform the Governor into a state puppet. This is proven 
not only by the telegram’s limited role in government, but also because the same 
relationship of power that had been exercised before the telegraph was in practice after it 
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was installed. Indeed, the Governor’s legal rights to autonomous actions were not 
rebuked and nor were concessions made to tailor the system of power to the new 
medium. The Colonial Office List of both 1867 and 1878 grant the Governor the right to 
autonomous action and to report his actions after he had executed them. This is 
significant because it shows that the telegraph did not revolutionize the legal structures of 
power, instead setting in writing a blockade against the chance of that happening. While 
the Secretary of State expected the Governor to telegraph him if necessary, he was not 
meant to do so for every occasion; nor was he to ask for permission via telegraph; nor 
was the Secretary of State meant to dictate the Governor’s actions by the technology. The 
telegraph did not install an a priori system of control, but rather instilled new forms of 
communication into the same structure. For the history of telegraphy, this is a significant 
finding as it challenges the hitherto idea that telegraphy equaled power and that faster 
prevailed over tradition in the realm of colonial power. It begs to question, therefore, 
what else could be learned about past technologies if, rather than assuming their 
dominance and technological determinism, we examined how they were used in cultural 
practice, in everyday use, and in the context of other technologies.   
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APPENDIX 
 
(1) CO 54/546, 2 APRIL 1883. 
 
  “My Lord, With reference to my telegram of the 28th march reporting the 
riot of the 25th, I have the honour to state that legal proceedings are being taken 
against some of the rioters the results of which shall be reported when they are 
concluded….. 
2—. I visited the Colombo Hospital last Wednesday and saw the men who had 
been admitted after the Riot, and I learnt from Dr. Kynsey that there had been 
no more deaths among them, but all were in a fair way to recovery.  
 3—. The proximate cause which led to the riot was the jealousy of the 
Roman Catholics, fanned into a flame by rumours spread (whether designedly or 
not ascertained) that the Buddhists were carrying in a procession images or 
pictures in ridicule of Christianity.  The Buddhists of Colombo have just 
completed the building of a new temple which is said to have been begun fifty 
years ago. Like all Buddhist temples this contains a statue of the Buddha, and the 
closing ceremony of the construction was to be celebrated in the Buddhist 
manner of painting the eyes of the statue. This ceremony which may be 
compared in some respects to the consecration of a church in Europe is usually 
accompanied by Peraheras or processions from the country round varying 
according to the sanctity or otherwise of the new Temple. In the present case the 
new temple was widely known, and many Buddhists were prepared to go there in 
procession offering gifts. The ceremony of opening the eyes (as it is called) is 
usually performed on the day of the full moon, and the High Priests fixed on the 
full moon which, according to the Sinhalese reckoning, fell on the 23rd of march 
for their ceremony.  
4—. To make clear what followed I must notice that the Roman Catholics 
commenced in 1870 to build a large and commodious stone cathedral dedicated 
to Saint Lucia, in the vicinity of the new Buddhist Temple. The cathedral is not 
yet finished, but the nave is far completed as to be opened for public worship. 
There has naturally been much jealousy between the adherents of the two 
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religions, thus brought into immediate contact with each other; but the Roman 
Catholic Bishop, Monsignor Paynani, has lived many years in Ceylon on friendly 
terms with the Buddhists and I had no reason to believe that he would, nor do I 
believe that he did, either encourage or allow the furious opposition to the 
Buddhists which led to the recent riot.  
5.—The day of the full moon which the Buddhist priests selected for 
their ceremony happened to be in the Christian Calendar Good Friday, and the 
Inspector General of Police apprehended that the formation of the procession 
on that day (which must necessarily pass close to Saint Lucia’s Cathedral) would 
be offensive to the Catholics, and lead to disturbances. It was therefore arranged 
by the Inspector General, after some difficulty, that the Buddhist ceremony 
should be postponed until after the Roman Catholic service on the morning of 
the 25th, i.e. Easter Sunday. Major Tranchell the acting Inspector General went 
himself to see the Roman Catholic Bishop and the Bishop said he had no 
objection to it in the afternoon provided that nothing insulting to the Christian 
religion was carried in the procession. Accordingly the procession was allowed to 
take place but when passing the cathedral it was violently assaulted by thousands 
of Roman Catholics with sticks, stones, and brick bats. The police some lightly in 
number being only armed with batons were overpowered and it was necessary to 
call for military aid, which the magistrate promptly did, before order could be 
restored.  
6—.It was evident that in the excited state of the people any attempts to 
renew the processions would lead to a renewal of the fight, and therefore the 
permits which had been already given by the police for processions on the day 
following were recalled and the processions, which notwithstanding were formed, 
were stopped by the police from entering the town. 
7—.For the present I have thought it necessary to forbid all processions 
in Colombo, but this is only temporary, and it will be necessary to allow the 
Buddhists to have their procession to make the accustomed offerings as soon as 
can safely be done.  
8—. It is manifest from the reports I have received that the Roman 
Catholics were the aggressors in the riot. The Buddhists were conducting their 
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Perahera peacefully enough when they were furiously attacked by the Roman 
Catholics collected near their Cathedral, and though when attacked they 
retaliated the blame of the first commencement of the riot must be laid on the 
Catholics. On the other hand, it is first to the Catholics to say that stories were 
spread of insults to their religion by the Buddhists, and it is fair to believe that 
they were to some extent influenced by those stories. That the stories were false 
was ascertained by the Inspector General, who deputed a Roman Catholic 
Superintendent of Police to examine the various banners and shrines exhibited in 
the Perahera, and he passed them as unobjectionable.  
9—. I have made this report from the letters chiefly of the Acting 
Inspector General of Police and with other information as I could avail myself of, 
but I intend to appoint today a Commission to enquire into the origin of the 
disturbances, as that will hardly be investigated in the legal proceedings with 
sufficient fullness.  
10—. It is my duty to bring under your lordship’s notice the valuable 
services rendered in this affair by the Garrison of Colombo under the command 
of Lieutenant Colonel Stickley R.E. in the temporary absence of Lieutenant 
Colonel Duncan of the (102nd) Royal Dublin Fusiliers, both on Sunday the 25th 
and Monday the 26th. My special thanks are due to the Brigade Major, Major 
Currie, and to Captain Mills of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers in command of the 
troops employed. To these officers and to the admirable discipline of the soldiers, 
their constancy and patience under the trying circumstances of the Riot, it is 
owing that the disturbances were suppressed without the use of firearms and 
with the result of only one death; and that one not at the hands of the military 
but in the Riot. In fact, no one was injured by the soldiers; all the injuries on 
those who were received into the hospital being from blows with sticks or by 
stones.  
11—.The latest reports today appear to show that all is quiet. 
I have the honor to be My Lord, Your Lordship’s obedient humble servant, Arthur 
Gordon.” 
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(2) SLNA 6/8127, 5 MAY 1886. 
 
 “May it please your majesty as executive president of the royal commission 
appointed by your majesty’s royal warrant of the 8th of November, 1884, for the 
promotion of an exhibition of the “British, Colonial, and Indian Empire”, subsequently 
incorporated by Her Majesty’s Royal Charter of the 10th September, 1885. I humbly beg 
leave to lay before you a brief statement of our proceedings up to the present time.  
The general interest manifested on the display made by Your Majesty’s Colonial 
and Indian Empire at the Paris Exhibition of 1878 led me, as President of the British 
Commission, to express a hope that as opportunity might soon occur by which Your 
Majesty’s subjects in England would be enabled to witness the marvelous development 
which, under your beneficent rule, their brethren and fellow subjects had attained 
throughout so many portions of the globe. It was, therefore, with the highest gratification 
that I accepted Your Majesty’s gracious invitation to assume the Executive Presidency of 
this Commission, the appointment if which by Your Majesty has been the means of 
making this hope a reality.  
The invitation which we were empowered by Your Majesty to issue to the 
Colonial Government and to the Government of India were forwarded towards the close 
of the year 1884 and from the answer received it at once became apparent that this 
undertaking had obtained warm and hearty sympathy throughout Your  Majesty’s 
dominions.  
In Your Majesty’s dominion of Canada, throughout you Australian, African, West 
Indian and Eastern colonies, in your Mediterranean possessions, and elsewhere, grants 
were voted, commissions formed, and Executive Commissioners appointed. That the 
work of preparation was undertaken with enthusiasm and attended with success is 
evident from the complete and varied collections which at present fill the buildings 
through which your Majesty has just passed. 
The response received from the Government of India was also of the most cordial 
character. His Excellency the Viceroy caused, throughout the revenue and agricultural 
department, instructions to be issued to every district of Your Majesty’s Indian Empire 
for the collection of objects illustrative of the arts, manufactures, and resources of the 
great realm.  
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These collections, which now adorn a large section of the exhibition, have been 
supplemented by generous contributions from Her Highness the Princess of India, by 
collection the formation of which we ourselves have authorized, and beg the 
construction of private native exhibitors.  
We are desirous of bringing under Your Majesty’s notice our deep appreciation of the 
hearty cooperation of the Colonial Governments in this exhibition, and of taking this 
exceptional opportunity of stating how greatly we are indebted to the commissioners 
appointed by these Government, and to the Executive Commissioners on whom the 
superintendence of the entire work of installation has devolved.  
We further desire to record the valuable assistance which we have received from 
Your Majesty’s Viceroy, from the Supreme Government of India, and from the various 
officials which have so ably carried out their instructions. Our grateful thanks are also 
due to the Colonial governments, to the Government of India, to the corporation of the 
City of London, to many City Companies, and to the firms and individuals who have 
contributed to the Quarantine Funds.  
The fact that the list of subscribers not only includes those whose interests are 
likely to be specially affected by the Exhibition, but also comprehends every class of the 
community, supplies gratifying proof of the universal sympathy and interest which this 
undertaking has aroused.  
We venture to avail ourselves of this opportunity to convey to Your Majesty our 
dutiful and loyal acknowledgment of the interest which Your Majesty has been pleased to 
take in our labors, provided as it is by Your Majesty’s presence here today, nor can I 
resist a reference to a similar presided over by Your Majesty, but a few paces from this 
shot, thirty five years ago. On that memorable occasion, the first of its kind, the Prince 
Consort, my beloved and revered father, filled the position which I, following in his 
footsteps, at however great a distance, now have the honor and gratification of occupying. 
Your Majesty alone can fully realize with what deep interest my beloved father would, 
had he been spared, have watched, as their originators, the development of the 
exhibitions both in this country and abroad, and with what especial pleasure he would 
have welcomed one having for its object the prosperity of Your Majesty’s Empire, the 
interests of which he had so much at heart. In the Great Exhibition of 1851Your 
Majesty’s Colonial and Indian possessions were indeed represented1m but their 
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importance was then but little realized, and their present greatness was at that time 
unforeseen. During the years that have elapsed since 1851, few greater changes have been 
wrought than the marvelous development of the outlying portions of Your Majesty’s 
Empire. It is our heartfelt prayer than an undertaking intended to illustrate and to record 
this development may give a stimulus to the commercial interests and intercourse of all 
parts of Your Majesty’s domination, that it may be the means of augmenting that warm 
affection, and brotherly sympathy which is reciprocated by all Your Majesty’s Subjects, 
and that it may still further deepen that steadfast loyalty which we, who dwell in the 
Mother Country share with you kindred who have elsewhere so nobly done honor to her 
name. I receive with the greatest satisfaction the address which you have presented to me 
on the opening of this Exhibition. I have observed with a warm and increasing interest 
the progress of your proceedings in the execution of the duties entrusted to you by the 
Royal Commission and it affords me sincere gratification to witness the successful result 
of your judicious and unremitting exertions of the magnificent Exhibition which has been 
gathered together here today. I am deeply moved by your reference to the circumstances 
in which the ceremony of 1851 took place, and I heartily concur in the belief you have 
expressed, that the Prince Consort, my beloved husband, had he been spared, would have 
witnessed with intense interest the development of his ideas, and would, I may add, have 
seen with pleasure our son taking the lead in the movement of which he was the 
originator. I cordially concur with you that this undertaking may be the means of 
imparting a stimulus to the commercial interest and intercourse of all parts of my 
Dominion, by encouraging the arts of peace and industry, and by strengthening the 
bonds of union which now exists in every portion of my Empire. Ode on the opening of 
the Colonial and Indian Exhibition by Lord Jennyson, Poet Laureate welcome with one 
voice! In your welfare we rejoice. Sons and brothers that have sent from Isle and Cape 
and Continent produce of your field and blood, mount and mine and primal wood, 
works of subtle brain and hand, spleandors of the morning land, gifts from every British 
zone, Britons hold your own! May we fin d as ages run the mother featured in the son, 
and may yours forever be that old strength and constancy which has made your father 
great in out ancient island state, and wherever her flag may fly, glorying between sea and 
sky, makes the might of Britain known Britons, hold your own! Britain fought her sons 
of yore, Britian coiled and never more, careless of our growing kin, shall we sin our 
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father’s sin, men that in a narrower day unprophetic rulers they drove from out the 
mother’s nest, that young eagle of the west, to forage for herself alone, Britons, hold your 
own! Sharers of our glorious past, brothers, must we part at last? Shall not we, through 
good and ill, cleave to one another still? Britain’s myriad voices call Sons be welded, each 
and all, into one Imperial Whole, one with Britain heart and soul, one life, one flag, one 
fleet, one throne. Britons hold your own, and God guard all!” 
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